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Abstract  
This dissertation identified a gap in research for an intelligent monitoring system 
to monitor various indicators within complex engineering industries, in order to 
predict the potential situations that may lead to catastrophic failures.  The 
accuracy of prediction was based upon lessons learnt from historic catastrophic 
incidents.  These incidents are normally attributed to combinations of several 
minor errors or failures, and seldom occur through single point failures.  The 
new system to monitor, identify and predict the conditions likely to cause a 
catastrophic failure could improve safety, reduce down time and prioritise 
funding.  
This novel approach involved the classification of ten common traits that are 
known to lead to catastrophe, based on six headings used by the Health and 
Safety Executive and four headings used in Engineering Governance.  These 
were weight averaged to provide a ‘state’ condition for each asset, and 
amalgamated with a qualitative fault tree representation of a known 
catastrophic failure type.   The information on current ‘state’ was plotted onto a 
coloured 2D surface graph over a period of time to demonstrate one particular 
visual tool.  The research demonstrated that it was possible to create the 
monitoring system within Microsoft Excel and to run Visual Basic programs 
alongside Boolean logic calculations for the fault tree and the predictive tools, 
based upon the trend analysis of historic data.  Another significant research 
success was the development of a standardised approach to the investigation of 
incidents and the dissemination of information. 
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1 Introduction 
This research requirement arose from an investigation of engineering 
governance, document hierarchies and monitoring systems (Painting, 2008).  
This work highlighted several possible areas to investigate further, specifically 
the design and use of an intelligent monitoring system based upon the 
measurement of common traits associated with catastrophic incidents.  Even 
though these major disasters were associated with high risk operations, such as 
the petrochemical industry, the principle of monitoring common traits would be 
applicable to all engineering industries, including BAE Systems Maritime Services 
Engineering. 
………..Even though modern engineering industries are multifaceted 
organisations, consisting of ultramodern equipment, intricate processes and 
highly skilled employees, they are all still susceptible to catastrophic failures… 
(Painting, 2008) 
This chapter comprises of five sub-headings to introduce and explain the process 
employed in the development of this thesis, these were: 
 Claims of Originality. 
 Systems Created During the Research. 
 Thesis objectives. 
 Thesis Objectives and Results. 
 Thesis Conclusions and Recommendations. 
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1.1 Claims of Originality 
The thesis identified a gap in the current field of research and resulted in the 
following novel contributions that will advance the field of disaster prevention: 
 The predication of potential situations that may lead to catastrophe. 
 A new classification of common traits that lead to catastrophe. 
 Grouped traits under headings based on those used by the Health and 
Safety Executive (HSE) and four other Engineering Governance headings. 
 Created a standardised approach to the investigation of catastrophes. 
 Identified a novel way to amalgamate trait information with a qualitative 
fault tree to provide a known current ‘state’.  
 Created a new way of presenting trait issues using 2D surface plots and 
dashboards. 
1.2 Systems created during the research 
The thesis led to the creation of several systems to demonstrate that an 
intelligent monitoring system was indeed possible, these systems were: 
 A Dashboard and surface graph plot that represented trait conditions in a 
format that was both efficient and ergonomic. 
 An Excel based monitoring system that represented the ten trait levels 
when combined into a single weighted ‘state’. 
  
 
3 
 An intelligent monitoring system through representation of a weighted 
sum of all ten traits overlaid on a qualitative fault tree developed for a 
specific catastrophic event. 
 A predictive system that overlaid the trend analysis of historic data to 
predict the probable future condition of trait ‘state’ onto a fault tree. 
 A demonstration of standardisation in terminology used for disaster 
investigation and reporting, that would efficiently disseminated accurate 
feedback throughout engineering industry. 
1.3 Thesis Approach and Results 
The approach used in the development of this thesis involved several individual 
steps under three main research headings: 
 Common Traits. 
 Intelligent Monitoring. 
 Predictive Capability. 
Each of these research headings had several steps that were researched in 
separate chapters within this Thesis [see Figure 1.1 – steps grouped in boxes 
with identified relevant chapters]. 
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Figure 1.1 – Research Headings and Subgroups 
Common Traits 
There were four main steps under the common traits research heading that 
were covered in chapters 3, 4 and 5, these steps were: 
 The identification of ten suitable catastrophic incidents that had enough 
information to support the research and investigations into the root 
causes [see Chapter 3].   
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 The detailed research of the ten catastrophic incidents and the 
identification of the many root causes that led to each disaster [see 
Chapter 3].   
 The investigation of the root causes associated with the ten catastrophic 
incidents and the classification of twenty-one common traits, that when 
occurring in various combinations were the cause of each disaster [see 
Chapter 4].    
 The twenty-one traits were compared with the findings from the Health 
and Safety Executive (HSE) research into thirty-six UK and International 
incident case studies (HSE, 2004), and regrouped under ten trait headings 
based upon six headings used by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) in 
their publication ‘HSG 254 – Developing Process Safety Indicators’ (HSE, 
2006), and four general Engineering Governance headings that covered 
the remaining traits [see Chapter 5].   
Intelligent Monitoring 
There were four main steps under the intelligent monitoring research heading 
that were covered in chapters 6 and 7: 
 The investigation into Root Cause Analysis (RCA) tools and techniques 
identified five good approaches that could determine the combinations of 
events that cause catastrophic incidents [see Chapter 6], these were:  
 Events and Causal Factors. 
 Why-Why Chart. 
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 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). 
 Failure Mode Effects [and Criticality] Analysis (FME[C]A). 
 Reality Charting.  
 The five RCA techniques were compared to determine the most 
appropriate method to identify all the events and sub-events that could 
lead to a catastrophe [see Chapter 6].  
 The findings of the RCA technique comparison and the results of the 
common trait identification were used to develop a prototype monitoring 
system for a specific high risk area within Portsmouth Naval Base (PNB). 
The boundary for this test area included a large Dock and the surrounding 
infrastructure that directly supported it [see Chapter 7]. 
 The prototype monitoring system was tested using a test scenario covering 
several deteriorating trait conditions over a ten week period [see Chapter 
7].   
Predictive Capability 
In order to provide advanced warning of impending disaster the ability to 
forecast traits states was investigated under the predictive capability research 
heading.  This consisted of three main steps covered in chapter 8: 
 The investigation into predictive techniques to provide timely and accurate 
trend analysis of historic trait data identified three predictive tools and 
techniques that could predict potential warning levels [see Chapter 8], 
these were: 
  
 
7 
o Simple straight line trend analysis and graphical representation. 
o Visual Basic (VB) programing in an Excel database. 
o Linear Regression and Neural Networks using Polyanalyst data-
mining software. 
 The testing and evaluation of predictive techniques using various test 
criteria discovered that the techniques provided a range of results that 
were proportional to the complexity and cost of design and development 
[see Chapter 8]. 
 The determination of the most appropriate predictive technique for use 
within PNB, based upon the simplicity and cost of build, as well as the 
speed and accuracy of results.  This resulted in the use of neural networks 
as the most accurate program to determine future states, but with the 
disadvantage of being the most costly and resource demanding solution 
[see Chapter 8].   
1.4 Thesis Conclusions and Recommendations 
The reports and findings from ten catastrophic incident investigations identified 
several issues, that when occurring concurrently caused each disaster. Each 
investigating body had their own guidelines and reported as such, although 
there was no evidence of a standard approach employed by each investigating 
body.  This identified the requirement to standardise the investigation approach 
and the method for effectively reporting these results.  A standardised approach 
would provide the ability to compare investigations across multiple engineering 
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industries, and allow legislation, get well programs and initiatives to be easily 
disseminated and understood across these industries. 
There were four recommendations for further work, these were: 
 The development of a full working system, covering all engineering aspects 
within the Portsmouth Naval Base (PNB) operations area. 
 The assessment and development of an automatic data capture facility for 
the ten trait headings.  
 The continued research into the various data mining techniques, and to 
identify the most cost effective and efficient tool for use within PNB. 
 The research and development of three dimensional [3D] models to depict 
the current and possible future condition of all assets and infrastructure 
within PNB. 
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2 Literature Review 
The literature referenced in this dissertation has been categorised under the 
following six main headings: 
 Catastrophic incidents. 
 Leading indicators (common traits). 
 Root Cause Identification. 
 Monitoring systems. 
 Intelligent monitoring systems. 
 Predictive capability. 
Ten well-known and well publicised catastrophic incidents were chosen and 
investigated in depth.  Out of the ten disasters, five were directly associated 
with high risk operations such as the petrochemical industry and the remainder 
were associated with the aircraft, chemical, nuclear, rail and space industries, 
since the principle of monitoring common traits should be applicable to any 
engineering industry.  The ten disasters were researched in-depth in Chapter 3.  
2.1 Catastrophic incidents 
The terms ‘catastrophe’ and ‘disaster’ are interchangeable within this 
dissertation, with a ‘catastrophic incident’ equating to a ‘disaster’.  The origin of 
‘catastrophe’ was from the Greek katastrophē: overturning, and ‘disaster’ from 
the 16th Century Italian disastro: unlucky event (Oxford University Press, 2006). 
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There were a number of well documented investigations into catastrophic 
incidents carried out by institutions and government bodies such as the United 
Kingdom’s Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and the United States Chemical 
Safety Board (CSB).  These provided a wealth of information on the ten disasters 
chosen to represent the breadth of engineering industry and were referenced as 
part of the initial research [see Chapter 3] and the identification of common 
traits [see Chapter 4].  Chapter 3 defines the referenced documents associated 
with the ten catastrophic incidents that were chosen to represent a cross section 
of engineering industry.  
2.2 Leading Indicators (Common Traits) 
In both personal and process safety lag indicators are those that have occurred 
such as incidents, accidents and failures.  Whist lead indicators are measures of 
performance within and around a system that would identify whether the 
system is functioning correctly and therefor prevent the incidents from 
occurring (Hopkins, 2009). 
The literature research set out to capture the information that in hindsight 
should have warned of the disaster, and the associated lead indicators.  Whilst 
there was no evidence of investigations that specifically identified any common 
traits associated with disasters in general, the reports and papers identified the 
many and varied reasons why each incident occurred, although none of the 
disasters could be directly linked to a single specific act or failure.   
An investigation undertaken by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) 
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considered several disasters in the formulation of a list of root causes (HSE, 
2004), and identified several specific traits associated with a range of 
catastrophic incidents. 
The ‘Correlating process safety leading indicators with performance’ paper 
(Forest & Kessler, 2013) used Six Sigma methodologies to map and identify 
leading indicators and the correlation between these and the incident occurring.  
The Six Sigma methodology defines, measures, analyses, improves and controls 
the processes employed within an Industry/business.  
The lead and lag indicators associated with the refining and petrochemical 
industries were discussed in the American Petroleum Institute (API) 
Recommended Practice (RP) ‘Process Safety Performance Indicators for the 
Refining and Petrochemical Industries – ANSI/API RP 754’ (American Petroleum 
Institute, 2010).  This document provided an insight into the types of safety 
performance issues that lead to major accidents. 
A critical examination of the distinction between lead and lag indicators was 
undertaken to specify the differences, how they might each be applied, and for 
what reason (Hopkins, 2009).  This paper discussed the differences between 
process safety and personal safety, and the fact that lead ‘personal safety’ 
indicators are not always a precursor to lag ‘process safety’ indicators.  
There were a number of papers that discussed the use of quantitative risk 
analysis (QRA) in the development of safety indicators, based on failure 
frequencies within similar industries (Skogdalen & Vinnem, 2012), safety 
indicators identified by a Norwegian risk level project relevant for early warnings 
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(Skogdalen, Utne, & Vinnem, 2011), and the combination of QRA with 
information from a precursor incident, such as lessons learned from an incident 
having already occurred within the system or industry, to form Quantitative Risk 
Analysis Precursor Incident Information (QRA PII) (Skogdalen & Vinnem, 2012).  
The definitions of lead and lag indicators and the causal relationship between 
the two were identified in the paper ‘The causal relation between lead and lag 
indicators’ (Dyreborg, 2009).  This provided useful examples of effective 
indicators.  Overall the eight referenced documents [see Figure 2.1] provided 
valuable information on the definition of common traits.  
Subject Referenced Documents Reference 
Leading 
indicators 
(common 
traits) 
Case Studies (HSE, 2004) 
Correlating process safety leading indicators with 
performance 
(Forest & Kessler, 2013) 
Process Safety Performance Indicators for the 
Refining and Petrochemical Industries 
(American Petroleum Institute, 
2010) 
Thinking About Process Safety Indicators (Hopkins, 2009) 
Developing safety indicators for preventing offshore 
oil and gas deepwater drilling blowouts 
(Skogdalen, Utne, & Vinnem, 2011) 
Combining precursor incidents investigations and 
QRA in oil and gas industry 
(Skogdalen & Vinnem, 2012) 
The causal relation between lead and lag indicators (Dyreborg, 2009) 
Quantitative risk analysis of oil and gas drilling, 
using Deepwater Horizon as case study 
(Skogdalen & Vinnem, 2012) 
Figure 2.1 – Publications Associated with Lead and Lag Indicators 
2.3 Root Cause Identification 
In order to identify the possible root causes associated with a disaster, there 
were a number of different techniques that could be used to determine the 
order of events necessary for a disaster to occur, including Failure Mode Effects 
Analysis (FMEA) (NASA, 2012), multiple criteria decision making processes 
(Davidson & Labib, 2003), and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) (Ericson C. , 1999).   
There were specific indicator types, designed explicitly for high risk 
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organisations, referenced in the Health and Safety Guidance document (HSG) 
254, (HSE, 2006), and the American Petroleum Institute (API) Recommended 
Practice (RP) ‘Process Safety Performance Indicators for the Refining and 
Petrochemical Industries – ANSI/API RP 754’ (American Petroleum Institute, 
2010).  
The literature research identified seven publications [see Figure 2.2] that 
provided an insight into techniques, their application and the advantages of 
using one technique over all others.  There were also a number of self-help 
books aimed at senior management and safety professionals alike that dealt 
with the identification and reduction of root causes associated with catastrophic 
incidents (Maguire, 2006) (Reason, 1997).   
Subject Referenced Documents Reference 
Methods to 
predict 
catastrophic 
incidents  
Safety Cases and Safety Reports - Meaning, 
Motivation and Management 
(Maguire, Safety Cases and Safety 
Reports - Meaning, Motivation and 
Management, 2006) 
Managing the Risks of Organisational Accidents (Reason, 1997) 
Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis 
(FMECA) 
(NASA, 2012) 
Learning from failures: design improvements using 
a multiple criteria decision making process 
(Davidson & Labib, 2003) 
Fault Tree Analysis - A History (Ericson C. , 1999) 
HSG 254 Developing Process Safety Indicators (HSE, 2006) 
Process Safety Performance Indicators for the 
Refining and Petrochemical Industries 
(American Petroleum Institute, 
2010) 
Figure 2.2 – Publications Associated with Prediction Methods 
2.4 Monitoring Systems 
The literature review set out to identify publications that discussed the use of 
monitoring systems that specifically looked for measurements based around 
certain identified traits that were known to cause or influence disasters, such as 
issues with management systems, maintenance and processes. 
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The research discovered published papers on infrastructure condition 
monitoring, that looked at the requirement to increase the assessment and 
monitoring of aging assets, especially when they exceeded their designed ‘life’ 
expectancy.  One paper proposed a methodology based upon the Partially 
Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP) (Srinivasan & Parlikad, 2013).  
This method relied upon historic data and the use of real time monitoring 
equipment, and an extensive understanding of the current state of the system to 
base the prediction of future states.  Whilst this methodology would provide the 
sound information on current maintenance state of all assets, it relied upon 
extensive data gathering via multiple sensors. 
The search for asset management strategies identified a paper that discussed 
two maintenance strategies, time based maintenance (TBM) and condition 
based maintenance (CBM) (Ahmad & Kamaruddin, 2012).  These two techniques 
required a known condition for each asset prior to basing the periodicity of TBM 
and a judgement demand on the current condition for CBM.   TBM relied upon 
bathtub curve assumptions made by the Original Equipment Manufacturers 
(OEMs) predicted life expectancy of the asset and historic data where possible, 
whilst CBM demanded large amounts of data to model the predicted life 
expectancy and meantime between failures prior to determining the most 
appropriate levels and types of maintenance.  The information on the type of 
data these techniques required drove this research towards practical solutions 
for the collection of monitoring system data. 
The search for risk based monitoring systems identified a paper on risk based 
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asset integrity indicators (Hassan & Khan, 2012), that discussed the 
development of lead and lag indicators.  Lead indicators to monitor the events 
that could lead to an incident and lag indicators to monitor the after effects of 
an incident.  This paper defined the use of a risk index, based on the weight 
averaged scores of multiple lead and lag indicators, with each score relative to 
the importance of the indicator.  It provided more of an insight into what could 
be possible if weightings were applied to indicators that were relative to the 
significance of each indicator.  
The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) Health and Safety Guidance document 
‘HSG 254 – Developing Process Safety Indicators’ (HSE, 2006) defined six process 
safety performance indicators (PSPIs) as specific indicators for the monitoring 
and measurement of key risk controls as safety key performance indicators 
(KPIs).  HSG 254 then set out to capture the PSPIs at ‘Plant/Facility’ level and to 
combine these in a hierarchy via ‘Site’ level indicators through to the top level 
that represented the ‘Organisation’.  The six PSPIs were: 
 Plant Change. 
 Inspection and Maintenance. 
 Staff Competence. 
 Operating Procedures. 
 Emergency Procedures. 
 Permit to Work. 
Each of the PSPIs were represented by a three colour traffic light dashboard, 
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indicating ‘Red = Failure’, ‘Amber = Warning and ‘Green = Good’. 
There were six referenced papers [see Figure 2.3], including two written and 
presented to safety engineering peer groups by the author of this dissertation.  
One was presented at the International Systems Safety Conference Minneapolis 
USA in 2010 (Painting & Sanders, ISSC 28, 2010) and another was presented at 
the IET Systems Safety Conference Manchester UK in 2010 (Painting, 1.A.1, 
2010).   
Subject Referenced Documents Reference 
Monitoring 
system 
Value of condition monitoring in infrastructure 
maintenance 
(Srinivasan & Parlikad, 2013) 
An overview of time-based and condition-based 
maintenance in industrial application 
(Ahmad & Kamaruddin, 2012) 
Risk-based asset integrity indicators (Hassan & Khan, 2012) 
HSG 254 Developing Process Safety Indicators (HSE, 2006) 
Engineering Governance through the Provision of 
Intelligent Monitoring Systems 
(Painting & Sanders, ISSC 28, 
2010) 
The Provision of Engineering Governance through 
Intelligent Monitoring Systems 
(Painting, 1.A.1, 2010) 
Figure 2.3 – Publications Associated with Monitoring Systems 
2.5 Intelligent Monitoring Systems 
There were two strong examples of monitoring system types that either 
performed calculations with a risk based monitoring system (Hassan & Khan, 
2012) [as described in Section 2.4], or used traffic lights to flow information up 
from the asset level through to the organisational level, using the process safety 
performance indicators defined in HSG 254 (HSE, 2006). 
There were no identified intelligent monitoring systems that particularly 
considered the measurement of common traits, or systems that tested whether 
the criteria met the necessary criteria of levels and combinations to cause 
incidents.   
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Due to the lack of identified subject literature, student projects to design 
intelligent monitoring systems were assigned to two Portsmouth University 
School of Engineering undergraduates. These projects were: 
  Project 1 – Part A - To design a system to demonstrate the ability to 
combine traits through the Boolean interpretation of a Fault Tree using 
Microsoft Excel and Visual Basic programming (Oluwadamilola, 2013).   
 Project 2 – Part A - To design a system to demonstrate the ability to 
combine traits through the Boolean interpretation of a Fault Tree using 
data mining software such as the Polyanalyst data analysis tool (Burns, 
2013). 
There were four documents associated with the literature research into 
intelligent monitoring systems [see Figure 2.4].  Two of these were reports 
provided by the University of Portsmouth undergraduates. 
Subject Referenced Documents Reference 
Intelligent 
monitoring 
system 
Risk-based asset integrity indicators (Hassan & Khan, 2012) 
HSG 254 Developing Process Safety Indicators (HSE, 2006) 
Monitoring Aspects which may lead to 
catastrophic failure 
(Burns, 2013) 
Monitoring of aspects that may lead to a 
catastrophic incident 
(Oluwadamilola, 2013) 
Figure 2.4 – Publications Associated with Intelligent Monitoring Systems 
2.6 Predictive Capability 
Although the use of trend analysis to predict the probability of future states was 
common place, there has been no identified literature on the use of trend 
analysis to feed information into an intelligent monitoring system in order to 
identify certain patterns that were known to indicate catastrophic incidents. 
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Due to the lack of identified subject literature, the two projects assigned to 
Portsmouth University School of Engineering undergraduates [see Figure 2.5], 
also tested the predictive capability of the intelligent monitoring systems within 
a Microsoft Excel® and Polyanalyst (data mining software) based environment: 
  Project 1 – Part B - To design a system to demonstrate the capture and 
identification of failure in systems before they occur (Oluwadamilola, 
2013).   
 Project 2 – Part B - To design, prototype, and produce a data monitoring 
system which has the ability to predict a catastrophic incident, whilst 
introducing an aspect of intelligence (Burns, 2013). 
Subject Referenced Documents Reference 
Predictive 
capability 
Monitoring Aspects which may lead to catastrophic 
failure 
(Burns, 2013) 
Monitoring of aspects that may lead to a 
catastrophic incident 
(Oluwadamilola, 2013) 
Figure 2.5 – Publications Associated with Predictive Capability 
2.7 Literature Review Conclusions 
The literature research identified an abundance of literature covering the ten 
disasters [see Chapters 3 & 4], with each listing the associated root causes, 
whilst there was no evidence of a defined set of questions or topics that could 
be used to investigate catastrophic disasters.  Although there were several 
published works on the design and use of monitoring systems, such as those 
defined by the HSE (HSE, 2006) and others documented by authors such as 
James Reason (Reason, 1997), no evidence has been identified to support the 
existence of an intelligent monitoring system that has been specifically designed 
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to monitor a set of traits and to combine their weighted sum into a dashboard 
based on a fault tree of a disaster scenario.  There was no evidence of any 
predictive monitoring systems that could predict the future state of traits 
associated with assets in an engineering environment.  
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3 Research of Catastrophic Incidents 
In order to ascertain the possible root causes, and to highlight specific traits that 
were associated with catastrophic incidents, it was necessary to study several 
disasters in detail.  In this Chapter, ten catastrophic incidents were summarised 
using information cited from investigation reports and other affiliated 
documentation.  The research into catastrophic incidents considered the 
following ten well documented disasters: 
 BP Texas City (Baker, et al., 2007). 
 Piper Alpha (Cullen, 1990). 
 Buncefield (Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board, 2008). 
 Texaco Refinery (Health and Safety Executive, 1997). 
 BP Deepwater Horizon (Oil Spill Commission, 2011). 
 Bhopal (Rosencranz, 1988). 
 Chernobyl (Chernobyl Accident 1986, n.d.). 
 Challenger (NASA, 1986) (National Academy of Engineering, 2006). 
 Royal Air Force Nimrod XV230 (Haddon-Cave, 2009). 
 King’s Cross Underground Fire (Fennell, 1988). 
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3.1 BP Texas City - 23rd March 2005 
A major explosion occurred at the BP Texas City Refinery [see Figure 3.1] 
resulted in the death of fifteen people and injured more than one hundred and 
seventy others.  The disaster was investigated by the U.S. Chemical Safety and 
Hazard Investigation Board who produced the ‘Investigation Report Refiner 
Explosion and Fire’ (U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, 2007).  
 
Figure 3.1 – Photograph of BP Texas City (U.S. Chemical Safety Board, 2005) 
The BP U.S. Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel chaired by James A. 
Baker III also produced an independent report on the incident (Baker, et al., 
2007). 
The system [see Figure 3.2] was being restarted on the morning of the disaster, 
after having been out of action due to maintenance.  The start-up process 
required flammable liquid to be pumped into the Raffinate splitter tower [Figure 
3.2 - shown in blue] where it was separated (refined) into heavy and light fuels.   
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            Figure 3.2 – BP Texas City System Diagram 
The pumping continued for approximately three hours, much longer than stated 
in the start-up procedures, due to failings in the tower liquid level warning 
devices.  
Without any warnings and due to the continuing pumping, the flammable liquid 
overflowed into the top of the Raffinate splitter tower and down the side of the 
tower towards the safety relief valves.  These reliefs were designed to lift at 
twenty-one psi, and due to a line pressure of approximately sixty-four psi, they 
lifted, allowing a large quantity of liquid to flow into the Blowdown Drum and 
Stack [Figure 3.2 - shown in pink].  The Blowdown Drum received the 
hydrocarbon liquids from the Raffinate splitter and allowed the hydrocarbon 
vapours to vent to atmosphere via the Blowdown Drum Stack, a large pipe 
immediately above the Blowdown Drum.  This sudden influx of liquid from the 
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Raffinate splitter caused a geyser of inflammable hydrocarbon liquid to be 
released, forming a large volatile vapour cloud which found a ground level 
ignition source, and caused a massive explosion.  It was thought that the most 
likely cause of ignition was an engine backfire from a diesel truck parked close by 
(U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, 2005). 
BP Texas City Literature  
The main investigation into the Texas City disaster was carried out by the US 
Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board.  The investigation also 
considered the role played by BP Group management based in London.  The U.S. 
Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board recommended that BP formed 
an independent panel to conduct a thorough review of BP’s corporate safety 
culture (U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, 2005).  This was 
undertaken and captured in the Baker Panel report (Baker, et al., 2007). 
The five documents [see Figure 3.3] referenced during the literature review 
provided an excellent discussion of the incident itself, they suggested the many 
root causes and improvements that could be made to the oil industry as a result. 
Disaster Referenced Documents Reference 
BP Texas 
City 
BP America Refinery Explosion (U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard 
Investigation Board, 2005) 
The Report of the BP U.S. Refineries Independent 
Safety Review Panel. 
(Baker, et al., 2007) 
Investigation Report Refinery Explosion and Fire. (U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard 
Investigation Board, 2007) 
Fatal Accident Investigation Report (BP Global, 2005) 
OSHA QuickTakes (OSHA, 1992) 
Figure 3.3 – Publications Associated with BP Texas City 
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3.2 Piper Alpha - 6th July 1988 
A routine maintenance procedure caused an explosion and resulting fire on the 
North Sea gas production platform Piper Alpha [see Figure 3.4], killing one-
hundred and sixty-seven men (Cullen, 1990). 
 
Figure 3.4 – Photograph of Piper Alpha (Exponent, 2010) 
Routine maintenance to remove and check a pressure safety valve on the back-
up condensate pump involved the removal of the valve from the system on the 
6th July.  Due to the complexity of the work involved in maintaining the valve, it 
was not planned to be replaced until the following day.  Permission was sought 
via the existing permit to work (PTW) system, and a blank plate was fitted in its 
place to seal the pipe.  That evening the primary condensate pump failed, and 
without knowledge of the repair to the back-up condensate pressure safety 
valve and the temporary fitment of a blanking plate, the operator started the 
back-up condensate pump.  The pressure built up and the blanking plate failed 
to seal the pipe, resulting in a high pressure gas leak.  This found an ignition 
source and exploded, causing a pressure wave that destroyed the firewalls 
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intentionally designed to prevent the spread of fire.  Without the protection of 
the firewalls, the oil pipes that ran close-by were destroyed and large quantities 
of oil ignited.  The built-in water deluge fire-fighting system was out of action 
and therefore could not be activated. 
Approximately twenty minutes later, the fire was hot enough to destroy the gas 
pipelines fed from the other platforms nearby.  As these were large diameter 
pipes with inflammable gas at a pressure of two-thousand psi, this significantly 
increased the ferocity of the fire and generated further explosions.  
Most of the men on board the platform went towards the accommodation area, 
but as this wasn’t smoke proofed and the repeated opening and shutting of 
doors spread the smoke further.  Most of the people that survived did so by 
jumping into the sea, something that they were specifically trained not to do.  
The whole catastrophic incident only took twenty-two minutes to occur (Oil & 
Gas UK). 
Piper Alpha Literature 
Lord Cullen began the Piper Alpha inquiry in November 1988 and published his 
findings in November 1990 under the title of ‘The Public Inquiry into the Piper 
Alpha Disaster’ (Cullen, 1990).  The inquiry consisted of two parts, to establish 
the cause of the catastrophic incident, and to make recommendations for 
changes in the safety regime.  There were several subsequent publications 
written in the fourteen years since the disaster that have captured the lessons 
learnt and the failings within the management of the oil industry at the time of 
the incident.   
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The four referenced documents [see Figure 3.5] provided an in-depth account of 
the issues surrounding the Piper Alpha incident, including the issues that led to 
the disaster and the way that the incident was managed during the subsequent 
fires and explosions.  The time that has passed since the disaster has allowed for 
many in-depth discussions over the root causes and behavioural issues of those 
on-board the oil rig and those supporting from a distance, these discussions 
provided a deeper understanding of the disaster.   
Disaster Referenced Documents Reference 
Piper Alpha The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster (Cullen, The Public Inquiry into the 
Piper Alpha Disaster, 1990) 
Piper Alpha: Lessons Learnt, (Oil & Gas UK) 
Piper Alpha: condolences are not enough (Allen, Piper Alpha: condolences 
are not enough, 2011) 
Learning from the Piper Alpha Accident: A Post-
mortem Analysis of Technical and Organizational 
Factors 
(Paté-Cornell, 1993) 
Figure 3.5 – Publications Associated with Piper Alpha 
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3.3 Buncefield - 11th December 2005 
A series of explosions and fires destroyed the Buncefield oil storage and transfer 
depot [see Figure 3.6].  Twenty-three large fuel storage tanks were damaged and 
forty-three people injured, fortunately there were no deaths (Buncefield 
Investigation Homepage, 2010). 
 
            Figure 3.6 – Photograph of Buncefield (MIIB, 2005) 
Buncefield was a large storage site, known as a tank farm, which was operated 
by a number of companies.  The site received fuel via pipelines, stored the fuel, 
and distributed the fuel via pipelines and road tankers to sites in and around the 
London and the South West area.    
The incident in 2005 was centred on tank 912 which was being filled in the early 
hours of the morning on the 11th December [see Figure 3.7].  From 
approximately 03:00 the level gauge in tank 912 ceased to indicate any rise in 
contents due to issues with the monitoring equipment, at this point the fuel was 
being pumped at a rate of 550m3 per hour.  The investigation calculated that 
tank 912 would have been full and at the point of over flowing by 05:20.  The 
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protection device that should have shut down the filling operation, failed to 
operate.  At 05:38 the CCTV system shows a vapour cloud forming from the 
escaping fuel [Figure 3.7 - shown as light pink].  By 05:46 this cloud was 
approximately 2m thick and by 05:50 it had started to flow off site.   Shortly after 
this, the pumping rate rose to 890m3 per hour, increasing the size of the vapour 
cloud.  
 
            Figure 3.7 – Buncefield Layout 
The vapour cloud ignited in the first explosion around 06:00, and from that point 
onwards all effort went towards bringing the incident under control (Buncefield 
Major Incident Investigation Board, 2008). 
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Buncefield Literature 
The Buncefield Standards Task Group (BSTG) was formed with representatives 
from the Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) Competent Authority and 
from the petrochemical industry.  The main aim of the investigation was to 
translate the lessons identified during the Buncefield investigation into practical 
guidance for the industry (Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board, 2008).  
Whilst the BSTG was developing process improvement guidance, the Major 
Incident Investigation Board (MIIB) conducted a full investigation of the incident 
itself (MIIB, 2005). 
The five referenced documents [see Figure 3.8] fully described the incident and 
defined the lessons learnt from the management of the tank farm prior to the 
disaster occurring, as part of the incident response, and during the clean-up 
phase after the disaster.  
Disaster Referenced Documents Reference 
Buncefield Buncefield Investigation Homepage (Buncefield Major Incident 
Investigation Board, 2008) 
Buncefield: Why did it happen? (The Competent Authority COMAH, 
2011) 
The Buncefield Explosion and Fire-Lessons 
Learned 
(Mannan, 2011) 
The UK Buncefield incident - The view from a UK 
risk assessment engineer 
(Herbert, 2010) 
Dispersion of the vapour cloud in the Buncefield 
Incident 
(Gant & Atkinson, 2011) 
Figure 3.8 – Publications Associated with Buncefield 
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3.4 Texaco Refinery - 24th July 1994 
The Texaco Refinery explosion [see Figure 3.9] caused twenty-six minor injuries 
and approximately £48M worth of damage to the Texaco refinery at Milford 
Haven, UK (HSE, 1997).  
 
            Figure 3.9 – Photograph of Texaco Refinery (BBC) 
The series of events that led to the explosion started just before 09:00 on the 
morning of the 24th July 1994, during an electrical storm.  This storm affected 
several areas within the plant including the Vacuum Distillation Units, Alkylation 
Units, Butamer Units and the Fluidised Catalytic Cracking Unit (FCCU).  The FCCU 
converted long chain hydrocarbons into shorter chain hydrocarbons such as 
fuels.  During this severe storm all units except for the FCCU, were shut down.  
This caused the FCCU to lose hydrocarbon flow, and what followed was a 
combination of valve movements and liquid flows that were not visible on a 
single display panel.  Therefore the problems with hydrocarbon flow were not 
identified by the operators.   
At approximately 09:00 the hydrocarbon liquid flowed into the Deethaniser, the 
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unit which separated the lower weight vapour elements [Figure 3.10 - shown in 
blue], was lost causing the liquid to empty into the Debutaniser which further 
separated lower weight vapour elements [Figure 3.10 – shown in green] via 
valve ‘A’ [all valves identified in Figure 3.10].   The system was designed not to 
allow this to occur and so valve ‘A’ shut.   As the feed into the Debutaniser 
ceased, this caused valve ‘B’ to shut.  This meant that the liquid was trapped in 
the Debutaniser and being heated.  The heat caused the pressure to rise and the 
relief valve lifted to release pressure to the Flare Knockout Drum, which 
removed liquid from vapour prior to venting from Flare Stack [Figure 3.10 – 
shown in red].  Just after 09:00, the liquid flow to the Deethaniser was re-
established, so valve ‘A’ re-opened and the liquid continued to flow to the 
Debutaniser.  This should have re-opened valve ‘B’ to allow the liquid to the 
Naphtha Splitter [Figure 3.10 – shown in purple].  
 
                      Figure 3.10 – Simplified Diagram of Texaco Refinery FCCU  
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Even though there was indication to the operators that valve ‘B’ had opened, it 
actually remained shut.  In order to relieve the pressure in the Debutaniser, the 
operators opened valve ‘C’ which led to the Interstage Drum, which was the 
holding drum for the Wet Gas Compressor [Figure 3.10 – shown in lilac], and the 
Wet Gas Compressor, which compressed gases into liquid for recovery [Figure 
3.10 – shown in burgundy].   
Due to the faulty line-up of the system, opening valve ‘C’ did not prevent the 
Debutaniser from over filling with liquid.  The Debutaniser vented to the flare for 
a second time, at just after 10:00.  Valve ‘C’ caused the levels of liquid in the 
Interstage Drum to flood and trip the Wet Gas Compressor.  With the Wet Gas 
Compressor no longer working, the large volumes of gas had nowhere to go, and 
so were vented by the Flare Stack.   
Unfortunately this caused the levels in the Interstage Drum to rise so far that 
they went to the Flare Stack.  This liquid was drained through a pre-rigged, ad-
hoc, line made from steam hoses, which allowed the Wet Gas Compressor to 
start again at 12:28.  The liquid began to flow through the unit again, but as 
valve ‘B’ was shut, the Debutaniser vented for a third time causing an explosion 
thirty-six minutes later.  
This led to another cycle of opening and closing valves, large volumes of gas to 
flare out, and large volumes of liquid to enter the corroded Knockout Drum 
discharge pipe.  The elbow on this pipe broke and approximately twenty tonnes 
of highly flammable liquid escaped to form a large vapour cloud which caused 
the main explosion (Health and Safety Executive, 1997). 
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Texaco Refinery Literature 
The investigation of the Texaco Refinery disaster was undertaken by the Health 
and Safety Executive (HSE) to determine the cause of the incident and to 
publicise the lessons learnt (HSE, 1997).  It provided a comprehensive insight 
into the root causes and how the disaster developed.   
Out of all the disasters, the Texaco refinery incident had the least amount of 
published information available [see Figure 3.11].  The main source of 
information was from the investigation undertaken by the Health and Safety 
Executive (HSE).  This provided information on the incident, the associated 
mitigating factors that prevented possible fatalities, the root causes and the 
subsequent actions that were undertaken in the days and weeks that followed 
(HSE, 1997). 
A case study titled ‘Training for emergency management tactical decision games’ 
focused on the human factors associated with the incident, and how these 
lessons should be used to provide tactical decision training whilst providing a 
detailed account of the incident (Crichton & Flin, 2011).  There was a selection of 
anecdotal information written elsewhere as part of other investigations and 
presentations that have been published since the disaster.  These were not 
referenced in this dissertation.  
Disaster Referenced Documents Reference 
Texaco 
Refinery 
The explosion and fires at the Texaco Refinery, 
Milford Haven. 24th July 1994. 
(HSE, 1997) 
Training for emergency management: tactical 
decision games 
(Crichton & Flin, 2011) 
Figure 3.11 – Publications Associated with Texaco Refinery 
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3.5 BP Deepwater Horizon - 20th April 2010 
A massive explosion destroyed the BP Deepwater Horizon drilling rig [see Figure 
3.12] situated in the Gulf of Mexico, killing eleven crew members and seriously 
injuring a further seventeen people (BP, 2010). 
 
            Figure 3.12 – Photograph of BP Deepwater Horizon (Guardian) 
The BP Deepwater Horizon drilling rig floated in nearly 5,000 feet of water in the 
Gulf of Mexico.  As with many deep water drilling operations, the planned work 
was behind schedule.  On April 20th during the daily operations conference call, 
they scheduled for a team of specialists to fly out and perform some tests on the 
bottom cement seal that had been poured the day before.  The concrete used 
was special light nitrified foam cement slurry, designed for use at this depth and 
pressure.  
It was decided that, as the cementing appeared to have gone so well, the 
specialists would not be required to run the full set of tests.  They left the rig, 
saving time and roughly $128,000 in fees.  Other tests, such as the positive and 
negative pressure tests, were then carried out by the drill rig team in order to 
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check that the well head was robust enough to withstand the eventual 
abandonment of the rig.  Abandonment was a term given to describe when a rig 
had completely removed the viable oil and gas from the well, and leaves the site 
permanently.  
That evening at around 17:00hrs, there were some issues with the negative 
pressure test, but these didn’t get reported in the confusion caused by the 
excessive number of people in the control room during the watch changeover.  
The negative pressure test was then performed using another method and the 
team were convinced all was well.  The team re-opened the blowout preventer 
and started to pump sea water down the drill pipe to displace the mud and 
spacer.  Just after 21:00hrs, a high frequency vibration was detected by the 
bridge watch keeper, who went outside and saw that the supply vessel was 
covered in a muddy film.  A loud hissing noise followed.  
High volumes of mud and gas emerged from the degasser and the first explosion 
occurred.  All emergency functions built-in to control the well, and in this case 
designed to shut the well down to prevent any further release of hydrocarbons, 
failed.  
The rig was destroyed and eleven people lost their lives (BP p.l.c., 2010), (BP 
p.l.c., 2013), (Flournoy, 2011) & (Oil Spill Commission, 2011). 
BP Deepwater Horizon Literature 
The president of the United States of America, Barack Obama, commanded the 
formation of an independent National Commission for the BP Deepwater 
Horizon disaster, to analyse and determine the cause, as well as setting the 
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requirement to improve the safety of offshore drilling operations (National 
Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 2011).  
The progress made by the National Commission was captured, presented and 
regularly updated on the Oil Spill Commission (OSC) website (Oil Spill 
Commission, 2011). 
BP also undertook an internal investigation of the disaster, interviewing 
survivors and those associated with the cause of the disaster but not present on 
the platform at the time (BP, 2010).  The progress made by the BP investigation 
team was captured and presented on the BP website (BP p.l.c., 2013). 
The Fire and Blast Information Group (FABIG) website ‘History of Accidents’ 
provided a description of the facility, a full account of the accident and the 
lessons learnt through investigation, in particular the fact that ‘the investigation 
team did not identify a single action or inaction that caused the accident’ (Fire 
and Blast Information Group, 2012). 
The Deepwater Horizon incident was the most recent disaster investigated as 
part of the literary research, with a total of six referenced documents [see Figure 
3.13], of which five covered complex investigations, and another that used the 
incident as a case study to demonstrate quantitative risk analysis (Skogdalen & 
Vinnem, 2012).  These documents provided a balanced explanation of the events 
that caused the incident, some undertaken internally as part of government 
directives, and others that discussed and compared the findings of these 
investigations.  
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Disaster Referenced Documents Reference 
BP 
Deepwater 
Horizon 
BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore 
Drilling 
(Oil Spill Commission, 2011) 
Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report (BP, 2010) 
History of Accidents (Fire and Blast Information Group, 
2012) 
Deep Water - The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future 
of Offshore Drilling 
(National Commission on the BP 
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and 
Offshore Drilling, 2011) 
Deepwater Horizon accident (BP p.l.c., 2013) 
Quantitative risk analysis of oil and gas drilling, 
using Deepwater Horizon as case study 
(Skogdalen & Vinnem, 2012) 
Figure 3.13 – Publications Associated with BP Deepwater Horizon 
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3.6 Bhopal - 2nd & 3rd December 1984 
Approximately forty tons of methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas, mixed with other 
unknown gases leaked from a chemical plant owned and operated by Union 
Carbide (India) Limited (UCIL) [see Figure 3.14].  Some two thousand people died 
immediately and another estimated two-hundred to three-hundred suffered 
from various respiratory illnesses (Rosencranz, 1988). 
 
 Figure 3.14 – Photograph of Bhopal Chemical Plant (Toxipedia) 
Union Carbide (India) Limited (UCIL) was a successful producer of fertilisers, and 
the disaster root causes began several years before the incident.  The plant 
received chemicals in high level concentrations and diluted them for onward 
sale and use.  By 1969 the UCIL chemists had discovered how to produce 
fertilisers on site through an alpha-napthol process leading to a special unit 
being built by 1978 to perform this process, but this failed to operate.  More 
money was invested in a re-design and the unit was re-built by 1981; again the 
process failed and so UCIL had to continue to import alpha-napthol from Union 
Carbide (UC).  UCIL discussed whether they should import methyl isocyanate 
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from UC, but the Indian government disapproved and set a deadline of 1985 to 
cease importing both methyl isocyanate and alpha-naphthol.  The new unit was 
nearing completion by 1982, but the plant was becoming less viable for fertiliser 
production and was starting to make a loss, driving a decline in plant investment 
and the training of personnel.  Experienced employees took jobs elsewhere with 
better futures, and those that replaced them were rapidly advanced through the 
management system, and as such were not as well trained or experienced as 
those they had replaced.  The plant went into decline and by 1984 it was at 20% 
capacity.  The remaining stock of chemicals was combined to make 
approximately sixty-two tons of methyl isocyanate, twenty-two tons were 
pumped into tank 611 and the remaining forty tons were pumped into tank 610.   
 
            Figure 3.15 – Bhopal Schematic 
The production should have originated from tank 610, but due to pressurising 
issues, tank 611 was used instead [see Figure 3.15]. 
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On 2nd December, a water hose [Figure 3.15 – shown as light brown line] was 
attached to the plant pipework to carry out pipe wash-down maintenance in the 
methyl isocyanate area, to reduce the effects of corrosion.  Prior to washing 
down the pipework, a ‘Slip Blind’ blanking plate [Figure 3.15 –  identified as red 
line in correctly fitted ‘Slip Blind’ circle] was meant to be fitted in a suitably 
placed flange coupling, to prevent the wash-down water entering areas where it 
might pose an issue.  This task normally took a couple of hours to break the 
flange and fit the ‘Slip Blind’ and tighten the flange back up.  Whilst this work 
was undertaken, it wasn’t unusual to have trace chemicals fall out of the open 
pipe onto the operator, hence the reason for doing the work in full protective 
equipment.  However, it was normal practice not to fit these ‘Slip Blind’ due to 
the required level of effort (Labib & Champaneri, 2012).   
Most of the safety systems were in a poor state of repair, including the vent 
scrubber [Figure 3.15 – shown in burgundy] which was there to neutralise any 
gas leaks, and the flare via the flare stack for flame neutralisation of gases.  The 
fridge plant [Figure 3.15 – shown in green] was designed to keep the methyl 
isocyanate cool but had been shut down so that the Freon gas could be used 
elsewhere, and the fire water spray system [Figure 3.15 – shown in grey] could 
not cool the flare stack since it would not reach the top.  The vent scrubber was 
designed to filter the gases through caustic soda and so render the gases safe as 
a liquid product of this reaction, this vent scrubber was also out of action due to 
maintenance (García-Serna, Martínez, & Cocero, 2007).   
Even though most of the equipment was in a poor state, the operations 
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proceeded.  Blocked pipes caused water to back-up in the system, but the 
supervisor ordered them to continue with the operation.  Water passed along 
the pipework unhindered by the isolation ‘Slip Blind’ and entered into tank 610 
via a valve that was either not shut after the last evolution, or was failing to seal 
correctly, allowing the water to pass.  This water mixed with the methyl 
isocyanate in tank 610, causing an exothermic reaction to produce heat and 
pressure from the released gases, the pressure went from two psi to ten psi 
within a matter of minutes.  This initial rise in pressure was ignored because the 
operators were used to spurious readings from faulty gauges.  By 00:15 the 
pressure in Tank 610 was at fifty-five psi, well beyond its operational limits.  The 
bursting disk [identified in Figure 3.15], that was designed to fail at forty psi, 
ruptured allowing gas to travel along the pipework to the Vent Scrubber.  The 
control room operator went out to check the process and heard gas escaping, he 
ordered the control room to engage the Vent Scrubber with the caustic soda, 
but this failed to happen due to being out of service for maintenance.  The alarm 
was sounded and then silenced moments later.  The poisonous gas continued to 
escape for two hours (Browning, 1993). 
Bhopal Literature 
The main referenced documents were ‘Bhopal, Transnational Corporations, and 
Hazardous Technologies’ (Rosencranz, 1988), and ‘Union Carbide: Disaster at 
Bhopal’ (Browning, 1993).  The former provided a good insight into the Indian 
governmental response and the history behind the disaster.  The latter, written 
by the then governing Union Carbide Corporation Vice President of Health, 
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Safety and Environmental, who delivered an in-depth explanation of the 
incident, including the long chain of events and the difficulties faced by Union 
Carbide India Limited (UCIL) that led to the incident.  The other documents, such 
as the Bhopal plant situation summary (Peterson, 2008), provided information 
relative to the economic background that effected the plant and surrounding 
area, and an in-depth account of the gas leak.  This information helped to 
ascertain the root causes and the identification of contributing factors. 
Two thought-provoking documents provided a detailed account of the incident 
from inside the plant and externally from the surrounding populace, the first 
written by an ex-Union Carbide Plant Bhopal employee who worked at the plant 
at the time of the incident (Chouhan, 2005), and the second was a duel 
perspective account of the incident from the Mayor and Chief of Police of 
Bhopal (Bisarya & Swaraj, 2005). 
Another valuable paper (Labib & Champaneri, 2012) described how Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA) and Reliability Block Diagrams (RBDs) could be used to define the 
root causes of the Bhopal disaster, provided a demonstration of FTA and RBD as 
well as a good account of the disaster itself. 
A discussion on future green design criteria, looked at combining process, safety, 
greenness and economics into the initial design concept as part of a Bhopal case 
study (García-Serna, Martínez, & Cocero, 2007).  This case study provided 
another viewpoint on the incident and how Green Hazards and Operability (g-
HAZOP) analysis could be used to design out the issues, such as those that 
caused the incident, not only from the normal HAZOP process, but also when 
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considering the relative ‘greenness’ of the system. 
The seven referenced publications provided a deep insight into the root causes 
of the disaster, and were supported by the referenced National Geographic 
video documentary on the disaster (Geographic) [see Figure 3.16]. 
Disaster Referenced Documents Reference 
Bhopal 
 
 
Bhopal, Transnational Corporations, and 
Hazardous Technologies 
(Rosencranz, Bhopal, Transnational 
Corporations, and Hazardous 
Technologies, 1988) 
The Bhopal Disaster - Learning from failures and 
evaluating risk 
(Labib & Champaneri, 2012) 
Green HAZOP analysis: incorporating green 
engineering into design, assessment and 
implementation of chemical processes 
(García-Serna, Martínez, & Cocero, 
2007) 
Union Carbide: Disaster at Bhopal (Browning, 1993) 
Bhopal Plant Disaster (Peterson, 2008) 
The unfolding of Bhopal disaster (Chouhan, 2005) 
The Bhopal gas tragedy—A perspective (Bisarya & Swaraj, 2005) 
Bhopal Gas Tragedy Documentary Part II (Geographic) 
Figure 3.16 – Publications Associated with Bhopal 
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3.7 Chernobyl - 26th  April 1986 
An explosion ripped through the number four Reactor Bolshoy Moshchnosty 
Kanalny (RBMK) building [see Figure 3.17] caused by the pressurised water 
reactor going out of control during a low power test.  Two workers died as a 
result of the explosion and a further twenty-eight firemen and emergency clean-
up workers died within three months, from radiation sickness.  The total number 
of people affected by the disaster was unknown and will probably remain that 
way (IAEA) (Chernobyl Accident 1986, n.d.)). 
 
            Figure 3.17 – Photograph of Chernobyl (BBC, nd) 
The lead up to the disaster started on the 25th April 1986.  The reactor crew 
were preparing for a routine shut down of the reactor, and to test the length of 
time that the turbines would continue to spin and provide electrical power to 
the main circulating pumps [all identified in Figure 3.18]. 
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            Figure 3.18 – Basic Layout of Reactor 
This test had been attempted the year before, when the turbine had run down 
too quickly.  Since then, there had been changes to the voltage regulators to 
lengthen the run down time.  On the 25th April, the evening shift operators 
started performing a series of experiments to test whether the auxiliary systems 
would still perform using power generated by the reactor when it was in a low 
power state.  To reduce the power level of the reactor by 20%, the graphite 
tipped boron carbide control rods [Figure 3.18 – shown in brown] were lowered 
into the reactor.  The control rods were made of a material that absorbs free 
neutrons and thus slowing down the reaction within the core.  Unfortunately the 
rods were lowered too quickly and resulting in almost completely shutting down 
the reactor.  
At 00:30 a decision was made to increase the power state by raising the control 
rods, and by 01:00 the power level had only reached 7%, so more rods were 
raised.  Safety systems were disabled to allow the reactor to continue operating 
at such low power levels.  
At 01:23 the power was at 12% and the operators began the test, within seconds 
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the power levels rose to dangerous levels and the coolant water turned to 
steam.  Normally it was only considered safe when thirty control rods were fully 
lowered, and at that time only six were in position, so the remaining rods were 
lowered into the core.  Because of peculiarities within the RMBK reactors, this 
action caused a displacement of water from the control rod slots which poured 
into the reactor base.  The sudden movement of the control rods also caused a 
power surge one-hundred times the normal level.  
The reaction between the hot fuel and cooling water caused the fuel to 
fragment and a sudden rise in steam (BBC, nd).  This massive over pressure 
partially detached the one-thousand tonne cover plate of the reactor, in turn, 
causing the rupture of the fuel channels and jamming the control rods in the 
halfway down position.  The reactor was now out of control.  Water from the 
emergency cooling circuit fell onto the reactor causing a string of steam 
explosions which sent fission products into the atmosphere, killing two workers.  
Extremely hot radioactive fuel caused fires which in turn caused the main 
release of radioactivity.  Approximately three-hundred tonnes of graphite that 
surrounded the core was ejected from the reactor during these explosions. 
In an attempt to cool it down, approximately three-hundred tonnes of water per 
hour was dumped in to the reactor via the auxiliary feed pumps.  After two days 
this was stopped due to worries that it would flood reactors one and two.  For 
the next eight days, around five-thousand tonnes of boron, dolomite, sand, clay 
and lead was dropped by helicopter onto the core to put fires out and to reduce 
the release of radioactive particles. 
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For ten days, large amounts of radioactive particles were released into the 
atmosphere, wind speed and direction was monitored closely and the forty-five 
thousand population of Pripyat were evacuated on 27th April.  A further one-
hundred and sixteen thousand people were evacuated during the following 
weeks and months.  In the years following the incident some of the people have 
moved back into the contaminated areas, but on the whole two-hundred and 
twenty thousand have been resettled elsewhere.  The full impact of the 
Chernobyl disaster is still unknown and will probably remain so (Chernobyl 
Accident 1986, n.d.). 
Chernobyl Literature 
The main source of information regarding the Chernobyl disaster was identified 
as the World Nuclear Association website (World Nuclear Association, 2013).  
This provided an overview of the disaster and the sequence of events, including 
a good description of the root causes.  The in-depth analysis was sourced from 
the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG) safety report INSAG-7 
(International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, 1992) , which was an updated 
version of the original INSAG-1 report into the Chernobyl Accident.  INSAG are 
an advisory group under the Director General of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, who identify, share and provide counsel for generic nuclear safety 
information.  This in-depth analysis was supported by an account of the incident 
from a medical perspective that also provided the radiation levels associated 
with the series of events (Balonov, 2007). 
There were five main documents [see Figure 3.19] used in the literature research 
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of the Chernobyl disaster.  These provided an insight into the incident through 
several presentations and discussion papers that mentioned some of the issues 
that have been identified since the disaster.  Such as the Chernobyl accident 
causes, consequences and problems of radiation measurements (Kortov & 
Ustyantsev, 2013), which described the incident and the comparisons with the 
Fukushima incident (2011).   Another paper described the analysis of the disaster 
from 01:19:00 on the day of the disaster, to the first power excursion, and 
provided complex schematic diagrams of the reactor (Mochizuki, 2007).  
Disaster Referenced Documents Reference 
Chernobyl 
 
 
World Nuclear Association  (World Nuclear Association, 2013) 
INSAG-7 The Chernobyl Accident: Updating of 
INSAG-1 
(International Nuclear Safety 
Advisory Group, 1992) 
Chernobyl accident: Causes, consequences and 
problems of radiation measurements 
(Kortov & Ustyantsev, 2013) 
Analysis of the Chernobyl accident from 1:19:00 to 
the first power excursion 
(Mochizuki, 2007) 
The Chernobyl Forum: major findings and 
recommendations 
(Balonov, 2007) 
Figure 3.19 – Publications Associated with Chernobyl 
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3.8 Challenger Disaster – 28th  January 1986 
Within seconds of the launch of the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) space shuttle ‘Challenger’ the booster rocket exploded 
[see                     Figure 3.20], killing seven astronauts, one of whom was a school 
teacher (NASA, 1986). 
 
                    Figure 3.20 – Photograph of Challenger Explosion (Coral Springs Talk.Com, 1986) 
In the years leading up to the incident there were issues with the development 
of the Solid Rocket Motor (SRM), mainly due to a lack of initial development 
work, and the lack of funding associated with the bid value contracted by 
Morton Thiokol Incorporated (MTI).  Even though there was the opportunity to 
attempt corrective action on the initial design issues, this was not pursued by 
MTI since it would have interfered with the production schedule.  In 1985 the 
issues with the joint seal escalated, which could have flagged the danger of 
launching in temperatures below 53°F (12°C) (National Academy of Engineering, 
2006).  An MTI Engineer sent a memo, with a limited distribution, to the 
President of Engineering at MTI on July 31st 1985, stating: 
"If the same scenario should occur in a field joint (and it could), then it is a jump 
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ball as to the success or failure of the joint because the secondary O-ring cannot 
respond to the clevis opening rate and may not be capable of pressurization.  The 
result would be a catastrophe of the highest order--loss of human life." 
"An unofficial team (a memo defining the team and its purpose was never 
published) with leader was formed on 19 July 1985 and was tasked with solving 
the problem for both the short and long term.  This unofficial team is essentially 
non-existent at this time. In my opinion, the team must be officially given the 
responsibility and the authority to execute the work that needs to be done on a 
non-interference basis (full-time assignment until completed)." 
"It is my honest and very real fear that if we do not take immediate action to 
dedicate a team to solve the problem, with the field joint having the number one 
priority, then we stand in jeopardy of losing a flight along with all the launch pad 
facilities." 
(National Academy of Engineering, 2006) 
On January 27th 1986, the day before the launch, a teleconference meeting was 
called by MTI to discuss potential issues with the low temperatures that were 
being experienced at the launch pad and the impact of these low temperatures 
on the sealing ability of the ‘O’ seals that were fitted to the Solid Rocket Motor 
(SRM) Field Joint [see Figure 3.21].   
 
 
            Figure 3.21 – SRM Field Joint  
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The overnight weather prediction for the launch site was 18°F (-8°C).  The 
engineers were given just one hour to prepare slides.  The presentation provided 
by the MTI Engineers presented the historic data on the ‘O’ seal damage found 
on the Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) joints and how the effects became more 
noticeable as the temperature dropped.  
MTI recommended a ‘no-launch’ to NASA based upon the engineering 
presentation, NASA were appalled with this decision, but confirmed that they 
would not override the contractor’s decision of ‘no-launch’.  MTI went off-line 
for a short while to discuss the evidence, they decided that the information was 
inconclusive and that there was not enough evidence to prove that the ‘O’ seal 
would fail.  So MTI made a management decision to reverse the no-launch 
decision.  The meeting concluded without any further challenge from NASA. 
As the Challenger space shuttle lifted off of the launch pad, 0.678 seconds after 
launch, the video recording of the take-off showed a puff of grey smoke emitting 
from the aft field joint on the right SRM [see Figure 3.22].  
 
Figure 3.22 – Photograph of Challenger on Launch Pad (NASA) 
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This puff of smoke indicated that there was an issue with the sealing 
arrangement in the SRM.  Between 0.836 and 2.500 seconds, eight more distinct 
puffs of smoke were captured on film escaping from the SRM.  The Challenger 
unusually experienced several high altitude wind shear conditions from 
approximately thirty-seven seconds to sixty-four seconds into the flight.  This 
wind shear meant that the steering system had to compensate more actively 
than on any other shuttle launch.  At 59.262 seconds into flight, the smoke 
flume had changed into a continuous flame.  As this flame increased in size it 
was aerodynamically forced in the direction towards the rear of the booster and 
onto the External Tank (Hydrogen tank).  At 64.660 seconds into the flight, the 
leaking hydrogen ignited and seventy-two seconds into the flight, it terminated 
in a massive explosion (NASA, 1986). 
Challenger Literature 
The main report into the Challenger disaster was written as a response to the 
executive order ‘12546’ given 3rd February 1986 by the president of the United 
States of America, Ronald Reagan.  This Government led investigation included 
distinguished leaders of government, scientific, technical and management 
communities.  The Commission included safety recommendations that were not 
directly associated with the disaster, but were intended to make future flights 
safer (NASA, 1986).   Whilst the Commission dealt with the facts and root causes, 
there were a number of ethical concerns with the way that NASA and Morton 
Thiokol managed engineering matters, especially those connected to the root 
cause of the disaster (National Academy of Engineering, 2006) (Rossow, 2012). 
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Differences between the findings of the presidential commission and 
congressional committee were captured in a paper discussing the ethics 
surrounding technical and professional communication (Dombrowski, 2007).  
The presidential commission concluded the primary cause was the O-ring, and 
the congressional committee concluded that it was down to poor judgement 
and decision making of those involved. 
The four supporting document [see Figure 3.23] provided an unbiased discussion 
on the root causes of the Challenger disaster, with the ethical reports and case 
studies providing examples of the behavioural issues that were rife at the time 
of the incident.  
Disaster Referenced Documents Reference 
Challenger Report of the Presidential Commission on the 
Space Shuttle Challenger Accident. 
(NASA, 1986) 
Ethical Decisions - Morton Thiokol and the Space 
Shuttle Challenger Disaster 
(National Academy of Engineering, 
2006) 
Engineering Ethics Case Study: The Challenger 
Disaster  
(Rossow, 2012) 
The evolving face of ethics in technical and 
professional communication: Challenger to 
Columbia 
( Dombrowski, 2007) 
Figure 3.23 – Publications Associated with Challenger 
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3.9 Royal Air Force Nimrod XV230 – 2nd September 2006 
A Royal Air Force (RAF) Nimrod 'XV230' plane was on a routine mission flying 
over Helmand Province in Southern Afghanistan when a fire started, causing a 
mid-air explosion killing all twelve personnel on board (Haddon-Cave, 2009). 
The Nimrod took off at 09:13 hours from the deployed operational base and 
began the mission.  This mission was going to plan, and to give it the required 
extended duration of flight, it refuelled in-flight from a Tristar tanker.  In-flight 
refuelling was a well-practiced procedure, and was used regularly since the 
original requirement set in 1982 to support long haul flights to the Falkland 
Islands during the conflict.  On completion of the in-flight refuel, at 11:11 hours, 
two warning alarms activated simultaneously, these indicated a fire in the bomb 
bay and the presence of either smoke or hydraulic mist in the elevator bay.  The 
aircraft depressurised at 11:12 hours and at 11:13 hours the camera operator 
reported “we have flames coming from the rear of the engines on the starboard 
side”.  The crew carried out emergency drills, transmitted a Mayday call and 
diverted course to land at Kandahar airfield.  The Nimrod was spotted by a 
Harrier plane at 11:16 hours, descending with flames trailing behind the 
starboard wing.  At 11:17 hours, the Harrier pilot reported that the Nimrod had 
exploded, three-thousand feet above ground level. 
The cause of the disaster was associated with two specific design modifications.  
These modifications were the Supplementary Conditioning Packs (SCP) and Air 
to Air Refuelling (AAR).  The SCP design required a feed-off from the engine hot 
air exhausts to pass through the No.7 dry tank.  The AAR modifications required 
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fuel pipes to run through No.7 dry tank [all items identified in Figure 3.24].  The 
AAR modification also required special blow off plates to be fitted to the fuel 
tanks, to allow any excess pressure in the fuel tanks to be relieved to 
atmosphere.  
 
                   Figure 3.24 – No.7 Tank Dry Bay SCP & AAR Layout (Haddon-Cave, 2009) 
The fuel line on the Nimrod had approximately four-hundred fuel couplings, 
most of which were Flight Refuelling Services (FRS) couplings.  These were a type 
of coupling that had been used on Spitfires, Lancasters and Vulcan bombers.  
The ‘O’ seals used in these fittings were only ever replaced during corrective 
maintenance when leaking was observed.  The remainder were Avimo couplings 
which were known to have ‘O’ seals made out of non-conforming materials after 
year 2000. 
The insulation on the hot air exhaust pipes was known to deteriorate and during 
the upgrade process, degradation to pipework connectors was also noticed.  The 
vent pipe was covered in Refrasil, a non-absorbent covering to prevent fuel from 
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soaking in.  Flexible muffs, laced up with steel wire, were used to cover 
expansion joints.  Although one of the muffs fitted on the SCP did not cover the 
hot elements as effectively as it should have.  
Even though there was a fuel source and ignition source present in the No.7 dry 
tank, the area was not designated as a fire zone and there was no fire detection 
or fire suppression system in the No.7 dry tank. 
It was not known exactly which of coupling types failed, but there was a 
significant fuel leak into the No.7 Dry Tank, this ignited when it came into 
contact with the hot air exhaust system, resulting in a catastrophic explosion at 
an altitude of three-thousand feet (Haddon-Cave, 2009). 
Royal Air Force Nimrod XV230 Literature 
The Nimrod Review, requested by the Secretary of State for Defence on 4th 
December 2007, to investigate the loss of the Royal Air Force (RAF) Nimrod 
XV230 was undertaken by Charles Haddon-Cave QC (Haddon-Cave, 2009).  The 
investigation terms of reference were to:  
 To examine the arrangements for assuring the airworthiness and safe 
operation of the Nimrod MR2 in the period from its introduction in 1979 to 
the accident on 2 September 2006, including hazard analysis, the safety 
case compiled in 2005, maintenance arrangements, and responses to any 
earlier incidents which might have highlighted the risk and led to corrective 
action; 
 To assess where responsibility lies for any failures and what lessons are to 
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be learned; 
 To assess more broadly the process for compiling safety cases, taking 
account of best practice in the civilian and military world; 
 And to make recommendations to the Secretary of State as soon as 
practicable, if necessary by way of interim report.” (Haddon-Cave, 2009) 
This in-depth independent review into the loss of Nimrod XV230 found several 
failures in the leadership, working culture and the setting of priorities within the 
MOD and Industry alike.   
Two other documents supported the initial findings of the review as well as 
reporting the root causes from a slightly different perspective (Haddon-Cave, 
2010) (Wilcutt & Harkins, 2012).   
The three reports [see Figure 3.25] provided a detailed account of the incident 
and the endemic issues that caused the problems to be overlooked and 
incorrectly assessed.  The Haddon-Cave review especially delivered a 
comprehensive list of the root causes that led to the disaster. 
Disaster Referenced Documents Reference 
Royal Air 
Force 
Nimrod 
XV230 
The Nimrod Review (Haddon-Cave, 2009) 
Partnerships in Safety: The Next Steps  (Haddon-Cave, 2010) 
Safe Anyway: RAF Nimrod XV230 Crash over 
Afghanistan 
(Wilcutt & Harkins, 2012) 
Figure 3.25 – Publications Associated with RAF Nimrod XV230 
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3.10 King’s Cross Underground Fire – 18th November 1987 
At approximately 19:30 hours on a Wednesday evening just after the evening 
rush hour, when there was on average one-hundred thousand people passing 
through Kings Cross within a two and a half hour window, a passenger noticed a 
small fire underneath a step near the top of escalator number four [Figure 3.26 – 
shown in red].   
 
Figure 3.26 – Kings Cross Layout (Cooke, 2012) 
The passenger reported the fire at the ticket office, who in turn reported it to 
the relief Station Inspector via telephone.  Shortly after this, another passenger 
noticed smoke and a red glow about two thirds of the way up the escalator.  He 
pressed the emergency stop button and raised the alarm by shouting to get the 
passengers off the escalator.  A ticket collector and two policemen at the exit 
barrier went to investigate.  One of the policemen saw the flames and tried to 
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raise the alarm by radio, but the radio didn’t have any reception, so he went to 
the surface to call his headquarters so they could call the London Fire Brigade.  
The British Transport Police headquarters received the call at 19:33 hours.  They 
in turn called the emergency services on 999 at 19:34 hours (Fennell, 1988). 
At 19:36 hours the two railwaymen were told by the policemen to evacuate 
people via the Victoria Line escalator, they then taped and blocked off the 
Piccadilly Line escalator.  The relief Station Inspector went to look under 
escalator five, from here he saw flames under escalator four, so he went to get a 
CO2 to attack the fire, but the flames were too fierce.  There was a water fog 
fire-fighting system built into the system with the operating switch nearby, but 
this was not initiated.  At 19:39 hours the two police officers evacuated the area 
via the Victoria Line escalators.  The Victoria and Piccadilly Line trains were 
ordered not to stop at Kings Cross.  The fire brigade Station Officer sent the 
message ‘make pumps four, persons reported’ at 19:44 hours.  By 19:45 hours 
the ticket office was overwhelmed by intense heat and thick black smoke.  The 
trains continued to stop and drop off passengers up until 19:48 hours (Fennell, 
1988). 
The seat of the fire was later confirmed to be associated with detritus and 
grease that the chain wheels were running through on the running tracks [all 
items identified in Figure 3.27].  The speed and intensity of the fire as it rushed 
up under the escalator was thought to be associated with the Coanda effect, 
named after the Romanian aeronautical engineer Henri Coanda (France/Clichy 
Patent No. 2108652, 1936).   
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Figure 3.27 – Escalator design (Cooke, 2012) 
The Coanda effect is when a fast flowing gas or liquid is attracted to a flat or 
curved surface, increasing velocity as the flames were drawn down towards the 
surface [see Figure 3.28].   This effect was believed to have produced the blast of 
hot air and flames that hit the ticket hall at 19:45 hours.  In total thirty-one 
people died. 
 
Figure 3.28 – Coanda effect on escalator 
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There were theories that the fire may have been associated with a large quantity 
of white spirit and lubricating oil stored in a space under the escalator.  There 
was also speculation that the fire might have been started through heat initiated 
from an over tight handrail, or from the loadings on the fifty year old wheels and 
bearings, causing overheating (Hamer, 1988). 
King’s Cross Underground Fire Literature 
The official investigation into the King’s Cross underground fire was appointed to 
Desmond Fennell OBE QC on 23rd November 1987, and presented to the 
Secretary of State for Transport on 21st October 1988 (Fennell, 1988).  The 
report answered three questions: 
 How did the fire start? 
 Why was there a flashover? 
 Why did 31 people die? 
Further investigations highlighted issues that were not originally identified in the 
main investigation (Hamer, 1988) (Del Giudice, 2005). 
In all, the three documents [see Figure 3.29] delivered a stark explanation of the 
many issues encountered in the years prior to the incident as well as those faced 
on the night of the disaster. 
Disaster Referenced Documents Reference 
King’s Cross 
Underground 
Fire 
Investigation into the King's Cross Underground 
Fire 
(Fennell, Investigation into the 
King's Cross Underground Fire, 
1988) 
White spirit found in King's Cross fire (Hamer, White spirit found in King's 
Cross fire, 1988) 
Kings Cross Fire - 1987 (Del Giudice, 2005) 
Figure 3.29 – Publications Associated with King’s Cross 
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3.11 Summary 
The ten catastrophic disasters discussed in this chapter, whilst appertaining to 
different types of engineering industry, highlighted several common traitss in 
the causation of disasters, including the management of design, maintenance, 
operator capability and process issues.  Chapter 4 details the number and 
combinations of root causes associated with each disaster.  
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4 Identification of Common Traits  
The ten catastrophic incidents investigated in Chapter 3 identified that there 
were several traits associated with the cause of each disaster, and that some of 
these traits were common to more than one disaster.  The research undertaken 
in Chapter 4 captured the specific root causes extracted from the key 
investigation reports and the many associated publications. The key 
investigation reports associated with against each disaster, shown in brackets, 
were: 
 BP Texas City (Baker, et al., 2007). 
 Piper Alpha (Cullen, 1990). 
 Buncefield (Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board, 2008). 
 Texaco Refinery (Health and Safety Executive, 1997). 
 BP Deepwater Horizon (Oil Spill Commission, 2011). 
 Bhopal (Rosencranz, 1988). 
 Chernobyl (Chernobyl Accident 1986, n.d.). 
 Challenger (NASA, 1986) (National Academy of Engineering, 2006). 
 Royal Air Force Nimrod XV230 (Haddon-Cave, 2009). 
 King’s Cross Underground Fire (Fennell, 1988). 
Although each of these disasters has been investigated, sometimes by the same 
groups of people and professional bodies, there has not been a common naming 
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criteria applied to the root causes that could be initiators.  This dissertation 
recognises these root causes as common traits, and to enable the disasters to be 
compared, and the relative importance of each common trait to be defined and 
understood, a common criterion for trait headings are defined in section 4.1.  
4.1 Initial Trait Headings 
In order to achieve a common criterion the circumstances leading to each 
disaster have initially been grouped under the three main engineering 
governance headings of People, Processes and Tools.  Each initial trait has been 
identified with a unique letter ‘A’ to ‘U’ respectively. 
4.1.1 People 
‘People’ refers to the suitability of training and experience of each employee, 
and how this was captured within an organisation through matrices or 
databases, and covers the following areas: 
A. Suitably Qualified & Experienced Personnel (SQEP). 
B. Staff Management/Leadership. 
C. Working Culture. 
D. Formal Accreditation of People. 
E. Occupational Health Management. 
4.1.2 Processes 
‘Processes’ covered management systems, policies, procedures, audits and 
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emergency procedures: 
F. Quality Assurance/Control. 
G. Quality Audit. 
H. Test Procedures. 
I. Risk Assessment. 
J. Risk Management. 
K. Supply Chain & Procurement. 
L. Process Audit. 
M. Processes. 
N. Emergency Procedures. 
O. Permit to Work (PTW). 
4.1.3 Tools 
‘Tools’ was the collective term used for all systems, equipment and technology, 
including Information Technology (IT), system design, funding program and the 
capture and recording of lessons to ensure that the previous experience of 
others was taken into account and the designs adapted or amended as required. 
This included:  
P. Maintenance/Inspection. 
Q. Equipment State. 
R. Design. 
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S. Safety Systems. 
T. Funding. 
U. Learning/Capturing Lessons. 
The meanings attributed to each of the traits under ‘People’, ‘Processes’ and 
‘Tools’ are detailed in the remainder of this section. 
A. Suitably Qualified & Experienced Personnel (SQEP) 
The Suitably Qualified and Experienced Personnel (SQEP) trait covered the 
training requirements and undertakings that were associated with the upkeep of 
key skills and staff competence, as well as the management systems required to 
ensure personnel remained in date for specialist training or testing.  This trait 
also included all the systems and databases that held and managed this 
information.   
Poor trait example: No evidence to support the existence of a training plan or no 
real understanding of the capability gap between requirement and reality.  
B. Staff Management/Leadership 
The Staff management and leadership trait included the level of leadership and 
management provided by senior management teams and local supervisors.  
‘Leadership’ was defined as someone who had the vision to understand the 
direction in which the company should move, and ‘management’ was defined as 
the administrative effort to enforce the rules to follow the chosen direction 
(Painting, 2008).  
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Poor trait example: Businesses that set out to maximise profit with little concern 
for safety, and supervisors that ignored issues because they either didn’t have 
the time to deal with them, or did not want to disappoint senior management. 
C. Working Culture 
The working culture trait included employer and employee cultural behaviours 
such as the amount of management backing for safety and work issues, and how 
employees understood their responsibilities and whether they were willing to 
commit.   
Poor trait example: Workforces that did not acknowledge responsibility to 
initiate improvements. 
D. Formal Accreditation of People 
The formal accreditation of people trait was linked to the SQEP trait, and 
detailed how each business formally accredited personnel in order to satisfy 
individual job roles.  Formal accreditation included delegation of authority, 
certification of competence, and other formal sign-off by someone who had the 
authority to do so.   
Poor trait example: A business that had no comprehension of who could 
perform certain tasks, especially when they should have some form of assurance 
to demonstrate suitability. 
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E. Occupational Health Management 
The occupational health management trait included management systems 
designed primarily to protect and promote the health of employees. 
Poor trait example: A lack of established workforce health monitoring and 
management systems for dangerous occupational tasks, such as working with 
asbestos and radiation sources. 
F. Quality Assurance/Control 
The quality assurance trait covered the systematic implementation of quality 
plans and the methods that provided leadership assurance.  Quality control 
included several techniques to monitor and check that quality assurance was fit 
for purpose and regularly audited. 
Poor trait example: the lack of auditable trails that covered the creation and 
adaptation of processes, or equipment accepted into service without any formal 
acceptance process. 
G. Quality Audit 
The quality audit trait was associated with the systematic examination of quality 
processes and quality management systems that ensured continued suitability. 
Poor trait example: No evidence of existing quality management system or 
nominated quality representatives. 
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H. Test Procedures 
The test procedures trait included all agreed procedures and methodologies 
employed to test whether a system, equipment or process had been re-instated 
correctly and was working in accordance with the design requirements.  
Poor trait example: Evidence of the re-instatement of a system that hadn’t been 
tested to ensure that it had been designed, installed or repaired to an 
acceptable level. 
I. Risk Assessment 
The risk assessment trait included the identification of hazards, evaluation of 
associated risks and the mitigation put in place to reduce each risk to an 
acceptable level. 
Poor trait example: No evidence that risks associated with a particularly 
hazardous operation had been measured or considered, and existing processes 
with unacceptable, unmanaged high levels of risk. 
J. Risk Management 
The risk management trait included the management systems and processes to 
ensure hazards were captured, quantified and prioritised for mitigation.  This 
included an understanding of the level of endorsement each type of risk 
required in order to determine whether it was at an acceptable level. 
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Poor trait example: No evidence that there was, or ever had been a risk 
management system in place, or evidence that issues were just ‘lived with’ even 
though the risks were known. 
K. Supply Chain & Procurement 
The supply chain and procurement trait included the identification of 
requirements for the acquisition of goods or services from an external source to 
the business.  This included the tendering and acceptance criteria, how the 
goods were stored, handled and distributed. 
Poor trait example: Evidence that supplies had not been checked to ensure they 
were legally compliant, and lack of essential documentation.  An example poor 
procurement was associated with supplied equipment that did not have suitable 
equipment specification, or compliance information. 
L. Process Audit 
The process audit trait was focused on whether processes were regularly 
audited to ensure that they were unambiguous and appropriate to each specific 
task.  This included the management systems that ensured periodic 
consideration of system modifications, operational restrictions and changes in 
legislation. 
Poor trait example: Evidence that there were no management systems, or audits 
to ensure processes were regularly checked for suitability.   
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M. Processes 
The processes trait was associated with the correct format and suitability of 
processes and procedures to perform specific normal and abnormal operations.  
This covered the definition of specific tasks, roles and responsibilities of 
personnel, and any specific associated safety restrictions.  
Poor trait example: Evidence of unsuitable processes that had not been updated 
to reflect changes in system design, operational requirement, organisation 
structure or legislative amendments.   
N. Emergency Procedures 
The emergency procedures trait encompassed all procedures that were 
intentionally written to provide guidance and instruction during an emergency 
situation.  This included all preparation required to ensure warning signs and 
markings were in place and in accordance with the requirements laid down in 
legislation, as well as the roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders, 
nominated personnel in charge of the emergency and fully understood 
emergency communication plans.   
Poor trait example: No evidence to support the existence of a suitable 
emergency procedure, or whether this procedure had been practised. 
O. Permit to Work (PTW) 
The permit to work (PTW) trait included all the procedures, processes and 
management systems that were specifically used to prevent the undertaking of 
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operations and maintenance unless they had been through a number of 
stringent safety checks, and specific sign-offs by named qualified personnel prior 
to the work being undertaken.   
Poor trait example: No evidence to support the existence of a PTW system, or 
evidence that a system was in place but not followed or fully understood by the 
operators or managers. 
P. Maintenance/Inspection 
The maintenance part of the combined trait was associated with the general 
upkeep of assets to ensure that they remained reliable and available for use.  
Maintenance actions could be proactive, whereby maintenance took place at 
regular intervals throughout the asset lifecycle, or reactive whereby 
maintenance was only undertaken when the asset was found to be in a below 
optimum state, or when it had partially or wholly failed. 
The inspection part of the trait included all surveys, examinations and non-
destructive testing (NDT) that were required to prove that something continued 
to be fit for purpose, as well as determining whether something new had been 
designed and built to a specific standard.  
Poor trait example: No evidence of any maintenance management scheduling 
systems or any maintenance tasks undertaken, either through lack of funding, 
poor leadership and management, or the sub-standard level of operators.   
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Q. Equipment State 
The equipment state trait referred to the general condition of all equipment 
associated with each of the catastrophic incidents, and whether the equipment 
was being maintained or quarantined.  
Poor trait example: Systems and equipment in a poor state of repair and 
evidence of ad hoc equipment line-ups, or process adaptations to compensate 
for defective equipment. 
R. Design 
The design trait included all the aspects associated with the initial design, such 
as ergonomics, anthropometrics and user interfaces, as well as safety systems 
such as active/passive protection devices, and the choice of material suitability 
and longevity.  This trait also included the associated management systems to 
ensure that designs continued to meet the intended requirement, and were 
adapted as operational requirements altered or when legislation was revised. 
Poor trait example: No evidence of a design management system, or any proof 
that the original design had been adapted to meet with current operational and 
legal requirements.  
S. Safety Systems 
The Safety systems trait included all management systems that ensured the 
safety and reliability of assets and processes, this included the existing hazard 
management systems to reduce or remove risk. 
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Poor trait example: Evidence that demonstrated the lack of any hazard or risk 
management associated with assets or processes.  
T. Funding 
The funding trait covered the past, present and future financial investment in 
the assets and their maintenance, and the Continued Professional Development 
(CPD) of employees to ensure Suitably Qualified and Experience Personnel 
(SQEP). 
Poor trait example: No evidence to support any financial investment in the 
upkeep or replacement of assets.  No training plans in place to ensure 
continuation of SQEP, and the lack of investment in research and technology 
(according to scale of the business). 
U. Learning/Capturing Lessons 
The learning and capturing lessons trait included the capture of information 
relevant to failures of assets or processes from within the business and from 
other sources such as published disaster reports.  The learning/capturing 
management system must demonstrate captured lessons and the dissemination 
of information to those responsible for design implementation and hazard 
management. 
Poor trait example: No evidence to support the dissemination of relevant 
information within the business, or any attempt to identify and use information 
from various Government bodies and investigation reports. 
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4.2 BP Texas City 
The Texas City plant had twenty-five deaths in the thirty years leading up to the 
2005 disaster, and many hazardous material releases.  This, along with 
amalgamations and cost cutting exercises, including reduced maintenance and 
reductions in staff training, left the plant susceptible to disaster (Baker, et al., 
2007).   
The BP global ‘Fatal Accident Investigation Report’ (BP Global, 2005) found four 
critical factors that led to the disaster at the plant, these were: 
 Loss of containment. 
 Raffinate splitter start-up procedures and application of knowledge/skills. 
 Control of work and trailer siting. 
 Design and engineering of the blow down system. 
The investigation gathered evidence from the following areas: 
 Maintenance. 
 Emergency Response. 
 Audit Programme. 
 Lessons Gained. 
 Risk Management. 
 Communications. 
 Process Safety. 
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 Business Plans. 
 Measurement and Monitoring. 
 Organisation. 
 Leadership. 
Within the context of the investigation report, and other reports readily 
available, there were a number of issues that have been grouped under the 
following trait headings from Section 4.1: 
Suitably Qualified & Experienced Personnel (SQEP) 
There were issues with personnel placed into responsible senior positions at the 
BP Texas City plant, without having received any management or technical 
training to ensure that they were suitably qualified to meet the requirement.  In 
addition there was no evidence of a system to track the qualifications and 
training of personnel at the plant.   
The senior site leadership team had recognised these issues, but unfortunately 
did not turn them around before the disaster (BP Global, 2005, p. 155). 
Staff Management/Leadership 
The Texas City plant was a large facility with over thirty process units and 
supporting infrastructure.  The organisation had changed a many times in the 
years leading to the incident in 2005.  This meant that there were several 
variations of processes and maintenance instructions, each written by different 
parts of the business.  The fact that there wasn’t a single source of documents 
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for processes and maintenance indicated a ‘siloed’ mentality, whereby each 
area saw itself as a separate entity and the need for a single source of 
documentation was ignored.   
The organisation hierarchy was not adequate for the size of the plant, with some 
supervisors and managers having too large a remit.  The problems this caused 
were further exacerbated through poor and unclear lines of authority and 
accountability (BP Global, 2005, p. 153). 
The efficiency and applicability of leadership was hampered by the 
organisational size and complexity, this led to a reliance on middle management 
to fulfil the leadership role of senior management.  Without clear leadership 
there were no tangible lines of accountability, poor motivation and no clarity 
around what was considered appropriate behaviour for the workforce.  This led 
to distrust between the workforce and senior management (BP Global, 2005, p. 
155).   
Even though the start-up procedure included a requirement for communication 
between operatives and other process areas within the plant, no-one informed 
the adjacent areas that the Raffinate process was about to start.  There was a 
fifteen minute shift director’s morning meeting that discussed cross unit 
operations.  Due to the size and complexity of the plant, this did not allow 
enough time to discuss each operation in enough detail to gain insight into other 
operations, or to fully brief on this particular process.   
When the dayshift supervisor left on the day of the disaster, there was no clear 
handover of duties or responsibilities (BP Global, 2005, p. 141).  The site had 
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several business plans in place at the time of the incident, but these were 
focused mainly on reducing SHE incidents.   
At the time of the incident there was a one thousand day plan in place that 
focused on:  
 Don’t Hurt Anyone (injuries, HSE action item closure). 
 Be a Good Neighbour (spills, reportable incidents). 
 Be Reliable (availability, maintenance spend). 
 Create Value (productivity, commercial performance). 
 Great Place to Work (employee survey). 
(BP Global, 2005, p. 143) 
On the day of the incident there was a celebration lunch to commemorate the 
recorded low personnel injury rates at the plant.  There was no emphasis on 
audit and assessment of processes, or the intention to bring these up to date 
with both organisational changes and localised procedural changes.  
Working Culture 
There was a lack of training and a lack of oversight for start-up procedures.  This 
was further exacerbated through an apparent lack of drive to maintain systems 
and equipment, highlighting a poor working culture at the plant.  There was also 
evidence that company policies had not been disseminated down through the 
organisation to those at the coal face, actually doing the work.   
There was evidence that a number of incidents, both equipment and process 
  
 
79 
failures, had gone unreported or were not fully investigated.  There was no 
evidence of people intentionally not reporting incidents, but these results may 
have been associated with organisational incentives for reducing incident cases 
(BP Global, 2005, p. 144). 
Formal Accreditation of People 
The local advancement of personnel into responsible senior positions, without 
having received any management or technical instruction, or training to ensure 
that they met the requirement, inferred that there was no formal accreditation 
of personnel, or the existence of management systems to monitor and maintain 
the appropriate levels of SQEP. 
There was evidence that performance appraisals of employees had not taken 
place.  This would have been the primary method to determine the level of 
knowledge and therefore the ability to develop an accurate training plan (Baker, 
et al., 2007). 
Occupational Health Management 
The siting of temporary trailers to accommodate contractors near to the area 
they were working in was a common theme at BP Texas City.  The business had 
completed a Major Accident Risk (MAR) study prior to the explosion, which had 
identified the need for explosion-proof turnaround trailers.   
BP Texas City management had noted the issues with parking trailers near the 
unit, but had done nothing about it.  BP Policy required that a Management of 
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Change (MOC) checklist was to be raised to cover the siting of the trailers.  This 
called for the trailers to be sited at a minimum distance of one-hundred and 
seven metres from the process.  
The fact that the trailers were sited within this distance did not mean that they 
could not be sited there; it merely called for further analysis.  The trailers were 
sited after the last refinery site wide study that took place in 2002, and therefore 
were not due to be considered until the next site wide study scheduled for 2007 
(Baker, et al., 2007). 
Quality Assurance/Control 
Texas City had several Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for operational, 
commercial, environmental and safety performance.  None of these KPIs were 
prioritised or tracked, nor did they focus on lead indicators.  Instead they relied 
upon lag indicators such as ‘Days Away From Work Cases (DAFWC) and 
Recordable Injury Frequency (RIF).   
Both of these lag indicators showed a downwards turn, indicating that safety 
levels were improving.  There was no proof that any effort was spent in the 
measurement or analysis of process safety incidents (BP Global, 2005, p. 144). 
Risk Assessment 
There didn’t seem to be any lessons identified or learnt from historic incident 
data.  Requirements that could have been identified included the reduction of 
pressures in certain procedures, additional training for operators, human factor 
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implications associated with the design of control panels and human interface 
devices, and the requirement for more supervision during start-up procedures 
(BP Global, 2005, p. 135). 
Risk Management 
The investigation found a poor risk management culture that was unable to 
identify hazards associated with the many extant processes at the plant.  Even 
though there was an inability to detect risks, there was an acceptance that these 
risks existed, and to some extent these were high levels of risk (BP Global, 2005, 
p. 141). 
Process Audit 
The Texas City site had received several audits in the time leading up to the 2005 
disaster.  These audits had only concentrated on testing the document 
management systems, rather than testing the validity and suitability of the 
processes themselves.  It was also found that the audits did not investigate the 
process and management issues associated with the previous incidents (BP 
Global, 2005, p. 139). 
Process Failure 
In 1992 the Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OHSA) released the 
Process Safety Management (PSM) rule, setting the requirements for the 
management of hazards associated with processes using highly hazardous 
chemicals (OSHA, 1992).   
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This rule was promulgated to the relevant operators and managers at the time, 
but not re-enforced after that.  The workforce was not aware of the PSM rule, of 
any further regulatory requirements, or any company policies.  This was 
demonstrated by the Operations Supervisor not being involved in the decision to 
park contractors in his area of responsibility, and some operators not following 
the processes (BP Global, 2005, p. 143). 
Emergency Procedures 
The emergency procedures were not captured or published, and the 
responsibility of those involved in an emergency response was not adequately 
defined (BP Global, 2005, p. 130). 
Maintenance/Inspection 
Maintenance records were up to date without any backlog or deferred 
maintenance routines, although there was uncertainty as to whether the 
maintenance had actually been carried out or not (BP Global, 2005, p. 128). 
Equipment State 
There were many failures in systems and equipment, including: 
 Raffinate Splitter Tower level indicator transmitter indication failure.  It 
was indicating the liquid levels were decreasing, when they were actually 
increasing. 
 Raffinate Splitter Tower high level alarm sensor did not operate.  The 
operators did not know the height of liquid that would cause it to alarm. 
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 Raffinate Splitter Tower level sight glass was dirty and therefore 
unreadable.  This could have given a visual indication of the tank level if it 
had been clean. 
 The set-up of the computerised control system did not allow for Raffinate 
Splitter Tower ‘in and out’ flow data to be displayed on the same screen.  
Therefore the imbalance was not seen by the operator.  
Safety Systems 
Safety Systems include method statements, risk assessments, hazard 
identification processes and Permit to Work (PTW) systems.  Had a functional 
PTW system been in place in 2005, it would have identified that the system, 
prior to starting after maintenance, required a test to confirm that it was in a 
suitable condition for the process to be undertaken safely.   
If this had been performed in accordance with a permit to work system, it would 
have identified the issues with the indicator and alarms. 
Learning/Capturing Lessons 
There was evidence that issues had been identified with the: 
 Siting of contractors trailers. 
 Processes used and adapted locally. 
 Lack of training. 
 Lack of management oversight. 
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 Faulty equipment. 
However, there didn’t seem to have been any evidence of anything being put in 
place to render them no longer an issue, or any attempt to do things differently. 
Summary of Traits 
There were fifteen traits identified as the combined root cause for the BP Texas 
City disaster [see Figure 4.1]. 
BP Texas City - Identified Traits 
Suitably Qualified & Experienced Personnel (SQEP) 
Staff Management/Leadership 
Working Culture 
Formal Accreditation of People 
Occupational Health Management 
Quality Assurance/Control 
Risk Assessment 
Risk Management 
Process Audit 
Process Failure 
Emergency Procedures 
Maintenance/Inspection 
Equipment State 
Safety Systems 
Learning/Capturing Lessons 
Figure 4.1 – BP Texas City Traits 
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4.3 Piper Alpha 
The Piper Alpha disaster investigation found a number of issues in the following 
six main areas (Cullen, 1990): 
 Training. 
 Audit. 
 Emergency procedures. 
 Process failure. 
 Maintenance Systems. 
 Design - Safety system failure. 
Within the context of the investigation report, and other referenced reports, 
there were a number of issues that have been captured under the following trait 
headings: 
Suitably Qualified & Experienced Personnel (SQEP) 
The investigation found that the training of personnel for the management of 
maintenance activities, such as the Permit to Work (PTW) system, was not 
adequate.  Watch keepers and operators were not fully aware of the PTW that 
was in place, nor did they understand the full implications of starting the backup 
condensate pump whilst it was under maintenance (Allen, 2011).  There was not 
enough fully qualified and experienced personnel on the platform at the time of 
the disaster, instead there was a number of temporary promotions in place with 
less qualified personnel fulfilling these more demanding roles.  This had a 
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profound effect on the way that the disaster was handled by the crew of Piper 
Alpha (Paté-Cornell, 1993). 
Staff Management/Leadership 
There was no evidence of clear and meaningful handovers from one shift to 
another.   The handovers should have captured the current state of the 
platform, the operational intent for the next watch, and any operating 
restrictions that may have been placed upon the platform from an external 
source, or restriction caused through maintenance and repairs on the platform 
itself.  Had this been in place and well-practiced, there would have been a full 
brief on the maintenance being undertaken on the back-up condensate pump, 
and the associated restrictions.  This type of detailed brief would have 
prevented the disaster (Paté-Cornell, 1993). 
Quality Audit 
The company in control of the Piper Alpha platform, Occidental Petroleum, had 
performed regular audits of the platform, but the investigation found that these 
audits had not been done very well.  Known issues were not fully raised or 
managed, such as the inoperable deluge system and other major issues were 
ignored (Cullen, 1990). 
Test Procedures 
The isolation of the pump was achieved by shutting a valve, when this should 
have been achieved through the removal of pipework and the fitting of suitable 
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pressure tested blanks.  Had this been put in place and tested to ensure that the 
isolation was sufficient, the disaster would have been avoided (Cullen, 1990). 
Risk Assessment 
The design of the emergency evacuation routes and the safe refuge areas for the 
crew during planned escape were insufficient.  Accommodation blocks were a 
designated safe refuge, but those blocks fell off of the platform and sunk, along 
with many personnel who had mustered there after the alarm was first raised.  
The crew could not reach the lifeboats because of the levels of destruction 
caused by the initial and subsequent explosions, and as such, none of the 
lifeboats were ever launched.   
Those that survived did so by jumping off of the platform, something that they 
were trained not to do (Allen, 2011).  As the fire spread from one module to the 
next, it destroyed the most critical areas of the platform.  The control room and 
the radio room were destroyed during the initial stages of the disaster, along 
with the power generation area, public address system, general alarm, 
emergency shutdown controls, and passive and active fire protection systems 
(Paté-Cornell, 1993). 
Risk Management 
There was an attitude that the major accidents were so rare that they did not 
seem to warrant too much consideration, and so the focus was mainly on 
smaller more likely incidents.  The oil industry at the time of the incident was 
geared around maximum production and minimum down time.  Without a 
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sound risk management system in place, there was no understanding of the 
actual level of risk that the platform was incurring (Paté-Cornell, 1993).  
Process Audit 
The failings in emergency equipment process audit resulted in the lack of 
inspections associated with life rafts, fire pumps and emergency back-up 
systems such as emergency lighting.  There was evidence that some of the audits 
were being carried out although the audit findings weren’t being managed, and 
as such the significant issues with corrosion on the deluge system remained 
without any action to repair.  
Processes 
There was no evidence of any specific emergency processes to cover the 
possibility of a disaster on this scale.  The other platforms close-by did not 
understand the size of disaster that was unfolding on Piper Alpha, demonstrated 
by the fact that platforms Tartan and Claymore continued to pump gas onto the 
Piper Alpha platform in order to maintain the line pressure.  Claymore continued 
to pump for an hour after the disaster initiation.   
There was no apparent central command or control process, nor was there an 
ability to communicate with other platforms (Paté-Cornell, 1993). 
Emergency Procedures 
The emergency procedures undertaken by the platform operators were not 
practised, nor was there seemingly any understanding of the steps personnel 
  
 
89 
should take to manage the spread of smoke.  Doors were repeatedly opened 
and closed in the accommodation area, causing an increased spread of smoke 
(Cullen, 1990).   
Not only were emergency procedures on board Piper Alpha insufficient, the 
systems in place for coping with such disasters were never fully realised or 
practiced.  The designated rescue vessels were not specifically designed to 
undertake rescue, as they were converted trawlers.  The designated rescue 
vessel was not fit to undertake a full rescue mission since the main searchlight 
was out of action, and the design of the trawler meant that the rope handrails 
were smoking in the heat as it approached the burning platform.  
If it hadn’t been for the bravery of those involved in the rescue, many more 
would have perished (Paté-Cornell, 1993).  The platform personnel and the 
managers were not fully aware of the emergency procedures, nor was the 
leadership team aware of the responsibility they had for the management of 
escape and evacuation.  These emergency procedures should have been 
practiced thoroughly by all on board the platform (Cullen, 1990). 
Permit to Work (PTW) 
Permit to Work (PTW) Systems were designed to provide an appropriate level of 
safety for all maintenance tasks, and at the time of writing were commonly used 
throughout engineering industries and practices.  A PTW should capture the 
requirement for taking systems out of use.  It should specify requirements that 
must be met prior to removing a system from operational service, allowing work 
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to commence safely.  Usually that type of work involved removing equipment 
and leaving systems in such a state that they could not be operated accidently.   
The PTW system should have identified all the hazards associated with planned 
work, and put mitigation in place to reduce the risk to an acceptable level.  The 
PTW once signed by suitably qualified personnel, should have been logged and 
the reduction in systems ability promulgated to all associated operators and 
personnel.  Any specific changes to process should have been disseminated to all 
operators and supervisors, and processes temporarily amended to suit.   
The PTW system in place on Piper Alpha had become too relaxed and the routes 
for formally communicating restrictions had become reliant on informal 
handovers between shift supervisors.  The disaster would never have occurred if 
this system had been implemented correctly (Cullen, 1990). 
Maintenance/Inspection 
The requirement to positively isolate equipment as it was removed from a 
system was not followed adequately.  It was not enough to just shut a valve, 
high pressure and high energy systems require positive isolation through either 
two valve isolation, or single valve isolation and blanking plate.  This positive 
isolation, or tagging out of equipment, should have ensured that it was 
physically impossible to open valves, or switch on systems, possibly through the 
use of locks and the removal of fuses.   
The disaster would never have occurred if the backup condensate pump had 
been positively isolated (Oil & Gas UK).  
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Equipment State 
Mainly through poor design, the critical escape and damage control equipment 
were damaged by the initial explosion.  This prevented the alarm being raised 
and the automatic shutdown systems from functioning (Cullen, 1990).  
Design 
The design of the Piper Alpha platform meant that the firewalls, whilst adequate 
for preventing the spread of fire, were not sufficiently robust to withstand 
explosion.  The initial blast caused by gas leaking from the temporary plate 
covering the hole left after the removal of the compressor pressure safety valve, 
blew the firewalls down and allowed for the rapid spread of fire to the 
surrounding area (Cullen, 1990).   The planning of escape routes did not allow 
for redundancies in the protection methods or variations in routes to provide 
alternative escape means.   
The design of the platform had placed the control room, radio room, generators 
and diesel pumps next to the production areas, so that when there was an 
explosion in the production area, it destroyed all the critical equipment and 
systems.  The platform had been designed to withstand minor incidences, but 
not to withstand the major fire loads associated with this disaster (Paté-Cornell, 
1993). 
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Safety Systems 
Some of the design decisions made during the initial build of Piper Alpha were 
considered acceptable, since they conformed to codes and statutes in existence 
at the time it was designed.  These should have been re-addressed over time as 
legislation changed and technology progressed.   
If a safety management system was in place it would have ensured that all 
hazards were mitigated to an acceptable level, through cost benefit analysis to 
demonstrate that each risk was as Low as Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) and 
endorsed by a committee of subject matter experts (Cullen, 1990).   
Summary of traits 
There were fourteen traits identified as the root cause for the Piper Alpha 
disaster [see Figure 4.2]. 
Piper Alpha - Identified Traits 
Suitably Qualified & Experienced Personnel (SQEP) 
Staff Management/Leadership 
Quality Audit 
Test Procedures 
Risk Assessment 
Risk Management 
Process Audit 
Processes 
Emergency Procedures 
Permit to Work (PTW) 
Maintenance/Inspection 
Equipment failure 
Design failure 
Safety System Failure 
Figure 4.2 – Piper Alpha Traits 
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4.4 Buncefield 
The investigation into the underlying causes of the Buncefield incident found 
problems in the following five areas (The Competent Authority COMAH, 2011): 
 Safety Management Systems. 
 Audit. 
 Process failure. 
 Incorrect/unpractised emergency procedures. 
 Design failure. 
Within the context of the investigation report, and other referenced reports, 
there were a number of issues that have been captured under the following trait 
headings: 
Suitably Qualified & Experienced Personnel (SQEP) 
An independent audit of the Buncefield site in 2004 found that the contract co-
ordinators should be competent to perform their tasks, and the level of 
competence should reflect the level of risk, although very little was done in 
response to this issue.  Recommendation nineteen of the final report suggested 
that the sector should work with the competent authority to prepare guidance 
on the training, experience and assurance of competence for all personnel 
associated with safety critical and environmental protection activities 
(Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board, 2008). 
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Staff Management/Leadership 
Management failed to recognise the considerable pressure that the supervisors 
were under to adapt to the ever changing conditions at the site, brought on by 
increased throughput and excessive working time requirements.  Supervisors 
who worked five twelve hour shifts in a row, not including any overtime, meant 
that some of the supervisors were working eighty-four hours in a seven day 
period (The Competent Authority COMAH, 2011). 
Quality Audit 
There was no effective auditing system in place.  The audits did not test the 
quality of the management systems at Buncefield, or whether the systems were 
being used, or whether they were fit for purpose (The Competent Authority 
COMAH, 2011). 
Test Procedures 
The independent high-level switch (IHLS) was fitted to Tank 912 without a 
padlock because the Motherwell staff thought that it was just an ‘anti-tamper’ 
device.   The site did not perform any testing to confirm whether the switch had 
been installed correctly and was fully operational.  If it had been tested, it would 
have provided the opportunity to fit the padlock so that it held the test lever in 
the correct position (The Competent Authority COMAH, 2011). 
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Risk Assessment 
Risk assessments of emergency responses were not in place as part of the 
emergency documentation.  These should have identified all potential credible 
scenarios, including the potential for multiple tank and bund fires, as well as 
taking into account the large volumes of fire-fighting water run-off (Buncefield 
Major Incident Investigation Board, 2008).  
Risk Management 
The Hertfordshire Oil Storage Ltd (HOSL) had a board of directors, but no-one to 
do the work, therefore the safety report was produced by a contractor.  This was 
never checked by the HOSL team (Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board, 
2008). 
Supply Chain & Procurement 
TAV Engineering Ltd was aware of the application of their switch in these high 
hazard systems although the information they provided with the switch did not 
suitably fulfil the requirement for such high criticality equipment.  The Supply 
chain should have identified this shortfall and put plans in place to rectify it (The 
Competent Authority COMAH, 2011). 
Process Audit 
The HOSL team was responsible for the production of a safety report under the 
conditions set out by COMAH, but they never checked it (Buncefield Major 
Incident Investigation Board, 2008). 
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Processes 
The tank filling and fuel movement procedures did not specify how to choose 
the correct tanks, or the levels that each tank should be filled to.  At the time it 
was common practice to slightly overfill tanks (The Competent Authority 
COMAH, 2011). 
Emergency Procedures 
The risk assessments associated with the emergency conditions did reflect the 
worst case scenarios, such as more than one tank involved in the fire and the 
breakdown of containment.  However, there was no up to date plan identifying 
the drainage systems or infrastructure on site.  Risk assessments of emergency 
responses were not in place as part of the emergency documentation.  Had this 
been done, the emergency response would have addressed the available fire-
fighting decisions, such as the benefits of a controlled burn off of the fuel against 
the use of firewater and the inevitable run-off environmental issues (The 
Competent Authority COMAH, 2011). 
Maintenance/Inspection 
The bunding of the tanks directly associated with the incident, and others at the 
Buncefield site had evidence of cracks.  This should have been identified and 
repaired as part of an inspection and maintenance regime (The Competent 
Authority COMAH, 2011). 
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Equipment State 
There were two main areas of equipment/systems that the investigation 
identified as being in poor repair.  These were tank bunding and drainage.  There 
were cases of tank bunding with cracks, and issues with perforated drains 
allowing firewater to drain away into the surrounding soil (The Competent 
Authority COMAH, 2011). 
Design 
Several design failings were found during the investigation, such as the 
independent high-level switch found on Tank 912.  TAV Engineering Ltd had 
designed the switch so that it could be routinely tested in situ.  A failing point 
was that those who operated and maintained the switch did not fully 
understand the full functionality, and as such the switch was made inoperable 
after performing a test.  Had there been a rigorous testing and acceptance 
process, this fault in the operation and the design of the switch could have been 
rectified.    
The mimic screens on the control system showed a red emergency shutdown 
button to close all tankside valves, this button had never been fitted to the 
system.  This issue was further exacerbated through the fact that it was never 
tested during practice emergency procedures.  Had this been done, the 
shortcomings in design would have been identified.  The design of the tank 
mimic pages on the monitoring system only allowed for one tank information 
window at a time.  If there was more than one tank being operated, the 
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operators would automatically stack the information windows with the chosen 
tank on top.  This meant that the operators could not physically see all the 
information that they required in order to manage effectively.   
The bunding of the tanks at the Buncefield site was poorly designed to withstand 
burning fuels.  Whilst the concrete dams performed well, the areas where pipes 
and conduits passed through the bunds failed.  When the secondary 
containment in the form of bunding failed, safety relied solely upon tertiary 
containment.  There was very little in the way of tertiary containment, so the 
burning liquids moved offsite.  The design of the firewater lagoon, intended to 
capture run-off firewater, failed due to the liner being susceptible to damage 
from the nearby explosions (The Competent Authority COMAH, 2011). 
Safety Systems 
A Safe System of Work (SSOW) should have been employed to capture any 
incidences of working outside of the ‘normal’ working envelope.  Had the SSOW 
been in place, it would have highlighted the requirement to reduce all possible 
related risks to an acceptable level.   A top tier COMAH site such as Buncefield 
was required to have a safety management system and associated safety 
reports, with the latter capturing the emergency response planning.  These 
reports did not consider the likelihood of more than one tank being involved in 
an incident at the same time.   
There was no apparent contractor control system or a management of change 
system in place to ensure that designs were fit for purpose and updated to 
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reflect current technology and invention.  The safety management systems in 
place focused more on SHE than process safety incidents (The Competent 
Authority COMAH, 2011).  
Summary of traits 
There were fourteen traits identified as the root cause for the Buncefield 
disaster [see Figure 4.3]. 
 
Buncefield - Identified Traits 
Suitably Qualified & Experienced Personnel (SQEP) 
Staff Management/Leadership 
Quality Audit 
Test Procedures 
Risk Assessment 
Risk Management 
Supply Chain & Procurement 
Process Audit 
Processes 
Emergency Procedures 
Maintenance/Inspection 
Equipment State 
Design 
Safety Systems 
Figure 4.3 – Buncefield Traits 
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4.5 Texaco Refinery 
The investigation into the 1994 Texaco Refinery Explosion carried out by the 
Health and Safety Executive (HSE, 1997), grouped the recommendations into six 
main areas: 
 Safety Management Systems. 
 Human Factors. 
 Plant Design.  
 Plant Modification. 
 Inspection Systems. 
 Emergency Planning. 
Within the context of the investigation report, and the referenced documents, 
there were a number of issues captured under the following trait headings: 
Suitably Qualified & Experienced Personnel (SQEP) 
There were issues with the training of operators, and the ability of these 
operators to work effectively under stressful conditions.  The company had a 
process by which management staff would help out in times of need, this if 
managed correctly could have been beneficial, but during emergency situations 
such as the one experienced at the site, the number of people involved were all 
working to separate agendas, which did not improve the response effort (HSE, 
1997).  
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Staff Management/Leadership 
Without a good communications plan, clear leadership and a working knowledge 
of processes, incorrect decisions were made during the disaster.  There was a 
requirement for a clear hierarchy of leadership and leaders needed to stand 
back and assess the situation in order to respond in a coordinated and effective 
manner (HSE, 1997). 
Risk Assessment 
The investigation found plant modifications that had not been subjected to any 
formal safety assessment process, such as the pump out modification to the 
Flare Drum.  This had a detrimental impact on the automatic liquid handling 
system, allowing liquid to pass through an outlet that was designed only for gas 
(HSE, 1997).  
Process Audit 
An emergency ad-hoc line made from steam hoses and used to drain down the 
Wet Gas Compressor Interstage Drum was put in place without following 
company procedures.  This meant that although there was an ability within the 
system to drain the Interstage Drum, there was no written procedure detailing 
how this should be done (HSE, 1997).  
Processes 
There was no evidence of formal design review, or process amendment for the 
pump out modification to the Flare Drum.  This modification allowed liquid to 
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pass through an outlet valve that was designed for gas only.  The disaster may 
have been avoided if the procedure had been amended, and had the ability to 
manually open a valve been known (HSE, 1997). 
Emergency Procedures 
The emergency teams were given credit for the fire-fighting and cooling effort 
required to bring this disaster under control.  They recycled fire-fighting water, 
after checking for flammable and toxic contaminates.  The investigation found 
that emergency procedures should have considered the vast amount of water 
required to provide a sustained fire-fighting effort, this would have raised the 
need to identify adequate water supplies (HSE, 1997).   
Maintenance/Inspection 
A number of instrument maintenance issues were identified during the 
investigation by the HSE.  Out of the thirty-nine instrument loops tested, twenty-
four were found to have issues that rendered the system inoperative.  A number 
of these faults were known and being ‘lived with’, some were due to design 
changes that the technicians may not have easily identified.  Had the 
modifications been through stringent design reviews, these issues would have 
been identified by the engineers.  There were a number of issues that could 
have been found through simple visual inspections.   
Out of all the faults that had been critical, none of them were seen to be safety 
critical (HSE, 1997). 
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Equipment State 
Apart from the investigation findings around plant modifications that had not 
been subjected to any formal safety assessment process there were issues with 
equipment condition.  The thirty inch diameter pipe from the vessel flare drum 
was severely corroded, with material down to 0.3mm near the area where it 
ruptured.  Although this corrosion may not have caused the rupture itself, since 
the pressures it was subjected to, were considerable.   
There were twenty four deficiencies associated with instrument maintenance, 
varying from minor issues to issues that seriously affected the automatic 
systems (HSE, 1997). 
Design 
The investigation identified several failures in the design of the system.  The 
most significant was associated with human interface devices such as the 
monitoring system displays.  The ability to monitor effectively was governed by 
which the screen the operator had selected, other alarms not associated with 
the systems, or equipment being monitored, were not seen by the operators.  
There was no apparent priority of alarms, whereby the most important safety 
critical alarms could be seen above all other alarms.  Instead, less important 
alarms were allowed to clutter the monitor, giving an incorrect tactical picture to 
base important decisions upon.   
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                      Figure 4.4 – Simplified Diagram of Texaco Refinery FCCU  
The investigation found evidence of plant modifications that had not been 
subjected to any formal safety assessment process, such as the pump out 
modification to the Flare Knockout Drum [Figure 4.4 – shown in red].  Prior to 
this modification, all liquid that collected in the lowest section of the Flare 
Knockout Drum was sent to a slops tank via an automatically operated valve and 
a normally open manually operated valve.  The modification meant that any 
liquid collecting in the Flare Knockout Drum would be re-cycled through the 
system via the automatic valve, with the manually operated valve now normally 
in the shut position.  As the liquid was re-cycled through the system, the levels 
rose.  Until the level was enough to have a detrimental impact on the automatic 
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liquid handling system, allowing liquid to pass through an outlet to the Flare 
Stack that was designed only for gas [Figure 4.4 – arrow from Flare Knockout 
Drum].  There was no evidence of a formal design review, or any process 
amendment to account for this modification which ultimately changed the 
protection from automatic to manual.  The disaster may have been avoided if 
the procedure had been amended and the ability to manually open this normally 
shut valve been known (HSE, 1997). 
Safety Systems 
The symptoms that caused this disaster had been identified in other major 
incidences around the world, but there was no evidence of any learning from 
these other catastrophes, nor the use of safety management systems to capture 
information from these incident reports and investigations.  A safety 
management system could have used this information to instruct work and 
internal investigations into the systems and equipment used at the Texaco 
Refinery.  These internal investigations would have highlighted similar issues and 
have driven suitable mitigation to reduce the potential to cause harm within the 
site (HSE, 1997). 
Learning/Capturing Lessons 
The fires at Texaco burned for three days.  Even though there was evidence from 
disasters at other petrochemical plants that fires may burn for many days, the 
emergency procedures at Texaco did not cover fires that burnt for more than 
twenty-four hours (HSE, 1997). 
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Summary of traits 
There were eleven traits that, when occurring together, were identified as the 
root cause for the Texaco disaster [see Figure 4.5]. 
Texaco - Identified Traits 
Suitably Qualified & Experienced Personnel (SQEP) 
Staff Management/Leadership 
Risk Assessment 
Process Audit 
Processes 
Emergency Procedures 
Maintenance/Inspection 
Equipment State 
Design 
Safety Systems 
Learning/Capturing Lessons 
Figure 4.5 – Texaco Traits 
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4.6 BP Deepwater Horizon 
The investigations into the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster carried out by BP and 
the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore 
Drilling, found several issues which were grouped into: 
 Operating Management System. 
 Contractor Assurance. 
 Safety Culture. 
 Maintenance. 
 Design Management and Evaluation. 
 Risk Assessment. 
Within the context of the investigation report, and other referenced document, 
there were a number of issues that have been captured under the following trait 
headings: 
Suitably Qualified & Experienced Personnel (SQEP) 
The investigation suggested the requirement for BP to introduce in house 
expertise in subsea blowout preventers (BOPs) and blowout preventer control 
systems.  The investigation also found the requirement for the development of a 
Segment Engineering Technical Authority (SETA) role to provide independent 
assurance of contractor BOPs and BOP control systems.  There was also a call for 
the International Association of Drilling Contractors to develop formal 
certification for those responsible for BOPs and BOP control systems (BP, 2010). 
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One finding associated with SQEP was the requirement to enhance the drilling 
and completions competency programs, so that it would enforce the capabilities 
of personnel in key operational positions (Fire and Blast Information Group, 
2012). 
Working Culture 
A survey of the Transocean crew carried out on behalf of Transocean earlier that 
year, found that the team were relatively strong in certain core areas.  They also 
found that approximately 46% of the crew feared reprisals for reporting unsafe 
acts, and 15% thought that sometimes there weren’t enough people to carry out 
the processes safely (National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 
and Offshore Drilling, 2011). 
Quality Assurance/Control 
There was no apparent quality assurance of the cement design and testing.  Had 
the BP Macondo well team performed a more detailed quality assurance of the 
foam slurry design, this may have resulted in either a re-design or additional 
steps to confirm zonal isolation which would have prevented the incident from 
occurring (BP, 2010).  
Quality Audit 
There were a number of quality audit failings identified by the investigation, 
including issues with the BP’s Drilling and Well Operations Practice (DWOP) and 
the implementation of the Operating Management System (OMS).  These issues 
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incorporated the need to review the Engineering Technical Practices (ETPs) for 
their suitability and for levels of configuration control (BP p.l.c., 2013).  
Test Procedures 
The BP’s Macondo team had made several changes to the temporary 
abandonment procedures in the weeks leading up to the disaster, including the 
changes to the depth that they set the cement plug from the original eight 
thousand three hundred and sixty-seven feet to six thousand feet, and changing 
the procedure from requiring a negative pressure test, to a procedure that 
didn’t mention anything about a negative pressure test. 
Risk Assessment 
There was no evidence found to prove that any of the temporary abandonment 
procedural changes had been through any formal change management process, 
or whether they had been subjected to a full risk assessment to identify the 
levels of risk associated with the change.  This highlighted the fact that without 
an attempt to understand what the risks were, it would be impossible to 
demonstrate that they had been reduced to an acceptable level (National 
Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 2011).  
Risk Management 
The planning for final abandonment fell under the BP internal guidelines 
Engineering Technical Practice 10-60 (ETP 10-60) (National Commission on the 
BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 2011), as such it should 
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have undergone a formal risk assessment, if risk management systems existed.  
This may well have allowed the BP Macondo team to propose further mitigation 
(BP p.l.c., 2013). 
Supply Chain & Procurement 
The investigations found evidence that non-Original Engineering Manufacturer 
(OEM) parts had been used.  The procurement process should have identified 
these Non-OEM parts and the need to assess whether they were fit for purpose. 
Process Audit 
The review process for the slurry cement design, including foam stability, 
contamination effects and fluid loss potential, were not critically assessed.  Had 
there been a process audit, this may have highlighted this issue (BP p.l.c., 2013).  
Processes 
BP’s Engineering Technical Practice (ETP) document ‘GP 10-60 – Zonal Isolation 
Requirements during Drilling Operations and Well Abandonment and 
Suspension’, specified that the top of cement (TOC) should be one thousand feet 
above any distinct permeable zones, and that this zone should extend to one 
hundred feet above this.  If this cannot be achieved then the TOC should been 
calculated using a proven cement evaluation technique applicable to the oil and 
gas industry.   
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The investigation found that there was no evidence of this process having been 
undertaken (BP p.l.c., 2013). 
Emergency Procedures 
The fluid returns from the well should be monitored for any traces of 
hydrocarbons during the drilling and completion (D&C) operations.  The 
investigation found that the rig crew did not recognise these indicators.  When 
this influx occurred, the crew should have responded immediately with the 
correct emergency procedure.  If the crew had diverted the hydrocarbons 
through the fourteen inch overboard diverter, it would probably have reduced 
the majority of the gas discharged overboard.   
The subsea supervisor should have activated the emergency disconnect 
sequence (EDS), to disconnect the riser from the blowout preventers (BOPs) 
stack.  The investigation found no indication to suggest that this was attempted 
(BP, 2010). 
Maintenance/Inspection 
A BP audit team audited the Deepwater Horizon platform in 2009.  They 
identified a large amount of maintenance items that were overdue by more than 
30 days.  Some of these maintenance items were high priority and associated 
with the blowout preventer (BOP) maintenance.  There were issues with the way 
that the maintainers captured and managed information pertaining to the 
maintenance carried out, they were found to be using log books and 
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spreadsheets to manage maintenance, rather that the Transocean maintenance 
management system (RMS-II).  The fact that the information wasn’t in one place, 
made it extremely difficult to track what had and what hadn’t been completed 
(BP, 2010). 
Equipment State 
On recovery from the sea bed after the incident, a blowout preventer (BOP) 
solenoid valve used to close the Blind Shear Ram (BSR), to seal the well, was 
found to be defective and had a non-Original Engineering Manufacturer (OEM) 
electrical connecter fitted.  There were other items in the BOP found defective, 
these were believed to have been present before the disaster struck, and not 
associated with the explosions due to the fact that they were situated on the sea 
bed (BP, 2010). 
Design 
The investigation identified several modifications that had been made to the 
blowout preventer (BOP), which had not been accepted through a design review 
process.  These modifications had the potential to adversely affect the 
effectiveness of the BOP (BP, 2010). 
Safety Systems 
The safety manual was unstructured, difficult to navigate, not written for the 
end user and provided a poor distinction between the requirement and how it 
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should be achieved (National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 
and Offshore Drilling, 2011). 
Learning/Capturing Lessons 
On March 8th 2010 there was a kick (reservoir fluids entering wellbore due to an 
underbalance) at a depth of thirteen thousand two hundred and fifty feet, the 
rig crew did not notice this for thirty-three minutes.  There was no evidence that 
Transocean took any documented or corrective actions from this earlier lesson 
to brief the team or to reduce the response time (BP, 2010). 
On December 23rd 2009, a similar incident occurred on a North Sea rig four 
months before the Macondo disaster.  This resulted in a tonne of oily mud 
entering the North Sea and cost Transocean five million pounds in expenses and 
an additional eleven point two additional days of work.  Transocean created a 
PowerPoint presentation with three main bullet points: 
 High vigilance when reduced to one barrier underbalanced. 
 Recognise when going underbalanced – heightened vigilance. 
 Highlight what the kick indicators are when not drilling. 
Transocean sent out an ‘operations advisory’ to the North Sea fleet on April 14th 
2010.  Neither presentation nor operations advisory were received by the 
Macondo rig crew (National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 
and Offshore Drilling, 2011). 
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Summary of traits 
There were sixteen traits that, when occurring together, were identified as the 
root cause for the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster [see Figure 4.6]. 
BP Deepwater Horizon - Identified Traits 
Suitably Qualified & Experienced Personnel (SQEP) 
Working Culture 
Quality Assurance/Control 
Quality Audit 
Test Procedures 
Risk Assessment 
Risk Management 
Supply Chain & Procurement 
Process Audit 
Processes 
Emergency Procedures 
Maintenance/Inspection 
Equipment State 
Design 
Safety Systems 
Learning/Capturing Lessons 
Figure 4.6 – BP Deepwater Horizon Traits 
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4.7 Bhopal 
There were several reports and cases studies explaining the root causes 
associated with the disaster.  Some of these reports were first-hand accounts of 
the incident from employees (Chouhan, 2005), officials (Bisarya & Swaraj, 2005) 
and the senior health, safety and environmental affairs officer involved in the 
accident at the time (Browning, 1993). The findings vary slightly, but can be 
categorised into: 
 Lack of trained personnel. 
 Poor staff management. 
 Poor working culture. 
 Lack of maintenance/inspection. 
 Emergency processes. 
 Design failure. 
Within the context of the investigation report, and other referenced documents, 
there were a number of issues captured under the following trait headings: 
Suitably Qualified & Experienced Personnel (SQEP) 
Once funding started to dry up at the Bhopal plant, so did investment in training 
employees.  Those that were qualified looked for better paid jobs elsewhere, 
leaving the plant without an adequate level of trained personnel.  As these 
senior people moved on, other less senior people replaced them, and so the 
numbers of experienced people went into decline.  Without this ‘knowledge 
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base’ the plant also went into decline, and by 1984 the plant was at 20% 
capacity (Peterson, 2008). 
Staff Management/Leadership 
With the experienced senior management and leadership teams absent due to 
better paid jobs elsewhere, and the inexperienced personnel having moved into 
these positions of authority without necessarily having gained the 
commensurate levels of management experience, the overall levels and 
effectiveness of management and leadership also went into decline (Peterson, 
2008).   
Working Culture 
During the washing operation, an operator noticed that two of the bleeder 
valves were not allowing water to pass as they should have done.  He stopped 
the operation and reported the issue to his superior.  This supervisor’s 
background was in operations rather than maintenance, so he did not fully 
understand the process and ordered the operator was to continue the wash 
down sequence (Peterson, 2008).   
Risk Assessment 
There was no evidence that the risks associated with the poor state of the plant 
had been captured, or whether any attempt been made to reduce them to an 
acceptable level (Peterson, 2008). 
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Risk Management 
Even though leadership and management at the Bhopal plant knew that the 
equipment and systems had fallen into a state of disrepair, and that the level of 
knowledge and experience within the workforce was falling rapidly due to the 
exodus of experienced personnel, there was no increased risk management 
activity at the site.  Had all this been taken into account, the risks associated 
with lack of funding and experienced operators could have been mitigated to an 
acceptable level, even if this meant shutting down operations (Peterson, 2008).  
Emergency Procedures 
The firewater spray system would not reach to cool the top of the flare stack, 
had the emergency procedures existed and had they been practised, this would 
have been realised and resolved.   
The Bhopal Police were not prepared for the emergency situation that they 
found themselves in.  The evacuation was thought to have been initiated by a 
retired army officer who worked at an industrial plant nearby, resulting in an 
army engineering unit evacuating the personnel from that unit to a local 
hospital.  Although the hospital did not know what to do, since there was 
nothing to help them identify what the gas was, and therefore what the antidote 
might be (Peterson, 2008). 
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Maintenance/Inspection 
The lack of experienced personnel meant that the levels of maintenance were 
falling and several areas had fallen into a state of disrepair.  Should the system in 
question have been subjected to inspection, the fact that it was not fit for 
purpose would have been realised.  
Equipment State 
Due to the lack of maintenance and inspection, several areas had fallen into a 
state of disrepair, including the vent scrubber which was designed to pass 
escaping gas through caustic soda to neutralise it before discharging to 
atmosphere.   
Other areas such as the flare stack were designed to neutralise the gas using a 
flame, but this did not have the capacity to cope with a major leak of gas.  
Systems such as the refrigeration system, designed to keep the methyl 
isocyanate (MIC) storage tanks cool, had been rendered inoperative several 
months before the disaster so that the Freon gas could be used elsewhere at the 
plant (Peterson, 2008).   
Design 
The plant began construction in 1968 when the local population of Bhopal was 
approximately three-hundred thousand and the areas near the plant were 
mainly uninhabited.  As other industries moved in nearby the plant, so the 
electrical infrastructure was improved and people began moving into 
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developments close to the plant.   Even though the plant formally applied to 
produce the pesticide SEVIN, central government classified the plant and its 
operations as ‘general industry’.  Had the plant been designated as ‘hazardous 
industry’, the nearby settlements would not have been allowed to have been 
developed (Browning, 1993). 
The design of the firewater spray ‘fire suppression and gas neutralisation 
system’ did not reach the top of the flare stack and so was rendered useless to 
provide any neutralisation of escaping gases (Peterson, 2008).     
Funding 
Whilst the Bhopal plant was manufacturing fertilisers, through the use of highly 
concentrated chemicals, it remained a profitable business.  Once the Indian 
Government had decided that the plant should manufacture chemicals onsite, 
the problems began.   
The plant invested heavily in research and development to find methods of 
locally manufacturing alpha-napthol.  After failing to develop fertilisers through 
the alpha-naphthol process twice, in 1978 and 1981, and the increased pressure 
applied by the Indian Government to locally produce methyl isocyanate, the 
plant made losses, and without additional funding the plant went into decline 
(Peterson, 2008). 
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Summary of traits 
There were ten (10) traits that, when occurring together, were identified as the 
root cause for the Bhopal disaster [see Figure 4.7]. 
Bhopal - Identified Traits 
Suitably Qualified & Experienced Personnel (SQEP) 
Staff Management/Leadership 
Working Culture 
Risk Assessment 
Risk Management 
Emergency Procedures 
Maintenance/Inspection 
Equipment State 
Design 
Funding 
Figure 4.7 – Bhopal Traits 
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4.8 Chernobyl 
The investigations into the cause of the Chernobyl Disaster, carried out by the 
World Nuclear Association (Chernobyl Accident 1986, n.d.), the British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC, nd), the International Nuclear Safety Group 
(INSAG), who are part of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 
produced several documents on the subject with INSAG-7 being the most up to 
date (International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, 1992).  This latter document 
identified seven main areas of failure: 
 Design. 
 Operator Actions. 
 Safety Framework. 
 Implications of Ignoring Deficiencies. 
 Importance of Competent Safety Analysis. 
 Deficiencies in the Regulatory Regime. 
 Lack of Safety Culture. 
Using the information from the investigation report, and the other referenced 
documents, the issues were captured under the following trait headings: 
Suitably Qualified & Experienced Personnel (SQEP) 
There were a number of conflicting reports into the cause of the Chernobyl 
disaster, each commissioned by different groups with different agendas.  Some 
report that the cause of the incident was due to operator error and others due 
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to the reactor design.  There were also claims that the plant management team 
were non-RBMK qualified personnel.  
The subsequent investigations undertaken by the international atomic agency 
identified a number of issues around operating experience and shortfalls in 
communications between designers, engineers, manufacturers, constructors, 
operators and the regulators.  The operators had to rely upon experience rather 
than using the instrumentation, this could result in the need for approximately 
one thousand manipulations of the system per hour (International Nuclear 
Safety Advisory Group, 1992).  
Staff Management/Leadership 
An independent organisation to regulate the nuclear industry within the Soviet 
Union did not exist at the time of the incident.  This would have enforced the 
requirement for a safety culture and strong safety management system, and 
would have driven the leadership to enforce it (International Nuclear Safety 
Advisory Group, 1992). 
Working Culture 
Nuclear power plants in the USSR at the time of the Chernobyl disaster were 
known not to have a safe working culture, demonstrated by the lack of 
regulation, dissemination and enforcement of existing protocols.  There were 
known issues with the following of locally developed procedures, such as the act 
of switching off the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) for extended periods 
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of time.  These local procedures contradicted the recognised procedure that 
should have been followed (International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, 1992). 
Quality Assurance/Control 
There was little evidence of quality assurance or control, illustrated by the 
apparent lack of understanding the problems associated with the RBMK reactors 
which may have been directly linked to the poor quality of the design 
calculations and subsequent analysis derived from computer modelling.  Until 
only shortly before the disaster occurred, the quality of Soviet computer 
modelling technics was very low (International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, 
1992). 
Test Procedures 
The isolation of the Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) was an approved 
step in the test procedure at the Chernobyl reactor if it was authorised by the 
Chief Engineer, although this was meant to be reported as a violation of 
procedures if it was isolated beyond the timelines of the test.  The plant had 
been at a half power state for eleven hours leading up to the test and the ECCS 
had been blocked for all this time, in clear contravention of test procedures.  It is 
to be noted that the disaster was not initiated by this breakdown in procedure 
(International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, 1992). 
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Risk Assessment 
The issues with this type of reactor were already known, similar design and 
process issues had been observed within the Leningrad nuclear power plant in 
1975 and again at the Ignalina nuclear power plant in 1983.  Unfortunately these 
known issues were not risk assessed in order to fully understand the 
complexities and resultant consequences.  Had these consequences been 
realised, they could have been investigated and design changes made to rectify 
the situation (International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, 1992). 
Risk Management 
The views of the INSAG investigation team are that the design of the RMBK four 
reactor did not meet the standards set in the original design.  Had a safety 
framework been in place, this would have provided a risk management system 
to ensure that designs were reviewed and assessed as to fitness for purpose 
(International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, 1992). 
Process Audit 
The poor quality of operating procedures was in certain circumstances mainly 
due to several inherent design defects (International Nuclear Safety Advisory 
Group, 1992).  Had there been a systematic process audit in place, this would 
have been identified as an issue. 
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There were a number of reported violations of procedures.  One of which was 
the flow of coolant water from the eight main coolant pumps.  The running of all 
eight pumps was not forbidden during test procedures although the resulting 
flow rates were known to be above the recommended levels captured in the 
procedures.  Another violation was to allow the reactor to operate at a low level 
Operating Reactivity Margin (ORM).   
This effectively increased the volume of bubbles from the boiling primary 
coolant water causing voids, and the positioning of control rods so that they 
were in a position that led to the destruction of the reactor (International 
Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, 1992). 
Emergency Procedures 
Due to the inability of the operators to accomplish the correct power level, the 
test procedure had been changed several times, leading to the reactor being in a 
highly unstable condition prior to the test.  Once the conditions were known to 
be incorrect, the test should have been stopped and the reactor brought to a 
safe state (International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, 1992). 
Design 
A nuclear reactor should be designed so that in the event of an emergency 
condition, an automatic response would bring that condition back into a safe 
state.  The RBMK reactors relied upon the quick response of human intervention 
from the operators.  The report found that there was no emergency shutdown 
to drop the control rods, or ‘SCRAM’ [Safety Cut Rope Axe Man] (Oak Ridge 
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National Laboratory (ORNL), 2000) the reactor.  It was believed, but difficult to 
determine absolutely, that due to poor procedures and practices the control 
rods were inserted into the reactor at incorrect timings and speeds.  This was 
thought to have caused the positive power spike which destroyed the reactor 
(International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, 1992). 
Safety Systems 
Competent safety analysis is extremely important in any safety management 
system to demonstrate that the required level of safety that has been applied to 
the process.  Had these design deficiencies been investigated at the time, it may 
have identified the associated problems and possibly highlighted some of the 
solutions (International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, 1992). 
Learning/Capturing Lessons 
The problems associated with the procedures undertaken at the Chernobyl 
reactor had already been identified at the Leningrad nuclear power plant in 1975 
and again at the Ignalina nuclear power plant in 1983.  There was no indication 
that these lessons had been captured or used to inform the understanding or re-
design the system or procedures (International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, 
1992). 
  
  
 
127 
Summary of traits 
There were thirteen traits that, when occurring together, were identified as the 
root cause for the Chernobyl disaster [see Figure 4.8]. 
Chernobyl - Identified Traits 
Suitably Qualified & Experienced Personnel (SQEP) 
Staff Management/Leadership 
Working Culture 
Quality Assurance/Control 
Test Procedures 
Risk Assessment 
Risk Management 
Process Audit 
Processes 
Emergency Procedures 
Design 
Safety Systems 
Learning/Capturing Lessons 
Figure 4.8 – Chernobyl Traits 
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4.9 Challenger  
After the Challenger Space Shuttle disaster, on the 3rd February 1986, the United 
States Senate gave Executive Order ‘12546’ which demanded a report on the 
disaster.  The Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle 
Challenger Accident (NASA, 1986) was completed on the 2nd May 1986.  
The main issues identified in this report were: 
 Safety Management. 
 Design Management. 
 Poor Management and Leadership. 
 Supply Chain Issues. 
Within the context of the investigation report, and the supporting referenced 
documents, there were a number of identified issues captured under the 
following trait headings: 
Staff Management/Leadership 
The Morton Thiokol Incorporated (MTI) Engineer had repeatedly told his senior 
management that there were issues with the ‘O’ seals and that these issues 
were exacerbated by low temperatures.  The conference call the day before the 
launch should have backed up the engineering decision for a ‘no-launch’, but 
senior management made a call based upon need for future contracts and not 
on the evidence before them (National Academy of Engineering, 2006). 
  
 
129 
NASA did not challenge the revised launch decision, even though they too 
should have asked MTI to demonstrate that the Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) was 
safe to operate in low temperatures (NASA, 1986). 
Working Culture 
The working culture at MTI was based around keeping the contract and 
maximising profit.  MTI knew at the very early stages of development that 
additional effort should have been put into the development of a better ‘O’ seal 
solution.  This lack of initial development work was associated with the bid value 
contracted by MTI (National Academy of Engineering, 2006).  The decision to 
launch, made by MTI and accepted by NASA, was based upon the information at 
hand at the time and on the pressing requirement to launch.  Retrospectively 
looking at this incident and second guessing those involved at the time, doesn’t 
do the situation justice.  Both NASA and MTI were under a lot of pressure to 
launch on time, and to admit to additional restrictions on launch caused by 
temperature conditions, went against the initial requirement of the space 
shuttle to meet programmed flights all year round.  Had there been the 
additional conscience of safety engineers and quality engineers representing 
both MTI and NASA present at the meeting, then the no-launch call may have 
been made.   
Quality Assurance/Control 
The level of safety engineering, quality assurance and quality control that NASA 
had during the Apollo missions was no longer evident during the Space Shuttle 
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era.  Had this been present at the teleconference meeting on January 27th 1986, 
then they may have insisted on a no-launch condition. 
Risk Assessment 
The concept of risk assessment was lost, NASA appeared to be requiring MTI, 
the contractor, to prove that it ‘was not’ safe to launch, rather than proving that 
it ‘was’ safe to launch.  The MTI engineers had proof that the ‘O’ seals 
performance deteriorated as the temperatures dropped.  This should have been 
enough to drive NASA and MTI to stop the launch and to undergo in depth 
testing to fully understand the science behind the issue, and what could be done 
to mitigate this risk to an acceptable level. 
Risk Management 
The investigating commission found that the freeze protection plan developed 
by NASA for Launchpad 39B was inadequate.  The amount of ice that was 
present on the fixed service structure and around the emergency escape 
equipment was beyond the acceptable limit to launch.  They found that the 
margins of safety used by NASA had been whittled down too far (NASA, 1986).  
This was clear evidence of a poor risk management system. 
Supply Chain & Procurement 
One of the early solutions to the possibility that the joints would flex during the 
excessive forces that it underwent during take-off, was to pack the inside of the 
joint with a special putty.  Each SRM was designed to be recovered after each 
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launch and used multiple times, and on some of the recovered SRMs there were 
holes found in the putty where ignition gases had escaped.  The type of putty 
used in some of the latter SRM launches was tested and found to be of a 
different compound than the original agreed design, due to changes made by 
the suppliers without the knowledge of MTI (NASA, 1986). 
Design 
Even though MTI knew that the initial SRM design should have had more 
investment, but in keeping the bid price down, this was never realised.  Once the 
issues with low temperatures and the potential for SRM leaking ‘O’ seals was 
identified, a full investigation and redesign was required, but was never 
undertaken because it would have interfered with the production schedule 
(National Academy of Engineering, 2006). 
Safety Systems 
One of the most glaring examples of poor safety management was the lack of 
both safety engineering and quality assurance engineering representation at the 
teleconference held on the 27th January 1986, the day before the disaster.  The 
safety, reliability and quality assurance functions that existed throughout the 
Apollo programmed, to ensure that all issues were assessed for potential safety 
concerns, had become ineffective prior to the Shuttle programme (National 
Academy of Engineering, 2006). 
A fundamental issue with the way both MTI and NASA reacted with this issue 
was the requirement to prove that low temperature would have an adverse 
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effect.  Instead the requirement should have been to prove that the SRM ‘O’ 
seals were safe to use at low temperatures. 
Summary of traits 
There were eight traits that, when occurring together, were identified as the 
root cause for the Challenger disaster [see Figure 4.9]. 
Challenger - Identified Traits 
Staff Management/Leadership 
Working Culture 
Quality Assurance/Control 
Risk Assessment 
Risk Management 
Supply Chain & Procurement 
Design 
Safety Systems 
Figure 4.9 – Challenger Traits 
  
  
 
133 
4.10 Royal Air Force Nimrod XV230  
The investigation into the cause of the Nimrod XV230 mid-flight explosion, and 
the wider issues associated with the incident was carried out on behalf of the 
Secretary of State for Defence by Charles Haddon-Cave QC (Haddon-Cave, 2009). 
This report found failures in: 
 Leadership. 
 Culture. 
 Design management. 
 Safety management. 
Within the context of the investigation report, and the other referenced 
documents, there were the following identified traits: 
Suitably Qualified & Experienced Personnel (SQEP) 
The report named a few areas that had personnel in positions that they were 
not qualified to be in, one of which was the Ministry of Defence (MOD) Safety 
Manager.  He reportedly had never been involved in a safety case before, had 
never managed such a hazard management project before, and he knew very 
little about Nimrods (Haddon-Cave, 2009).   
Staff Management/Leadership 
Those involved in the ownership, design management and production areas, did 
not fully understand their responsibilities and there was evidence that some of 
the higher level responsibility was left to relatively junior team members.  There 
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was little evidence of interaction between the military and industrial partners, 
especially when it came to the auditing of work undertaken on behalf of the 
military.  There was little or no clarity around responsibilities and deliverables, 
and especially the importance of measured handovers and acceptance criteria 
(Haddon-Cave, 2009). 
Working Culture 
The culture of those involved with the Nimrod programme, both military and 
industry, was based around the assumption that the planes were safe because 
there had been no accidents in their thirty year lifetime.  The report found that 
the safety case paperwork essentially was a tick-box exercise.  There were a 
number of corners cut in the development of the safety case, and there was 
evidence of poor planning and execution (Haddon-Cave, 2009).  
Risk Assessment 
The risk assessments were criticised due to the ‘endemic’ use of PowerPoint 
briefings to demonstrate engineering, instead of using technical papers to 
provide the detailed technical analysis that was required to make an informed 
decision on the level of risk associated with each hazard.  Without this level of 
information it would be impractical to assume that a safety committee could 
justify the commensurate level of risk and to provide an endorsed statement to 
support this (Haddon-Cave, 2009). 
  
  
 
135 
Risk Management 
The risk management system used to produce the Nimrod Safety Case (NSC) was 
flawed; it had forty percent of the hazards down as still ‘Open’ and thirty 
percent still ‘Unclassified’.  There were several factual errors, errors in analysis 
and errors in the classification of risks (Haddon-Cave, 2009). 
Process Audit 
The reporting and reviewing process audit of the oil leaks, reportable via ‘leaflet 
70’, was found to be questionable, and there was no follow up action by the 
MOD to look at these reports (Haddon-Cave, 2009).  This demonstrated the lack 
of process audit within industry and the MOD. 
Processes 
The Haddon-Cave report found that the process for developing and maintaining 
the safety case was ‘fatally undermined by a general malaise’ (Haddon-Cave, 
2009).   The report also identified issues with the procurement process. 
Equipment State 
The various couplings in the fuel systems used ‘O’ seals as the primary seal, 
these seals were known to leak, but only replaced during routine corrective 
maintenance.  The Avimo couplings were known, post 2000, to be using ‘O’ seals 
that were made of a non-conforming material, and yet were still being used on 
the aircraft.  The insulation used on the Supplementary Conditioning Packs (SCP) 
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hot air exhaust ducts was susceptible to degradation, and so left areas of 
exhaust unprotected.  Due to funding constraints, some of these issues could 
not be funded and therefore went unchecked (Haddon-Cave, 2009). 
Design 
With any equipment or system, there should be an agreed Design Intent, which 
is the original planned intention for use of the equipment or system in question.  
A design management system should look at a specific design change 
requirement and manage it so that the required change does not affect the 
original design intent, or if there is reason for changing the design intent, this is 
done in a measured way to ensure that it does not impact any other equipment 
or system in a derogatory manner.  Fitting of the SCP and Air to Air Refuelling 
(AAR) equipment instantly changed the design intent and created a fire hazard.  
The designers, operators and maintainers knew that the couplings used in the 
fuel system leaked, but there was no enforced regular maintenance task to 
inspect these pipes, nor any planned replacement of the non-conforming ‘O’ 
seals used in the couplings (Haddon-Cave, 2009). 
Safety Systems 
There were several major issues raised with the safety management of the 
hazard database and the building of the safety argument.  Out of the whole 
hazard database, forty percent of the hazards were left ‘Open’ and thirty 
percent were still ‘Unclassified’.  There were several errors in the calculation of 
risk levels, based upon factual and analytical errors.  There was no evidence that 
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the design modifications for SCP and AAR equipment had been subjected to 
proper assessment.  They had missed the fact that when a fuel source and 
ignition source were created within the same location, it became a fire zone and 
should be mitigated to bring the overall risk to a level that was As Low As is 
Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) and endorsed by a safety committee.  One of 
the ‘Unclassified’ risks concerned this fire hazard (Haddon-Cave, 2009). 
Learning/Capturing Lessons 
A Nimrod Airworthiness Review Team report dated 1998 warned of the conflict 
between ever-reducing resources and increasing demands that are being placed 
upon them, and the note that more emphasis should be placed on safety in 
order to safeguard the airworthiness of the fleet in the future.  Unfortunately 
these warnings were not heeded by the MOD (Haddon-Cave, 2009). 
Summary of traits 
There were eleven traits that, when occurring together, were identified as the 
root cause for the RAF Nimrod XV230 air disaster [see Figure 4.10]. 
RAF Nimrod XV230 - Identified Traits 
Suitably Qualified & Experienced Personnel (SQEP) 
Staff Management/Leadership 
Working Culture 
Risk Assessment 
Risk Management 
Process Audit 
Processes 
Equipment State 
Design 
Safety Systems 
Learning/Capturing Lessons 
Figure 4.10 – RAF Nimrod XV230 Traits 
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4.11 King’s Cross Underground Fire 
The formal investigation into the circumstances behind the King’s Cross 
underground fire was undertaken by Desmond Fennell OBE QC, on behalf of the 
Secretary of State for Transport (Fennell, 1988).  This investigation found several 
issues that either led to the fire occurring, or played a part in the impact of the 
fire.  These areas were: 
 Emergency Procedures. 
 Design and Maintenance Management. 
 Management and Leadership. 
 Safety Management. 
Within the context of the investigation report, and the other referenced 
documents, there were a number of issues captured under the following trait 
headings: 
Suitably Qualified & Experienced Personnel (SQEP) 
Until the King’s Cross Underground Fire disaster in 1987, the quality of staff 
training at the White City railway training centre had been inadequate.  The 
method of instruction had been just note taking and questioning, with the 
subject matter generally insufficient and out of date.  There were no central 
records kept to record the level of training each person had received during their 
career, which made the update of qualifications next to impossible to achieve 
(Fennell, 1988). 
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Staff Management/Leadership 
The owner of the underground, London Regional Transport, believed that the 
operators, London Underground, were responsible for all operational matters 
including safety.  The report also identified that London Underground believed 
that fires were inevitable, but confident because no previous escalator fire had 
caused a death (Fennell, 1988). 
Risk Assessment 
There were a number of known risks associated with the wooden escalators and 
the fact that it was common knowledge that passengers lit up cigarettes as they 
were exiting the underground.  This did not drive the requirement to remove 
ignitable debris from the escalators tracks, nor the need to monitor these areas 
more closely (Fennell, 1988). 
Emergency Procedures 
As a result of the Paddington fire on 24th December 1944, due to smoking 
materials falling in the escalator, the underside of the wooden style escalators 
were fitted with a water fog fire-fighting spray system, which was designed to 
dampen down the underside of these escalators and to put out fires.  Even 
though escalator number four was fitted with such a system, it was not operated 
on discovery of the fire.  Instead the employee went for the CO2 extinguisher 
which could not be operated due to the ferocity of the fire (Fennell, 1988).   
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There were emergency planning procedures in place, but the employee who 
went to inspect the fire was not used to the layout at King’s Cross, nor had they 
received any specific fire training.  The London Underground did not have an 
emergency evacuation plan.  After finding out that emergency services radio 
equipment did not work on the underground, the alarm was eventually raised by 
a Policeman who ran to the surface.  Police officers evacuated people via the 
Victoria Line escalator, believing that this was the quickest way to evacuate 
passengers, unfortunately it wasn’t.   
If there had been an emergency plan it would have defined the best evacuation 
routes to use for different scenarios (Fennell, 1988). 
Maintenance/Inspection 
The running tracks of the escalator were dirty with dust, fibres, debris and old 
grease, and therefore not properly lubricated.  These should have been cleaned 
and lubricated, but due to the design of the escalator, this cleaning was 
impractical without dismantling the entire escalator (Fennell, 1988).   
Equipment State 
The investigation found that it was likely that the escalator tracks had never 
been cleaned properly, even though the recommendation from the Paddington 
fire called for more regular cleaning and lubrication (Fennell, 1988). 
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Design 
The escalator was made of plywood covered metal and maple wood cleats for 
tread, with a metal fire cleat on each side to prevent cigarette ends and matches 
from dropping down below the steps.  Two weeks before incident, gaps 
between the treads were noticed on the Piccadilly Line escalator number four at 
King’s Cross.  It was presumed that this had been caused by the sideways 
‘crabbing’ movement of the escalator whilst in use.  It was also reported that 
approximately thirty percent of these fire cleats were missing (Fennell, 1988).  
Safety Systems 
Prior to the incident there was a limited understanding of what a safety 
management system was required to achieve, and the London Underground did 
not have any system to identify and eliminate hazards (Fennell, 1988). 
Funding 
There were plans to fit fire detection equipment and automatic fire suppression 
equipment, from 1948.  There had even been several trial systems fitted in 1954 
and 1964.  The proposals were to incorporate a fully automatic system, but this 
was intentionally left off the budget on one occasion and was rejected at a later 
date due to the limited expected remaining life of the wooden escalators, 
therefore not justifying the cost outlay (Fennell, 1988). 
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Learning/Capturing Lessons 
After the Paddington fire in 1944, a review found that there had been seventy-
seven fires on escalators in the five years leading up to 1944, caused in the main 
due to smoking materials being dropped into the gap.  Even though there was a 
smoking ban in force on the underground, there was proof that people were 
smoking on escalators as they were approaching the exit.  In fact there were 
forty-six escalator fires in the period from 1956 to 1988, thirty-two of which 
were directly associated with smokers’ materials (Fennell, 1988). 
Summary of traits 
There were ten traits that, when occurring together, were identified as the root 
cause for the King’s Cross Underground rail disaster [see Figure 4.11]. 
King’s Cross - Identified Traits 
Suitably Qualified & Experienced Personnel (SQEP) 
Staff Management/Leadership 
Risk Assessment 
Emergency Procedures 
Maintenance/Inspection 
Equipment State 
Design 
Safety Systems 
Funding 
Learning/Capturing Lessons 
Figure 4.11 – King’s Cross Traits 
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4.12 Conclusion 
Chapter 4 captured the pertinent issues identified as the root causes associated 
with each of the ten catastrophic disasters and categorised them against the 
initial trait headings.  This information was based on the initial investigations and 
the available publications and presentations developed subsequently as more 
details were exposed. 
The trait headings used in Chapter 4, whilst suitable for capturing the root 
causes of existing catastrophic disaster information, identified certain similarities 
between traits descriptions. Chapter 5 groups these similar traits under into ten 
distinct headings. 
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5 Grouping the Traits 
Chapter 4 applied a common approach to the categorisation of traits associated 
with the ten catastrophic incidents.  This chapter describes the fundamental 
difference between lead and lag indicators, the types of indicators to look for in 
the form of traits, and presents the findings from Chapter 4 in comparison with 
the findings of several HSE investigations, involving a revised trait categorisation 
terminology.  This chapter consists of six sub-headings: 
 Lead and Lag Indicators. 
 Summary of Identified Traits. 
 HSE Investigation Findings. 
 Combining Similar Trait Headings. 
 Comparison of Results. 
 Conclusion. 
5.1 Lead and Lag Indicators 
Lead indicators look for what could go wrong, whilst lag indicators measure 
what has gone wrong such as accidents, near misses and failures.  The difference 
between lead and lag indicators was established from the different types of 
safety hazards.  These were either process safety hazards or personal safety 
hazards.  Where personal safety hazards were ‘Slips, Trips and Falls’, normally 
associated with workplace safety, and process safety hazards were those 
associated with process failures such as explosions caused by the release of gas 
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(Hopkins, 2009).   
The approach for managing these hazards varied greatly, and the appropriate 
management of personal safety hazards did not necessarily prevent process 
safety hazards from occurring.  BP Texas City had an exemplar rating for 
personal hazard management and yet the processes failed and fifteen people 
lost their lives.  Whilst Hopkins (2009) concluded that it bared little consequence 
describing whether it was lead or lag for process safety indicators, Dyreborg 
(2009) disagreed and suggested that this would make safety management rely 
solely upon reactive monitoring in the form of lag indicators instead of 
considering the causal relationship between lead and lag indicators. 
 
                  Figure 5.1 – Process Safety Indicator Pyramid (American Petroleum 
Institute, 2010) 
The American Petroleum Institute (API) Recommended Practice (RP) 754 
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‘Process Safety Performance Indicators for the Refining and Petrochemical 
Industries’ defines the key concepts around the accident pyramid, first 
introduced by H.W. Heinrich in 1931.  These concepts were that safety accidents 
could be evaluated by the level of consequence, and that major accidents 
normally have a precursor incident.  The API defined a similar four tier pyramid 
[see Figure 5.1], with tier one ‘events of greater consequence’ as the most 
lagging indicator since the incident had already occurred, and tier four 
‘operating discipline and management system performance indicators’ as the 
most leading indicator as these should indicate a breakdown in management 
systems prior to a catastrophic incident (American Petroleum Institute, 2010). 
The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) defined lead indicators as active 
monitoring focused on a few critical control systems and lag indicators as 
reactive monitoring relying upon the reporting and investigation of incidents 
(HSE, 2006). 
Whilst this dissertation used lag indicators in the form of investigation results to 
determine the causal factors associated with catastrophic incidents, these 
particular subject areas, or traits, if used as lead indicators could ultimately 
provide a proactive approach to the prevention of such catastrophic incidents. 
5.2 Summary of Identified Traits 
Each of the disasters investigated in Chapter 4 had several lag indicators directly 
and indirectly associated with the cause of the disaster [summarised in Figure 
5.2].  These lag indicators were identified by the many investigations after the 
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disasters occurred, and formed the grouping of traits in this chapter.   
Identified Traits 
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Suitably Qualified & Experienced Personnel            
Staff Management/Leadership           
Working Culture           
Formal Accreditation of People           
Occupational Health Management           
Quality Assurance/Control           
Quality Audit           
Test Procedures           
Risk Assessment           
Risk Management           
Supply Chain & Procurement           
Process Audit           
Processes           
Emergency Procedures           
Permit to Work (PTW)           
Maintenance/Inspection           
Equipment State           
Design           
Safety Systems           
Funding           
Learning/Capturing Lessons           
 
                  Figure 5.2 – Summary of Traits Associated with each Disaster 
Even though the selection of disasters in this dissertation represented a wide 
range of industries, there were several common traits; these are shown 
graphically as a percentage [see Figure 5.3]. 
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                  Figure 5.3 – Commonality of Traits 
Whilst not all of the twenty-one traits were applicable to all ten disasters, eight 
were common across seven disasters [see Figure 5.3 - identified in red], whilst 
the ‘Risk Assessment’ trait was common to all ten disasters.  The relative 
criticality of each trait as the root cause of the ten disasters, based upon the 
results of the literature research, scored each trait as having either a high or low 
relative importance [see Figure 5.4 – with ‘H’ indicating High].  The relative 
criticality was based upon the number of the ten disasters that each trait was 
applicable to, and how many of these were considered to be highly critical. 
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Industry  Petrochemical Disparate   
Identified Traits 
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Suitably Qualified & Experienced Personnel    H      H   H H 40% 
Staff Management/Leadership H H H H  H H H H  80% 
Working Culture H     H H H H  50% 
Formal Accreditation of People            0% 
Occupational Health Management           0% 
Quality Assurance/Control H    H      20% 
Quality Audit           0% 
Test Procedures  H H  H      30% 
Risk Assessment  H  H H H H H H H 80% 
Risk Management H     H  H H  40% 
Supply Chain & Procurement     H   H   20% 
Process Audit    H H      20% 
Processes H H H H H  H  H  70% 
Emergency Procedures  H H  H H H   H 60% 
Permit to Work (PTW)  H         10% 
Maintenance/Inspection H  H H  H    H 40% 
Equipment State H   H  H    H 40% 
Design  H H H H H H H H H 90% 
Safety Systems H  H    H H H  50% 
Funding      H     10% 
Learning/Capturing Lessons     H  H  H H 40% 
                  Figure 5.4 – Relative Criticality of Traits 
The results indicated that the most critical traits were: 
1. Design [90%]. 
2. Staff management [80%]. 
3. Leadership and Risk assessment [80%]. 
4. Processes [70%]. 
5. Emergency Procedures [60%]. 
6. Working culture [50%]. 
7. Safety Systems [50%]. 
The comparison of criticality between the disasters associated with the 
petrochemical industry [see Figure 5.4 – first five disasters from left] against 
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those associated with the five disparate engineering industries [see Figure 5.4 – 
last five disasters from left], identified different traits being associated with 
petrochemical industry [see Figure 5.5]. 
Identified Traits 
Relative Criticality 
Petrochemical 
Industry 
Other Engineering 
Industry 
Suitably Qualified & Experienced Personnel  20% 60% 
Staff Management/Leadership 80% 80% 
Working Culture 20% 80% 
Formal Accreditation of People 0% 0% 
Occupational Health Management 0% 0% 
Quality Assurance/Control 40% 0% 
Quality Audit 0% 0% 
Test Procedures 60% 0% 
Risk Assessment 60% 100% 
Risk Management 20% 60% 
Supply Chain & Procurement 20% 20% 
Process Audit 40% 0% 
Processes 100% 40% 
Emergency Procedures 60% 60% 
Permit to Work (PTW) 20% 0% 
Maintenance/Inspection 60% 40% 
Equipment State 40% 40% 
Design 80% 100% 
Safety Systems 40% 60% 
Funding 0% 20% 
Learning/Capturing Lessons 20% 60% 
         Figure 5.5 – Relative Criticality Comparison 
This identified three traits that were specifically critical only to the 
petrochemical industry [see Figure 5.5 – with purple borders]: 
 Test procedures. 
 Processes. 
 Maintenance and inspection. 
The difference in applicability and criticality of certain traits to specific 
engineering industries, demonstrates the requirement to tailor the monitoring 
system to each type of engineering industry. 
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5.3 HSE Investigation Findings 
Alongside the findings of the research described in this dissertation, the Health 
and Safety Executive (HSE) published findings on research into thirty-six UK and 
International incident case studies (HSE, 2004).  These were carried out by the 
HSE to illustrate the importance of technical assessment criteria in the 
prevention, control and mitigation of major accidents.  The findings identified in 
the HSE ‘Table of Case Studies and Technical Measures’ (HSE, 2004), are labelled 
with number of disasters out of the total thirty-six, and summarised graphically 
as a percentage in the HSE trait analysis bar chart [see Figure 5.6].  
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      Figure 5.6 – Commonality of HSE Measured Traits 
The HSE did not state why or how they chose the thirty-five traits for their 
investigation, nor was there evidence of a specific list of trait types being 
universally applied across all thirty-six disasters. 
5.4 Combining Similar Trait Headings 
Chapter 4 identified twenty-one traits and the HSE investigation identified a 
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further thirty-five traits, giving a total of fifty-six traits.  In order to set up a 
monitoring system to measure these traits, the number of traits headings 
needed to be reduced to a manageable number.  This was achieved using the six 
headings identified by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) document HSG 254 
‘Developing Process Safety Indicators’ (HSE, 2006), and through the creation of 
four further engineering governance headings, to give a total of ten trait 
headings. 
5.5 HSG 254 Headings 
The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) document HSG 254 ‘Developing Process 
Safety Indicators’ (HSE, 2006), defined a method of monitoring high risk 
organisations such as chemical and major hazard industries.  The hierarchical 
process safety management system for a multi-site organisation, defined within 
the document, used six Risk Control Systems (RCSs) to monitor each site, 
covering plant change, inspections and maintenance, staff competence, 
operating procedures, emergency arrangement procedures and permits to work 
[see Figure 5.7].  
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Figure 5.7 – HSG 254 Hierarchical Process Safety Management System 
 
Each RCS was designed to capture both lead and lag indicators [described in 
Section 5.1], and was based upon the ‘Swiss Cheese’ model (Reason, 1997).  The 
‘Swiss Cheese’ model defined how the placement of barriers from both lead and 
lag indicators could help to reduce the likelihood of incidents occurring.  Lead 
indicators looked for holes/failings in existing systems found during routine 
audits, and the lag indicators were holes/failings identified after an event has 
occurred.  The RCSs were provided with a weighting, corresponding to their 
individual criticality level, for each individual site, this ensured that the level of 
reported risk was representative of the level of hazard within a site. 
Out of the fifty-six traits, twenty six transferred across to the six headings used 
by Health and Safety Executive (HSE) in their Health and Safety Guidance (HSG) 
document HSG254 ‘Developing Process Safety Indicators’ (HSE, 2006): 
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A. Plant Change. 
B. Inspections & Maintenance. 
C. Staff Competence. 
D. Operating Procedures. 
E. Emergency Procedures. 
F. Permits to Work. 
 
Figure 5.8 – Groupings under six HSG254 Headings 
The fifty-six combined traits were grouped into the six trait headings detailed in 
HSG254 (HSE, 2006) [see Figure 5.8] as follows:  
A. Plant Change 
Plant Change involved the modification of a system, sub-system or equipment 
through the management of design intent, or replacement with new or different 
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systems, sub-systems or equipment.  There was only one trait found by the HSE 
(HSE, 2004) that came under this heading and that was ‘Plant 
modification/change procedures’.  This trait was associated with the ‘initial 
design and maintaining design intent’ trait, and as such if used as an 
investigation heading, would help identify the issues of equipment or systems 
being changed without design authority approval. 
B. Inspections & Maintenance 
Inspections included all surveys, examinations and non-destructive testing (NDT) 
that was required to prove continued suitability, as well as determining whether 
something was designed and built to a specific standard.  
Maintenance was the process associated with the general upkeep of systems, 
sub-systems and equipment, to ensure that they remain reliable and available 
for use.  Maintenance actions could be proactive, whereby maintenance was 
planned to take place at regular intervals, or reactive whereby maintenance was 
only undertaken when the system, sub-system or equipment was found to be in 
a below optimum state, or when it has partially or wholly failed. 
The findings from investigations during this research and those undertaken by 
the HSE (HSE, 2004) that were grouped under the heading of ‘Inspections and 
Maintenance’, included: 
 Inspection/NDT. 
 Maintenance procedures. 
 Reliability of utilities. 
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 Relief systems/vent systems. 
 Equipment failure. 
 Lack of maintenance/inspection. 
C. Staff Competence 
Staff Competence included general working culture and behaviours as well as 
training requirements and undertakings that should be associated with the 
upkeep of key skills and Suitably Qualified and Experienced Personnel (SQEP).  
This also included management systems that were in place to ensure that 
personnel remained in date for specialist training or testing, as well as the 
systems that held and managed that information to support the requirement. 
The findings from the investigations described within this thesis and those 
undertaken by the HSE (HSE, 2004) that were grouped under the heading of 
‘Staff Competence’, included: 
 Training. 
 Lack of trained personnel. 
 Poor working culture. 
 No formal accreditation of people. 
D. Operating Procedures 
The term Operating Procedures referred to normal and abnormal procedures, 
policies and processes that defined how to operate systems, sub-systems, 
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equipment or specific processes.  The group ‘Operating procedures’ included 
those personnel responsible for the operations and any specific safety 
restrictions associated with operations. 
The findings from the investigations described within this thesis and those 
undertaken by the HSE (HSE, 2004) grouped under the heading of ‘Operating 
Procedures’, included: 
 Drum/ cylinder handling. 
 Isolation. 
 Lifting procedures. 
 Operating procedures. 
 Raw materials control/sampling. 
 Site security. 
 Roadways/site traffic control/immobilisation. 
 Process Audit. 
 Process failure. 
E. Emergency Procedures 
Emergency Procedures was the term used to define any procedure that had 
been intentionally written to provide guidance and instruction during an 
emergency situation, including the preparation required to ensure that all 
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warning signs and markings were in place and in accordance to the requirements 
laid down in legislation. 
The findings from the investigations described within this thesis and those 
undertaken by the HSE (HSE, 2004) were grouped under the heading of 
‘Emergency Procedures’, these included: 
 Emergency response/spill control. 
 Warning signs. 
 Incorrect/unpractised emergency procedures. 
F. Permits to Work 
Permits to work (PTW) groups the procedures, processes and containment 
systems that prevent operations and maintenance from being performed until 
there had been a number of safety checks, and specific sign offs by named 
qualified personnel, prior to work being undertaken.  There were a number of 
different types and levels of PTW systems that were relevant to work on systems 
with different levels of associated risk.  The findings from the investigations 
described within this thesis and those undertaken by the HSE (HSE, 2004) 
grouped under the heading of ‘Permits to Work’, included: 
 Permit to work. 
 Secondary containment. 
 PTW failure. 
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5.6 Engineering Governance Headings 
The remaining thirty traits were combined under the four general engineering 
headings: 
G. Safety Management Systems. 
H. Maintaining Design Intent. 
I. Product Safety Hazards 
J. Finance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 5.9 – Groupings under Four Engineering Headings 
The four headings were chosen by the author to represent the remaining traits 
that could not be grouped under the six HSE headings [see Figure 5.9].  These 
four headings were defined as: 
G. Safety Management Systems 
The heading of ‘Safety Management Systems’ represented the management 
systems associated with safety management, including: control systems, 
occupational health management, risk assessment and risk management 
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processes, management of staff, auditing systems and systems used to capture 
and learn from lessons gained through experience. 
The findings from the investigations described within this dissertation and those 
undertaken by the HSE (HSE, 2004) that were grouped under the heading of 
‘Safety Management Systems’, included: 
 Control systems. 
 Poor staff management. 
 Occupational Health Management. 
 Lack of audit. 
 Poor risk assessment. 
 Poor risk management. 
 Safety System Failure. 
 Not learning/capturing lessons. 
H. Initial Design & Maintaining Design Intent 
The heading of ‘initial design’ represented all the aspects associated with the 
initial design, including: human factors such as ergonomics, anthropometrics and 
user interfaces, as well as safety systems such as active/passive protection 
devices and choice of structural integrity. 
The ‘maintenance and management of design intent’ heading was concerned 
with those management systems put in place to ensure that the design did not 
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change to the point whereby it no longer met the intended operational 
requirement.  Another driver for changing design intent is the amendment to 
operational requirement, new technology, modified legislation or new 
legislation.  
Findings from the investigations described within this dissertation and those 
undertaken by the HSE (HSE, 2004) grouped under the heading of ‘Initial Design 
& Maintaining Design Intent’, included: 
 Active/passive fire protection. 
 Alarms/trips/interlocks. 
 Control room design. 
 Corrosion proof selection of materials. 
 Explosion relief. 
 Hazardous area classification/flame-proofing. 
 Leak/gas detection. 
 Plant layout. 
 Quench systems. 
 Segregation of hazardous materials. 
 Design failure. 
I. Product Safety Hazards 
The heading of ‘Product safety hazards’ was concerned with any hazard that 
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may be associated with a product, when a product could be an object, a service 
or intellectual property.  Hazards were associated with the product lifecycle, 
including the initial design, construction, in-service life, through to destruction 
and disposal.  A product design should take into account the future use of a 
product and applicable legislation. 
The findings from the investigations described within this thesis and those 
undertaken by the HSE (HSE, 2004) grouped under the heading of ‘Product 
Safety Hazards’, included: 
 Design codes - buildings/structures. 
 Design codes – jetties. 
 Design codes – pipework. 
 Design codes – plant. 
 Earthing. 
 Inerting. 
 Reaction/product testing. 
 Poor Quality Assurance/control. 
 Lack of test procedures. 
 Supply chain issues. 
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J. Finance 
The ‘finance’ grouping covered the past, present and future financial investment 
in the systems, sub-systems and equipment, as well as investment made in 
maintaining these systems, developing suitable processes and the training of 
personnel.  There was only one identified, and that was ‘lack of funding’.  
5.7 Comparison of Results 
The ten disasters were re-categorised using the ten trait definitions [see Sections 
5.5 & 5.6], and presented in a comparison table [see Figure 5.10].  Although the 
‘Plant change’ trait was a Risk Control System (RCS) heading as defined by the 
HSE (HSE, 2006), there was one case of ‘plant change’, as a root cause, captured 
by the HSE.  Even though there was no evidence of ‘plant change’ found in this 
dissertation, if used as an investigation subject heading, it would identify specific 
cases where equipment or systems had been changed without any form of 
governance approval [see Para 5.5 Part A], and therefore still perceived as a 
relevant trait heading. 
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Product Safety Hazards           
Finance           
             Figure 5.10 – Re-categorisation of Disasters using Ten (10) Traits 
  
 
165 
When data from the findings of the research described within this dissertation 
and the HSE case studies (HSE, 2004) were grouped under the ten trait headings, 
it can be seen from the comparison of thesis and HSE Results bar chart [see 
Figure 5.11] and the groupings of traits table [see Figure 5.12], that whilst the 
findings are not identical, there were a number of similarities in the findings.  
The number of findings are irrelevant due to the number of case studies that the 
HSE undertook..   
 
Figure 5.11 – Comparison of Thesis and HSE findings 
Trait Title Thesis HSE 
Safety Management Systems 37 5 
Design & Maintaining Design Intent 9 29 
Plant Change 0 6 
Inspections and Maintenance 15 20 
Staff Competence 25 4 
Operating Procedures 14 25 
Emergency Procedures 8 18 
Permits to Work 1 7 
Finance 1 0 
Product Safety Hazards 11 25 
Figure 5.12 – Groupings of Traits 
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5.8 Conclusion 
The ten traits identified within this chapter provided general headings that 
captured all the subjects used to define the root causes associated with the 
disasters researched in Chapter 4. 
They provided general headings that were self-explanatory and, if used for an 
accident investigation, would adequately deliver all the key issues associated 
with the cause of the disaster. 
Whilst the results were based upon the research of ten catastrophic incidents, 
these provided a representative cross section of the engineering industry.  Based 
upon 10 disasters, the average number of findings per disaster identified the 
most prevalent traits [see Figure 5.13]. 
Trait Title Thesis Average 
Safety Management Systems 37 
Design & Maintaining Design Intent 9 
Plant Change 0 
Inspections and Maintenance 15 
Staff Competence 25 
Operating Procedures 14 
Emergency Procedures 8 
Permits to Work 1 
Finance 1 
Product Safety Hazards 11 
Figure 5.13 – Thesis Average traits per Disaster 
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6 Root Cause Analysis Methods 
Chapter 5 used a revised trait categorisation resulting in ten specific trait 
headings based on the six used by the HSE (HSE, 2006) and four associated with 
engineering governance.  This chapter presents a comparison of several Root 
Cause Analysis (RCA) tools to determine the most appropriate for identifying the 
root causes of catastrophic incidents.  
6.1 Requirement for RCA 
A system to predict the possibility of catastrophic incidents is required to 
identify: 
 What must be monitored for each individual asset (the traits). 
 What the significance of each asset was and how they fit into the bigger 
disaster scenario. 
The traits discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, were selected to represent the critical 
aspects for each of the assets. The ten traits were: 
 Safety management Systems. 
 Maintaining Design Intent. 
 Product safety hazards 
 Finance. 
 Plant Change. 
 Inspections & Maintenance. 
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 Staff Competence. 
 Operating Procedures. 
 Emergency Procedures. 
 Permits to Work. 
There is a wide choice of prediction tools and methods available to piece 
together the various assets and the information associated with the ten traits.  
The most appropriate tool to determine how an asset state may change may not 
necessarily be the most advanced method or tool.  The choice of tool was based 
on effectiveness, simplicity, adaptability and ease of population.   The remainder 
of this chapter was dedicated to considering the best tool or method to capture 
and asses the data associated with possible causes or events that could lead to a 
catastrophe. 
6.2 Screening the Available RCA Methods and Tools 
There were a wide range of analysis tools available that concentrated on Root 
Cause Analysis (RCA), and some were more suitable than others in defining the 
various events and traits that caused a catastrophic incident.  Dean L. Gano 
compared ten common RCA methods and tools in his book ‘Apollo Root Cause 
Analysis – A New Way of Thinking’ (Gano, 2008).  He defined which of the ten 
RCA were tools and methods as ‘a tool is distinguished by its limited use, while a 
method may involve many steps and processes and has a wide usage’ (Gano, 
2008).  The ten tools and methods were: 
 Events & Causal Factors (Method). 
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 Change Analysis (Tool). 
 Barrier Analysis (Tool). 
 Tree Diagrams (Method). 
 Why-Why Chart (Method). 
 Pareto (Tool). 
 Storytelling (Method). 
 Fault Tree (Method). 
 Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA) (Tool). 
 Reality Charting (Method). 
In order to define which of these ten RCA methods and tools was the most user-
friendly, they were compared using six comparison criteria for how well each of 
the RCA tools and methods: 
 Defines problem. 
 Defines all causal relationships. 
 Provides a causal path to root causes. 
 Delineated evidence. 
 Explains how solutions prevent recurrence. 
 Easy to follow report. 
In his investigation, Gano used a ranking method with one point for ‘yes’, half  a 
point for ‘limited’ and zero points for ‘no’ [see Figure 6.1] (Gano, 2008). 
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Figure 6.1 – RCA Scoring Table (Gano, 2008) 
For an RCA to be used as the basis for a monitoring system in a complex and 
varied maritime engineering environment, it was necessary for it to be simple to 
build and maintain.  With the RCA methods and tools scoring one and a half 
points or greater, to remove the five methods that only defined the problem, as 
the starting point for discerning the most appropriate method or tool,  narrowed 
the initial ten down to five.  These were: 
A. Events & Causal Factors (method). 
B. Why-Why Chart (method). 
C. Fault Tree (method). 
D. Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA) (tool). 
E. RealityCharting ® (method). 
This list included five different RCA methods and tools, specifically designed to 
determine the root cause of an accident, some to predict and others to 
understand why the accident occurred.    
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A. Events & Causal Factors (Method) 
Events and Causal Factors (ECF) was an RCA method used by accident 
investigation professionals to determine the causal factors of an accident, based 
on the determination of the specific conditions that contributed to the accident 
(U.S. Department of Energy, n.d.).   
 
Figure 6.2 – Event & Causal Factors Build Process 
The event and causal factor charting process follows a simple six step process 
[see Figure 6.2]:  
A. Why did this event happen? (bottom right). 
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B. What events and conditions led to the occurrence of the event? (second 
from bottom right). 
C. What went wrong that allowed the event to occur? (bottom left). 
D. Why did these conditions exist? (3rd down on right hand side). 
E. How did these conditions originate? (2nd down on right hand side). 
F. Who had responsibility for the conditions? (top on right hand side). 
(U.S. Department of Energy, n.d.) 
On completion of the six steps, two additional steps were then applied [1] to 
check whether there were any relationships between events and conditions, and 
[2] to check whether there were any significant links to other events or 
conditions that may indicate a greater problem. 
The construction of the skeleton ECF should follow the findings of the 
investigation, as the evidence develops, so the ECF grows.  The ECF method 
helps to organise an investigation and the collection of data, but is more 
effective when using this information in other methods such as Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA) (Buys & Clark, 1995). 
B. Why-Why Chart (Method) 
The why-why chart, also known as the ‘5 Whys’, was a brainstorming method 
that repeatedly asks ‘Why?’ until the root cause was understood and there was 
no further worthwhile information.  Five was a nominal amount first defined by 
the Japanese in the 1950s, the root cause may be understood after three ‘Whys’, 
or it may need eight.   As the ‘whys’ are asked, the many reasons split out, 
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possibly forming several branches at a time [see Figure 6.3].   This particular 
example describes why a train was not working.  The final answer (on the right 
hand side) could lead to another question to find out why a train didn’t stop. 
 
Figure 6.3 – 5 Whys Example 
Whilst simple to create, this method required experienced users to construct 
and understand the information it produces.   
C. Fault Tree (Method) 
Fault trees such as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) were failure orientated methods 
used either quantitatively, to show the probability of a top level event occurring, 
or qualitatively to indicate what needs to happen in order for the top level event 
to occur.   FTA was designed for use in the Boeing Minuteman Missile System 
program in 1961 (Ericson C. , 1999). 
The FTA process concerns firstly the definition of the system boundaries, then 
identification of a top level event, and finally the population of the tree with all 
combinations of faults that lead to the top level event.  The tree of faults are 
held together with ‘AND’ and ‘OR’ logic gates.  With ‘OR’ gates signifying only 
one of the inputs needs to occur and ‘AND’ gates meaning all of the inputs must 
happen before the next level event occurs.  The fault tree analysis example 
[shown in Figure 6.4] depicted a simple fault tree showing the top levels of faults 
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leading to the top level event.  Both events ‘B’ and ‘C’ must happen before top 
level event ‘A’, and in order for fault ‘B’ to occur, either faults ‘D’ or ‘E’ must 
occur first.  
 
Figure 6.4 – Fault Tree Analysis Example 
Qualitative FTA involved looking at all possible combinations of faults and the 
sequence in which they needed to occur.  Fault trees were depicted using basic 
causes, ones that may happen without prior faults, and sub-events, or 
combinations of faults.  The basic causes could be graded to show levels of 
significance.  In Figure 6.4 they can be level ranked as ‘C, E’ and ‘C, D’ failure 
paths.  
Even though FTA was a common engineering method used to identify the 
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likelihood and dependencies in failures of systems, they still require RCA tools 
and methods to help in the identification of cause and effects.   
D. FMEA (Tool) 
Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Failure Mode Effects and Criticality 
Analysis (FMECA), were tools used to identify all the potential failure modes in a 
defined system (NASA, 2012).  FMECA was an extension of FMEA whereby the 
criticality levels were used to prioritise and manage the effects.  The tool was 
applied in two stages, firstly using the tool to identify all the possible failure 
modes associated with the system and the potential effects that they may cause.  
Then secondly to critically analyse the ranking of failure modes according to the 
probability and severity associated with each failure mode.   
The FMEA/FMECA process [see Figure 6.5] captured information associated with 
a particular failure mode so that it could be presented in a tabular form [see 
Figure 6.6], with the scoring matrices agreed prior to the FMEA/FMECA process 
starting.  The initial scoring was based upon the pre-mitigation levels of severity 
[9], occurrence [3] and detection probability [5] [see Figure 6.6 – blue rounded 
rectangle], providing a score of 135.  The final scoring was based upon the post-
mitigation levels of severity [9], occurrence [1] and detection probability [3] [see 
Figure 6.6 – green rounded rectangle], providing a final score of 27. 
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Figure 6.5 – FMEA/FMECA process 
The information gained through FMECA/FMEA could be used to inform the 
design management process, so that the higher impacting failure modes could 
be redesigned or processes adapted to reduce the associated levels of risk.   
This process, whilst being informative during the design process, was not overly 
suitable for the monitoring and management of existing well defined systems.  It 
was a useful tool to understand failures associated with a particular system, how 
that system sits within other more complex systems, and how each area affects 
the higher level systems.  This was an ideal way to logically identify the possible 
failure modes associated with existing systems. 
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Figure 6.6 – FMEA/FMECA Example 
E. RealityCharting ® (Method) 
Reality Charting (Gano, 2011) was based upon the premise that each effect had 
two or more possible causes, and that each cause could be either a ‘condition’ 
or an ‘action’.  In his book Gano defined seven steps in the creation of 
RealityCharting® RCA (Gano, 2011), these were: 
 Step 1 – Defining the problem [see Figure 6.7 – ‘Primary Effect’ box]. 
o What is the problem? 
o When did it happen? 
o Where did it happen? 
o What is the significance of the problem? 
 Step 2- Determine the causal relationships [see Figure 6.7 – ‘Action’ and 
‘Condition boxes]. 
o For each primary effect, ask why. 
o Look for causes in actions and conditions. 
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o Connect all causes with “Caused By” statements. 
o End each cause path with a question mark or a reason for stopping. 
 Step 3 – Provide a graphical Representation. 
 Step 4 – Provide evidence. 
 Step 5 – Determine if causes are sufficient and necessary. 
 Step 6 – Identify effective solutions. 
o Prevent recurrence. 
o Be within your control. 
o Meet your goals and objectives. 
o Not Cause other problems that you are aware of 
 Step 7 – Implement and track solutions. 
(Gano, 2011) 
The RealityCharting® process builds a chart depicting the primary effect and the 
actions and conditions that caused the effect [see Figure 6.7].   
Reality Charting was a logical and complex RCA method that provided a usable 
definition to a known issue as a result of an investigation into a particular 
accident.   RealityCharting ® provided a common evidence-based understanding 
of the problem, involving input from all stakeholders and therefore developing 
universal buy-in. 
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Figure 6.7 – RealityCharting® Example 
6.3 Selection of the most appropriate RCA tool  
There were several advantages and disadvantages associated with the use of 
each of the five Root Cause Analysis (RCA) methods and tools.  These are 
summarised in Figure 6.8.   
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) was chosen as the most suitable method to determine 
the combinations of root causes associated with a catastrophic disaster, based 
upon the simplicity of implementation when used qualitatively to define the 
combinations of sub-events that could cause a specific top-level event, such as a 
catastrophic disaster.  FTA logically combined the physical state of each sub-
event, equating to a condition level, using ‘AND’ and ‘OR’ gates, and was 
represented as a Boolean formula within the database.   
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Drawing upon each sub-event ‘state’, data held in a reference database, as 
required by each fault tree, permitted the re-use of individual event conditions 
that were associated with other fault trees.  The ability to re-use information 
across multiple fault trees had the additional advantage of reducing the 
complexity of design, without degradation of information. 
 
 
Figure 6.8 – RCA Advantages and Disadvantages 
  
Method 
/Tool 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Events & 
Causal 
Factors 
Easy to construct visual RCA method that provides the causal 
factors and builds upon a skeleton as the investigation 
progresses 
Once RCA was built, to use the 
information it still needed to be 
evaluated using either a tree method or 
FTA 
Why-Why 
Chart 
Very easy to produce a simple visual RCA diagram. Whilst simple to create, this method 
requires experienced users to construct 
and understand the information it 
produces. The information it provides, 
still needs to be evaluated using FTA.   
Fault Tree 
Analysis 
(FTA) 
 
A good tool, used to identify the possible sub-events that 
leads up to a higher level event occurring.  Very simple to use 
in a Qualitative style for understanding how the combinations 
of seemingly non-related event, will lead to specific events. 
The development of the FTA model leads to the re-use of 
certain events, since they may affect multiple top level events. 
This would allow for a reference database to be used to hold 
common events. This will reduce the complexity of design and 
therefore speed up the data processing.   
The development of the FTA was a logical build up with the 
top level event being the catastrophic incident. 
The overall high level event results 
from multi-layer events drawn together 
by the FTA creators. If the wrong 
thought process has been used, it will 
result in a spurious event tree and will 
be of no use whatsoever. 
FMEA 
/FMECA 
 
 
 
Good for identifying all the possible failure modes associated 
within a defined system and for running over similar systems 
to ensure the application of a standardised approach. 
Requires the system to be defined prior 
to analysis, and requires a pre-defined 
list of all possible failure modes to 
ensure a standardised approach.  
Based upon assumptions for the failure 
rates for each component in a system, 
this was difficult enough to quantify in a 
newly designed system, never mind for 
an existing old system.  
Reality 
Charting 
Simple and easy to construct a very good visual 
representation of an accident.  Logically places conditional 
causes and those presented through actions into a format 
that was easy to follow. 
The accident has to have already 
occurred prior to this method being 
employed, therefore not predictive. 
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7 Prototype Monitoring System 
Chapter 5 identified ten trait headings summarising the issues associated with 
the ten catastrophic incidents discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.  Chapter 6 
identified Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) as an appropriate Root Cause Analysis (RCA) 
method for identifying the root causes of catastrophic incidents.  This chapter 
discusses the creation of a prototype monitoring system using a combination of 
trait definitions and FTA. 
7.1 Boundaries and Assumptions 
There was a business level requirement to demonstrate the ‘current’ state of all 
assets within the Portsmouth Naval Base footprint, driven by Engineering 
Governance (Painting, 2008) and the development of a whole base safety 
argument (WBSA).  A prototype monitoring system to monitor the potential 
catastrophic incidents associated with a marine engineering environment would 
fulfil this requirement, and a working dock was used as the test area.    
The docks were designed to support the berthing and maintenance 
requirements of various vessel classes; as such they have jetties to berth against 
and dry docks to provide safe dry working environment to maintain and modify 
ship’s underwater systems and hull.  The system boundary for the prototype 
monitoring system was centred on a single dock and all the ancillaries that 
support the use of that dock, these included: 
 Dry Dock. 
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 Caissons (defined in 7.2). 
 Levelling Penstocks (defined in 7.2). 
 Drainage Penstocks (defined in 7.2). 
Although a working dock also required a crane, crane rails, electrical supplies, 
high pressure air, fresh water main, fire-fighting water main, workshops, offices, 
and other supporting equipment and systems, for the purposes of the test these 
were assumed as adequate and functioning.   
7.2 Dock Components 
A working dry dock has a caisson, or dock gate, to dam the entrance of the dock 
so that it can be pumped dry, and cranes to support lifting operations 
undertaken in and around the dock [see Figure 7.1].    
 
Figure 7.1 – Basic Dry Dock Plan 
A caisson is a box structure with a thick keel which aligns with grooves in the 
dock entrance.  When ballasted in position the caisson seals the dock and when 
de-ballasted the caisson floats out of position to allow ships to enter or leave the 
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dock. 
With the caisson ballasted in position at the dock entrance, the dock is pumped 
dry and filled via an underground network of large brick lined tunnels called 
‘culverts’ that open into the dock via dedicated drainage and flooding sluice 
valves called ‘penstocks’.  With the dock sealed by the caisson, the water is 
pumped out of the dock via high power dock pumps.  The dock is flooded by 
opening the levelling penstocks to allow water from sea or from the non-tidal 
basin into the dock [see Figure 7.2].  Each penstock has a dedicated control 
mechanism to operate the opening and shutting of the sluice valve. 
 
Figure 7.2 – Dry Dock Side View 
7.3 Simplified Dock Failure Fault Tree 
FTA defined a top level event and all the combinations of sub-events that lead to 
the top event being realised.  One of the most catastrophic incidents that could 
befall a dry dock, and therefore the top level event, was defined as ‘dock 
failure’, to indicate a catastrophic flooding event. 
Each sub-event was centred on the condition of a specific asset (equipment or 
system) that must fail in order to drive the effect upwards through the fault tree.  
The prototype monitoring system was based upon the failure of a Dry Dock due 
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to either an issue with the dock groove that locates the caisson as a dam, or a 
structural integrity failure of the caisson itself [see Figure 7.3].  In order for these 
events to cause the dock to fail, the dock must be drained down (either partially 
or fully) and the caisson must cease to act as a dam and seal the dock. 
 
Figure 7.3 – FTA Dock Failure Example 
The use of FTA alone only provided the breakdown of asset failures that led to 
each potential incident; it did not serve as a monitoring or management tool. 
The combination of the FTA method and the work undertaken in Chapter 5 on 
the ten trait headings [see Figure 7.4] to monitor all traits, provided a known 
condition for each of the assets associated with the dock.  As that known 
condition varied from ‘good’ to ‘fail’, so the FTA reflected this condition and how 
this condition change affected the top level event of ‘dock failure’. 
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Figure 7.4 – Ten Trait Headings (from Chapter 5) 
7.4 Trait Scoring Criteria 
Each of the ten traits was scored from ‘0’ to ‘9’ using set criteria to provide a 
common and logical approach to the capture and nomination of trait condition.  
The award of Red, Amber and Green (RAG) colours and the scoring shown in 
brackets equated to: 
 Red = Fail (0-3). 
 Amber = Warning (4-6). 
 Green = Good (7-9). 
The BAE Systems Chief Engineer’s Policy required the production of an auditable 
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Engineering Decision (ED) form in circumstances whereby the traits indicated a 
‘Fail’ or ‘Warning’ condition.  This ensured that additional mitigation was put in 
place and communicated accordingly.  The ten traits, with their associated 
definition table shown in brackets were: 
A. Plant Change – [see Figure 7.5]. 
B. Inspections & Maintenance – [see Figure 7.6]. 
C. Staff Competence – [see Figure 7.7]. 
D. Operating Procedures – [see Figure 7.8]. 
E. Emergency Procedures – [see Figure 7.9]. 
F. Permits to Work – [see Figure 7.10]. 
G. Safety Management Systems - [see Figure 7.11]. 
H. Maintaining Design Intent - [see Figure 7.12]. 
I. Product Safety Hazards - [see Figure 7.13]. 
J. Finance - [see Figure 7.14].  
All the trait scoring definitions were created to suit the naming conventions, 
both MoD and BAE Systems, used in the Portsmouth Naval Base management 
systems and processes. 
A. Plant Change 
The plant change trait [see Figure 7.5] boundary between ‘Good’ and ‘Warning’ 
was based upon the condition of the asset being considered that would not 
adversely affect the operational requirements of the business.   
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The boundary between ‘Warning’ and ‘Fail’ was based upon the condition of 
high impact assets that would affect the operational effectiveness of the 
business.  Such as the operational issues associated with the inability to support 
the dry docking of ships. 
 RAG Plant Change 
G
o
o
d
 9 Asset fully functioning, fit for purpose and formally accepted into service. 
8 Asset fully functioning and fit for purpose, no formal acceptance. 
7 Asset fully functioning and presumed fit for purpose. 
W
ar
n
in
g 6 Asset fully functioning but unknown design state. 
5 Asset functioning but evidence of design changes made without CE sign off. 
4 Asset reduced functionality and unknown design state. 
Fa
il 
3 Asset susceptible to repeated failures. 
2 Asset in restricted use due to unknown state. 
1 Asset in restricted use due to unknown state and multiple failures. 
0 Assets under permanent quarantine. 
Figure 7.5 – Plant Change Criteria 
B. Inspections & Maintenance. 
The Inspections and Maintenance trait boundary between ‘Good’ and ‘Warning’ 
[see Figure 7.6], was based upon the lack of maintenance and inspections that 
did not adversely affect the business due to built-in redundancy and the ability 
to hire in equipment if operational requirements demand.   
The boundary between ‘Warning’ and ‘Fail’ was based upon a reduced level of 
maintenance and inspection that would have a detrimental effect on the 
operational effectiveness of the business.  
 RAG Inspections & Maintenance 
G
o
o
d
 9 Surveys, inspections & maintenance assessed as suitable and in date. 
8 Surveys, inspections & maintenance up to date. 
7 Maintenance up to date, surveys & inspections overdue, no additional actions. 
W
ar
n
in
g 6 Maintenance up to date, surveys & inspections overdue, actions agreed via Engineering Decision (ED). 
5 Safety critical maintenance overdue to be agreed via (ED). 
4 Safety critical maintenance, surveys & inspections overdue to be agreed via (ED). 
Fa
il 
3 Safety critical maintenance, surveys & inspections overdue – quarantined via (ED). 
2 Safety critical maintenance overdue – quarantined via (ED). 
1 Safety critical maintenance, surveys & inspections overdue – quarantined via (ED). 
0 Safety critical maintenance, surveys & inspections overdue – long term quarantined via (ED). 
Figure 7.6 – Inspections & Maintenance Criteria 
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C. Staff Competence. 
The Staff Competence trait boundary between ‘Good’ and ‘Warning’ was based 
upon a reduced staff competence level that would not adversely affect the day-
to-day operation of the business [see Figure 7.7].  The differentiation was based 
upon the level and number of Suitably Qualified and Experienced Personnel 
(SQEP) and the level of understanding against the required tasks. 
The boundary between ‘Warning’ and ‘Fail’ was based upon a minimum staff 
competence level that would have a detrimental effect on the operational 
effectiveness of the business whether the hazards associated with the task had 
been captured and managed as a result of hazard identification (HAZID) 
 RAG Staff Competence 
G
o
o
d
 9 Fully resourced, task fully understood, all Suitably Qualified & Experienced Personnel (SQEP). 
8 Fully resourced, task fully understood, mostly SQEP. 
7 Fully resourced, task fully understood, minimum SQEP. 
W
ar
n
in
g 6 Adequate resource, task not fully understood, all SQEP. 
5 Adequate resource, task not fully understood, mostly SQEP. 
4 Adequate resource task not fully understood, minimum SQEP. 
Fa
il 
3 Minimum resource, need to apply Hazard Identification (HAZID) process to task, all SQEP. 
2 Minimum resource, need to HAZID task, mostly SQEP. 
1 Under resourced, need to HAZID task, minimum SQEP. 
0 Under resourced, need to HAZID task, no SQEP. 
Figure 7.7 – Staff Competence Criteria 
D. Operating Procedures. 
The Operating Procedures trait [see Figure 7.8] boundary between ‘Good’ and 
‘Warning’ was based upon a reduced level of operating procedures that would 
not adversely affect the day-to-day operation of the business.   
The boundary between ‘Warning’ and ‘Fail’ was based upon a further reduced 
level of operating procedures that would have a detrimental effect on the 
operational effectiveness of the business, due to a lack of ability to undertake 
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critical procedures. 
 RAG Operating Procedures 
G
o
o
d
 9 Procedures in place and in date – fully audited. 
8 Procedures in place and in date – partially audited. 
7 Procedures in place and in date – not audited. 
W
ar
n
in
g 6 Minor Quality Assurance (QA) and Engineering Governance non-conformances (NCs). 
5 Only Important Procedures covered by Process Instructions (PIs). 
4 Only Some Procedures covered by PIs. 
Fa
il 
3 Still covered by old style procedures that have not been checked whether still applicable. 
2 Processes covered by old irrelevant procedures. 
1 Processes not covered by procedures. 
0 Major Quality Assurance & Engineering Governance Non-conformances. 
Figure 7.8 – Operating Procedures Criteria 
E. Emergency Procedures. 
The Emergency Procedures trait [see Figure 7.9] boundary between ‘Good’ and 
‘Warning’ was based upon the minimum level of existing and practiced 
emergency procedures that would not adversely affect the day-to-day operation 
of the business.  A formal Engineering Decision (ED) would be required in order 
to define the level of operational impact and all necessary mitigations.  
The boundary between ‘Warning’ and ‘Fail’ was based upon a level of fully 
assessed and practiced emergency procedures that would have a detrimental 
effect on the operational effectiveness of the business, due to loss of ability to 
undertake critical procedures safely. 
 RAG Emergency Procedures 
G
o
o
d
 9 
Emergency procedures cover all asset operations, relevant communications, regularly tested and audited, 
or Emergency Procedures not required. 
8 
Emergency procedures cover all asset operations, relevant communications and regularly tested, or 
Emergency Procedures not required. 
7 Emergency procedures cover all asset operations and relevant communications. 
W
ar
n
in
g 6 Limited practised emergency procedures in place, partially reduced operations (ED). 
5 Limited practised emergency procedures in place, reduced operations (ED). 
4 Limited practised emergency procedures in place, reduced operations with additional mitigation (ED). 
Fa
il 
3 Limited unpractised emergency procedures in place, restricted operations (ED). 
2 Limited unpractised emergency procedures in place, severely restricted operations (ED). 
1 No Emergency procedures in place, operations with additional mitigation, under special consent only (ED). 
0 No Emergency procedures in place, operations ceased until further notice (ED). 
Figure 7.9 – Emergency Procedures Criteria 
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F. Permits to Work. 
The Permits to Work [see Figure 7.10] boundary between ‘Good’ and ‘Warning’ 
was based upon a restricted permit to work system that would not adversely 
affect the day-to-day operation of the business.   
The boundary between ‘Warning’ and ‘fail’ was based upon an identified permit 
to work system failure having a detrimental effect on the operational 
effectiveness of the business, through loss of ability to undertake critical 
operationally essential procedures.  The guidelines and requirements for the 
management of Ministry of Defence (MOD) establishment PTW systems are 
defined in the MOD Joint Services Publication (JSP) 375 – Health and Safety 
Handbook (Defence Safety and Environmental Authority DSEA, 2011). 
 RAG Permits to Work 
G
o
o
d
 9 
All Permit to Work (PTW) systems, Authorised Persons (APs) and Competent Persons (CPs) in place and 
fully audited by Authorising Engineer (AE) in accordance with (iaw) JSP 375, or PTW not applicable. 
8 All PTW systems, APs and CPs in place and key areas audited by AE iaw JSP 375. 
7 All essential PTW systems, APs and CPs in place and key areas audited by AE iaw JSP 375. 
W
ar
n
in
g 6 All essential PTW systems, APs and CPs in place and audited locally iaw JSP 375. 
5 All essential PTW systems, APs and CPs in place, with restrictions (ED). 
4 
Defence Infrastructure Organisation (DIO) issued Operational Restrictions in place, reduced capability 
captured (ED). 
Fa
il 
3 
Significant lack of qualified and assessed APs and CPs, PTW systems not able to cope with demand. 
Restrictions in place (ED). 
2 
Significant lack of qualified and assessed APs and CPs, PTW systems not able to cope with demand. 
Quarantines and restrictions in place (ED). 
1 
Major operational restrictions in place due to lack of assessed APs and CPs. Significant restrictions in place 
(ED). 
0 No AP/CP org, in contravention of Regs/Acts/JSP 375. 
Figure 7.10 – Permits to Work Criteria 
G. Safety Management Systems. 
The Safety Management Systems trait [see Figure 7.11] boundary between 
‘Good’ and ‘warning’ was based upon safety management system issues that 
would not have an adversely affect the day-to-day operation of the business.   
The boundary between ‘Warning’ and ‘Fail’ was based upon the level of safety 
  
 
191 
management system failures that would have a detrimental effect on the 
operational effectiveness of the business, due to the loss of ability to manage 
critical operations.  The applicable safety management systems included:  
 Occupational Health and Safety Management – BS OHSAS 18001 (British 
Standards, 2007). 
 Environmental Management – ISO 14001 (ISO, 2004). 
 Quality Management – ISO 9001: 2008 (ISO, 2008). 
 BAE Systems Naval Base Services Product Safety & Environmental 
Management Plan (PSEMP) (Elliott & Stone, 2012) 
 BAE Systems Naval Base Services Engineering Management Plan (EMP) 
(Musgrave, 2012) 
 MOD Joint Services Publication (JSP) 375 – Health and Safety Handbook 
(Defence Safety and Environmental Authority DSEA, 2011). 
 JSP 418 – MOD Corporate Environmental Protection Manual (MOD, 2010). 
 RAG Safety Management Systems 
G
o
o
d
 
9 
All Safety Management Systems (SMS) in place, reflected in relevant Processes, fully audited by an 
Independent Authority and no identified non-conformances, or SMSs not required for this Asset. 
8 
All SMS in place, reflected in relevant Processes, fully audited by an Independent Authority with only 
minor non-conformances. 
7 
All SMS in place, reflected in relevant Processes, fully audited by an Independent Authority with only 
minor overdue non-conformances. 
W
ar
n
in
g 
6 
Majority of SMS in place, some processes requiring update, partially audited by an Independent Authority, 
or Major non-conformances that do not adversely affect operations, managed through mitigation (ED). 
5 
Majority of SMS in place, some processes requiring update, partially audited by an Independent Authority, 
or Major non-conformances that reduce the efficiency of operations, managed through mitigation (ED). 
4 
Majority of SMS in place, some processes requiring update, partially audited by an Independent Authority, 
or Major non-conformances that reduce the operational capability but managed through mitigation (ED). 
Fa
il 
3 
Significant SMS issues, major processes requiring update, partially audited by an Independent Authority, 
or Major non-conformances that severely reduce the operational capability, quarantined (ED). 
2 Important SMS missing or incomplete, or Major SMS non-conformances. 
1 Major SMS non-conformances or HSE Improvement Notice. 
0 Major SMS non-conformances or HSE Prohibition Notice. 
Figure 7.11 – Safety Management Systems Criteria 
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H. Maintaining Design Intent. 
The Maintaining Design Intent trait [see Figure 7.12] boundary between ‘Good’ 
and ‘Warning’ was based upon the minimum level of auditable design 
information associated with the asset that would not adversely affect the day-
to-day operation of the business.   
The boundary between ‘Warning’ and ‘Fail’ was based upon the level and impact 
of reduced design information and auditable documentation that would have a 
detrimental effect on the operational effectiveness of the business. 
 RAG Maintaining Design Intent 
G
o
o
d
 
9 
Asset fulfils current legal and operational requirement, and strategic plans in place to update design to 
fulfil future (20yrs+) planned operational requirement.  All design information systematically managed on 
a central database and fully audited. 
8 
Asset fulfils current legal and operational requirement, and strategic plans in place to update design to 
fulfil future (5yrs+) planned operational requirement. All design information individually managed on a 
multiple databases and fully audited. 
7 
Asset fulfils current legal and operational requirement. All design information individually managed on 
multiple databases and fully audited. 
W
ar
n
in
g 
6 
Asset fulfils current legal and operational requirement.   All design information individually held on 
multiple databases, not audited. 
5 
Asset does not totally fulfil current legal and/or operational requirement, concessions in place (ED).  
Design information held in personal files and folders. 
4 
Asset does not totally fulfil current legal and/or operational requirement, concessions in place that may 
marginally reduce operational capability (ED). Design information held by individuals, not audited. 
Fa
il 
3 
Asset does not totally fulfil current legal and/or operational requirement, concessions in place that reduce 
operational capability (ED).  Design information held by individuals, not audited. 
2 
Asset does not fulfil current legal and/or operational requirement, concessions in place that reduce 
operational capability (ED).  Design information held by individuals, not audited. 
1 Asset does not fulfil operational requirement, asset quarantined (ED).  No design data held. 
0 Asset does not fulfil legal requirement, asset quarantined (ED).  No design data held. 
Figure 7.12 – Maintaining Design Intent Criteria 
I. Product Safety Hazards 
The Product Safety Hazards trait [see Figure 7.13] boundary between ‘Good’ and 
‘Warning’ was based upon the level of product safety hazards associated with 
the asset that would not adversely affect the day-to-day operation of the 
business.   
The boundary between ‘Warning’ and ‘Fail’ was based upon the level and 
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complexity of product safety hazards that would have a detrimental effect on 
the operational effectiveness of the business. 
 RAG Product Safety Hazards 
G
o
o
d
 9 No Product Safety (PS) issues. 
8 Minor PS issues and hazards that are managed by the Product Safety Working Group (PSWG). 
7 Minor PS issues – risk levels C and D (against MOD D-Ships risk matrix) – Managed by PSWG. 
W
ar
n
in
g 
6 Minor PS issues – risk levels B, C and D – Managed by Product Safety & Environmental Committee (PSEC). 
5 
Major PS issues – risk level B with short term Hazard Management Actions (HMAs) in place to reduce the 
level of risk, and/or remove the associated process - Managed by PSEC and Open Items (OI) reporting. 
4 
Major PS issues – risk level B with long term HMAs in place to reduce the level of risk, and/or remove the 
associated process - Managed by PSEC and OI reporting. 
Fa
il 
3 Major PS issues – risk level B with HMAs temporarily stopping process via quarantine (ED). 
2 
Major PS issues – risk level B with HMAs to permanently stop the process through quarantine (ED) and 
requirements for design change. 
1 Major PS issues – risk level A – Unmanaged. 
0 Unmanaged assets with unknown risks.  Full quarantine (ED). 
Figure 7.13 – Product Safety Hazards Criteria 
J. Finance. 
The Finance trait [see Figure 7.14] boundary between ‘Good’ and ‘Warning’ was 
based upon a lack of funding that would not adversely affect the day-to-day 
operation of the business.   
The boundary between ‘Warning’ and ‘Fail’ was based upon a lack of funding 
and preparation that would have a detrimental effect on the operational 
effectiveness of the business. 
 RAG Finance 
G
o
o
d
 9 In year Forward Maintenance Plan (FMP), or finance not currently required for this Asset. 
8 Mod Capital funding approved. 
7 In FMR – funded. 
W
ar
n
in
g 6 In FMR – awaiting funding approval with MOD. 
5 On MOD 10 Year Strategic Plan, Statement of Need (SoN) in system, but not yet funded. 
4 Business case accepted. Formal SoN raised. 
Fa
il 
3 Business case raised. 
2 Business case proposed. 
1 Unlikely to get funding in MOD financial year. 
0 No plans to fund. 
Figure 7.14 – Finance Criteria 
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7.5 The Hybrid Monitoring System 
All sub-events of the FTA were uniquely identified in a spread sheet with the 
associated state of each of the ten monitored traits, to provide a ‘0-9’ dashboard 
indication of the ‘current’ condition [see Figure 7.15].  The information 
associated with each sub-event included a unique identification number and the 
asset description. 
 
Figure 7.15 – Spread Sheet Dashboard Information 
The dashboard information was then overlaid onto the fault tree for ‘Dock 
Failure’ [see Figure 7.16] with sub-event ‘00001’ and ‘00002’ representing the 
two initial events [see Figure 7.16 – circled in blue]. 
Although the asset condition of ‘Dock Drained’ was red in the example [see           
Figure 7.16], this was due to it being in a ‘drained’ state.  This does not indicate 
an issue with the drainage system since the physical states of the dock could be 
either: filling, full, draining or drained, and when in the ‘drained’ state the dock 
is more susceptible to catastrophic failure. 
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          Figure 7.16 – FTA with Dashboard Information 
The FTA assets ‘00001 - Dock groove’ and ‘00002 - Caisson’ each had ten traits to 
signify their current condition.  The scoring of the dashboard was based on the 
Microsoft Excel® conditional formatting function, with ‘0 to 3’ indicating a ‘Fail’ 
condition, ‘4 to 6’ indicating a ‘Warning’ and ‘7 to 9’ indicating a ‘Good’ 
condition.  When populated, the dashboard indicated various states for each of 
the ten traits associated with the two assets [see Figure 7.17].  
 
Figure 7.17 – Spread Sheet Dashboard Warning Information 
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As an example, the full description of each trait associated with asset ‘00001 
Dock Groove’ is defined in Figure 7.18.  
Dock Groove - Trait RAG Definitions 
Plant Change 9 Asset fully functioning, fit for purpose and formally accepted into service. 
Inspections and 
Maintenance 
1 Safety critical maintenance, surveys & inspections overdue – quarantined via (ED). 
Staff Competence 9 
Fully resourced, task fully understood, all Suitably Qualified & Experienced 
Personnel (SQEP). 
Operating Procedures  9 Procedures in place and in date – fully audited. 
Emergency 
Procedures 
7 Emergency procedures cover all asset operations and relevant communications. 
Permits to Work 9 
All Permit to Work (PTW) systems, Authorised Persons (APs) and Competent 
Persons (CPs) in place and fully audited by Authorising Engineer (AE) in accordance 
with (iaw) JSP 375, or PTW not applicable. 
Safety Management 
Systems 
7 
All SMS in place, reflected in relevant Processes, fully audited by an Independent 
Authority with only minor overdue non-conformances. 
Maintaining Design 
Intent 
2 
Asset does not fulfil current legal and/or operational requirement, concessions in 
place that reduce operational capability (ED).  Design information held by 
individuals, not audited. 
Product Safety 
Hazards 
3 
Major PS issues – risk level B with HMAs temporarily stopping process via 
quarantine (ED). 
Finance 4 Business case accepted. Formal SoN raised. 
Figure 7.18 – Dock Groove Trait Definitions 
Even though the ‘00001 - Dock Groove’ example shows several warning signs for 
‘Inspections and Maintenance’, ‘Maintaining Design Intent’, ‘Product Safety 
Hazards’ and ‘Finance’, it did not indicate a potential catastrophic failure, since 
there were also several areas reported as ‘good’ (7 – 9).   
To provide a realistic representation of the actual impact posed by all the ten 
trait warning states, they were summarised under an additional heading of 
‘State’.  In order to summarise all traits under the ‘state’ heading one possible 
solution was to sum and average the ten traits, although Chapter 5 
demonstrated that some traits were significantly more important than others.  
To calculate and apply an accurate weighting against the ten traits associated 
with each asset condition, it was hypothesised that the relative importance of 
each trait would be equivalent to the average levels of trait findings per disaster 
as captured in Chapter 5.  The issue with using the averaged value was that 
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‘Plant Change’ equalled zero, therefore an offset of ‘+1’ had to be applied to 
each trait average to give it a multiple offset value [see Figure 7.19].  The 
resulting formula was divided by twenty-two point one, a number that equalled 
the total weighting, to ensure the result was aligned to the ‘0’ and ‘9’ scoring. 
Trait 
Average 
Findings 
Weighting 
(+1 offset) 
1 Safety Management Systems 3.7 4.7 
2 Design & Maintaining Design Intent 0.9 1.9 
3 Plant Change 0 1 
4 Inspections and Maintenance 1.5 2.5 
5 Staff Competence 2.5 3.5 
6 Operating Procedures 1.4 2.4 
7 Emergency Procedures 0.8 1.8 
8 Permits to Work 0.1 1.1 
9 Finance 0.1 1.1 
10 Product Safety Hazards 1.1 2.1 
 Total weighting 22.1 
Figure 7.19 – Average Trait Findings per Disaster 
The formula [red numbers identify trait headings from Figure 7.19] for the sub-
event ‘State’ was: 
State = ( (1*4.7)+(2*1.9)+(3)+(4*2.5)+(5*3.5)+(6*2.4)+(7*1.8)+(8*1.1)+(9*1.1)+(10*2.1) )  
22.1 
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7.6 Testing the Trait Weightings 
This section details the investigation concerning the application of single and 
multiple ‘Fail’ conditions to the weighting formula for ‘State’ described in 
Section 0.  
Initial Trait Weightings 
The ‘state’ formula was entered into the monitoring system dashboard and 
tested by entering a ‘0’ to indicate a ‘Fail’ condition for the traits that had, 
according to the results from Chapter 5, the greatest impact on the actual state 
of the asset, were: 
 Inspections and Maintenance. 
 Staff Competence. 
 Operating Procedures. 
 Safety Management Systems. 
 Product Safety Hazards. 
 
Figure 7.20 – Dashboard Showing Results of Asset Trait Warning Conditions 
The individual effect of these five ‘Fail’ conditions had no significant impact on 
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the overall ‘state’ of the asset examples [see Figure 7.20], which resulted in 
‘Good’ scores of ‘8’, ‘7’, ‘8’, ‘8’ and ‘8’ for examples ‘A’ to ‘E’ respectively.  The 
weightings applied to the relative importance of each trait should in theory have 
resulted in a ‘Warning’ condition, as these five traits were identified as the five 
most common to all the investigated catastrophic incidents, and weighted 
accordingly to make their effect more prominent [see Chapter 5].  
 
Figure 7.21 – Dashboard Showing Results of Varying Warning Conditions 
Each of the five traits were then tested simultaneously using three trait 
conditions to indicate ‘Warning (6)’, ‘Fail (3)’ and ‘Fail (0)’ [see Figure 7.21].  This 
resulted in overall State scores of ‘7 = Good’, ‘5 = Warning’ and ‘3 = Fail’ for asset 
examples ‘F’ to ‘H’ respectively.  Theoretically, this test should have indicated an 
overall ‘Fail’ condition when all five traits were in a ‘Fail’ condition of ‘3’.  This 
only occurred when all five were in a ‘Fail (0)’ condition in example ‘H’, since the 
five traits had a greater weighting in the formula than the remaining five traits.  
To effectively indicate the overall ‘state’ of an asset, there was deemed a 
requirement to devise an override condition that would show a ‘Fail’ condition 
over all other conditions. 
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Trait Weightings with Override 
The use of weightings to capture the overall trait state, as a lead indicator, was a 
proactive approach to monitoring, and was acceptable when looking for slight 
variations or deviations in traits levels.   When a trait suddenly dropped into the 
‘Fail’ state, it should have overrode all other inputs, so the significance would 
gain the attention as a lag indicator and drive a reaction to make the situation 
safe.  Whilst up till now, the premise of the monitoring system was to monitor 
lead indicators, lag indicators of issues and failures can be used as lead 
indicators for higher level failures [as discussed in Chapter 5]. 
To ensure that the asset ‘State’ reflected the overall asset trait condition as well 
as coping with lag indicators as warning conditions, a Boolean logic ‘IF’ 
statement was used [see Figure 7.22].   The cell references used in the Boolean 
statement [see Figure 7.22] are associated with the Excel® function arguments 
[see Figure 7.23]. 
 
Figure 7.22 – Boolean Statement 
The ‘Logical Test’ [see Figure 7.22 – blue bracket] checked whether the scoring 
for ‘Maintenance and Inspection (G12)’, ‘Staff Competence (H12)’, ‘Operating 
Procedures (I12)’, ‘Safety Management Systems (L12)’ and ‘Product Safety 
Hazards (N12)’ were equal or less than three (<=3).  If ‘True’ the formula [see 
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Figure 7.22 – green bracket] returned the highest warning condition equating to 
the lowest number, and if ‘False’ the formula [see Figure 7.22 – red bracket] 
returned the result from the weighted formula tested in section 7.5.  The 
warning conditions were those described in section 7.4. 
The first test presented five traits [see Figure 7.23 - circled in red] with states 
greater than three to indicate ‘Warning’ and not ‘Fail’ levels.  The Boolean 
argument [see Figure 7.23] returned ‘False’ and the resulting ‘State’ of six was 
based upon the weighted formula, indicating a ‘Warning’ condition [see Figure 
7.23 - circled in blue].  This demonstrated that the logical test calculated the 
result based upon the weighted sum of all ten traits. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.23 – Excel® Function Arguments and a ‘False’ conclusion 
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The Boolean formula was tested with the ‘Staff Competence’ trait in a ‘Fail’ state 
of two [see Figure 7.24 – second red circle from left] and the other high impact 
trait states represented by the same levels as the first test [see Figure 7.24 – 
three red circles from the right hand side and far left red circle].   
 
Figure 7.24 – Excel® Function Arguments with a ‘True’ conclusion 
The resulting ‘state’ of two indicated that the ‘Fail’ condition [see Figure 7.24 – 
blue circle] had been correctly identified by the formula.  These tests 
demonstrated that the initial weighted formula gave a reasonable summary 
state for an asset condition, but no clear warning of a ‘Fail’ condition should it 
occur.  The Boolean formula, with the adapted logical argument, allowed a ‘Fail’ 
condition to show through. 
7.7 D Lock Fault Tree 
The prototype monitoring system boundaries and assumptions discussed in 
Section 7.1 provided the top level FTA for ‘D Lock Failure’ [see Annex A]. 
The circles represented potential asset failures and the diamonds represented 
an asset condition that was associated with the state of an asset such as a 
Penstock or Caisson.  Each potential asset failure [see Annex A – circles] had one 
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or more basic asset conditions combined either by ‘AND’ or ‘OR’ gates, with all 
asset conditions and potential asset failures having a unique identification 
number [see Annex A – red numbers].  The events ‘00014’ and ‘00015’ had other 
fault trees identifying further root causes, and some individual root cause asset 
failures without associated fault trees.  The root causes for asset failures ‘00014 
and 00015’ were: 
 Asset condition ‘00014 - Drainage System Failure’ would only occur once 
the combination of penstock and pump failures were realised [see Figure 
7.25].  This would occur due to either asset failures ‘00001 – drainage A 
penstock P079’ and ‘00002 – drainage B penstock P080’ or ‘00004 - South 
pumping door P077’ and ‘00005 – South pumping door P078’ paired 
penstocks failing simultaneously due to double penstock isolation, or asset 
failure ‘00003 – North pump P090’ penstock due to it being a single 
isolation penstock.  
 
Figure 7.25 – Event 00014 Root Causes 
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 Asset condition ‘00015 – Penstock Leveller Failure’ would only occur if the 
combination of penstock and pump failures were realised [see Figure 
7.26].  With either assets ‘00006 – South West Leveller penstock P068’ and 
‘00007 – South West Leveller penstock P069’ failing simultaneously due to 
double penstock isolation, or either ‘00008 - Leveller P075’ or ‘00009 – 
leveller to 3 basin P076’ failing since they were single penstock isolations 
to tidal water from sea or non-tidal water from No.3 basin.   
 
Figure 7.26 – Event 00015 Root Causes 
 Asset condition ‘00016 – D Lock catastrophic caisson failure’ would occur if 
either asset ‘00010 – D Lock West caisson’, ‘00011 – Lock groove 
structure’, or ‘00012 – D Lock East caisson’ were to ‘Fail’ [see Figure 7.27]. 
 Asset condition ‘00017 – D Lock Catastrophic Structural Failure’ would 
occur if asset ‘00013 - lock wall structure’ reached a ‘Fail’ condition [see 
Figure 7.27]. 
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 Asset condition ‘00018 – D Lock Catastrophic Flooding’ would occur if asset 
00014 or 00015 reached a ‘Fail’ condition [see Figure 7.27].   
 
Figure 7.27 – Events 00016, 00017 and 00018 Root Causes 
As each asset state had three possible conditions of ‘Good’, ‘Warning’ and ‘Fail’, 
the FTA could also be used to indicate ‘Warning’ and ‘Good’ conditions once the 
criteria was met, thus providing a dashboard status for the whole system. 
7.8 Storing the Data 
The Excel® dashboard held the ‘state’ of all uniquely identified assets as a data 
list [see Figure 7.28]   so that the information could be used in any fault tree, 
since one asset may be part of many fault trees.  All other events that were a 
result of multiple events linked by ‘AND’ or ‘OR’ gates were calculated as an 
average of the inputs for ‘AND’ and the minimum function of the inputs for ‘OR’.  
Averaging the inputs ensured that both inputs had to be in a ‘Fail’ condition for a 
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‘Fail’ output, and the minimum function ensured that the lowest input number, 
representing the worst condition, would pass through. 
 
Figure 7.28 – Asset Data 
7.9 Presenting the Information 
There were many ways to present information in a format that was ergonomic 
and user friendly, human factors techniques on design for usability were 
reviewed (Institute of Ergonomics & Human Factors, 2012).  Presenting the main 
dashboard using an Excel® spreadsheet [see Figure 7.28] suited the requirement 
to see the ‘big picture’ for the management of assets.  However, this wasn’t 
necessarily the most efficient way to present the information.  The efficiency in 
presenting this information was achieved by overlaying ‘Warning’ or ‘Fail’ 
conditions on a map of Portsmouth Naval Base with relevant information 
flagged alongside these conditions [see Figure 7.29].   
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Figure 7.29 – Map Page with Example Indications and Information 
When selecting any of these indications the details associated with each asset 
were presented in a drill down details sheet [see Figure 7.30].  
 
Figure 7.30 – Drill-down Details Sheet 
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7.10 Chapter 7 Conclusions 
This novel approach for a monitoring system involved the classification of ten 
common traits that were known to lead to catastrophic incidents, based on six 
headings used by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and four headings used 
in Engineering Governance.  These were weight averaged to provide a ‘state’ 
condition for each asset, and amalgamated with a qualitative fault tree 
representation of a known catastrophic failure type.  The prototype monitoring 
system held the relevant information for each asset, and demonstrated that the 
weighted current ‘state’ of the assets could be calculated using the Boolean logic 
formula, taking into account the relative significance of the data that it was 
presented with.  Some of the information gathered to support the ten traits was 
gathered automatically from the existing maintenance and inspection databases, 
other information came from several locally held SQEP databases and 
information manually set by the Naval Base Chief Engineer’s department.  This 
manual capture and data entry did raise some issues over the processes that 
would be required to mandate the capture of data, such as the mandating of 
certain processes and the governance audits to check processes were followed.  
The disadvantage of this type of monitoring system was that it only identified 
the current situation, and if this was identified as being in a ‘Fail’ condition, it 
would not leave time to react apart from immediate stoppages or quarantine.  In 
order to manage complex engineering industries there must be time to prioritise 
repair plans using predictive capability based upon trend analysis.  This approach 
is described in Chapter 8.  
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8 Developing Predictive Capability 
Chapter 7 defined a prototype monitoring system that would indicate the 
current situation using the traits identified in Chapter 5, and how these 
determined the state of each asset.  Whilst it was advantageous to understand 
the current state of each asset, it did not allow time for mitigation to be put in 
place to prevent disaster.  This chapter discusses the capture and comparison of 
historic data to provide trend analysis, and the prediction of future states based 
upon this trend analysis.   
8.1 Full Data Set Example 
The data set measured, corresponded to the ‘D Lock Fault Tree’ described in 
Chapter 7 [see Figure 8.1 and Annex A], with all the possible combinations of 
events captured in the tree.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1 – D Lock Fault Tree 
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Events ‘00001’ to ‘00013’ were basic events that corresponded to the condition 
of each penstock and pump.  Events ‘00014’ to ‘00018’ were associated with the 
summing up of the basic events through either ‘AND’ gates or ‘OR’ gates.  The 
formula used to capture these combinations of events was defined adjacent to 
the ‘State’ column in blue type, for events ‘00014’ to ‘00018’ [see Figure 8.2]. 
 
Figure 8.2 – D Lock Trait Data Set 
The D Lock fault tree and the traits associated with each of the assets/events in 
the fault tree were tested with a simple scenario.  This scenario was based 
around the investigation and identification of issues associated with the 
‘Operating Procedures’ for ‘D Lock Drainage A - P078’ penstock.  This data was 
synthesised for the condition of each event over a ten week period [see Annex 
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B.1 to B.10].  The definitions of each trait score were summarised in Annex C. 
As the ‘Operating Procedures’ level dropped from a numerical value of six to 
four, the ‘State’ level was calculated using the weighted formula described in 
Chapter 7.  Once the ‘Operating Procedures’ level dropped to three, the ‘State’ 
level automatically reported a three due to the override function built into the 
formula.  
A surface graph, representing the ‘D Lock Drainage A - P078’ penstock condition 
over the ten week period [see Figure 8.3], showed the gradual decline in scoring 
associated with the identified lack of operating procedures.  The ‘State’ pattern 
[see Figure 8.3 – top part of surface graph towards week four], clearly presents a 
stepped colour change in the ‘State’ once the trait level fell to three, in 
accordance with the weighted formula developed in Chapter 7. 
 
                   Figure 8.3 – ‘D Lock Drainage A - P078’ Penstock Ten (10) Week Surface Plot  
State
Plant Change
Inspections and Maintenance
Staff Competence
Operating Procedures
Emergency Procedures
Permits to Work
Safety Management Systems
Maintaining Design Intent
Product Safety Hazards
Finance
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
8-9
7-8
6-7
5-6
4-5
3-4
2-3
1-2
0-1Weeks
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Whilst this demonstrated that the Fault Tree and the formulas worked, it didn’t 
provide any prior insight into the issues with ‘Operating Procedures’ or the fact 
that it was approaching a level that would raise the alarm and possibly lead to a 
catastrophic incident.  Although a level of insight could be achieved through 
human interaction and operators noticing a regular drop in trait levels, and a 
reasoned prediction that this level would continue to drop until at a dangerous 
level, this human intervention and recognition cannot be guaranteed.  To be 
intelligent the system must recognise the dropping levels and predict a possible 
further reduction to a level that would raise alarm.  This predictive capability 
must rely upon trend analysis. 
8.2 Trend Analysis 
Trend analysis is the prediction of future states based upon historic data 
projected forward in time.  When comparing data over a four week period, and 
plotting the levels of ‘Staff Competence’ reducing from ‘7’ to ‘4’, a simple graph 
could be extended by one week to determine the future state level of ‘3’ in 
week five [see Figure 8.4].   
The level of ‘3’ for ‘Staff Competence’ determined a level of ‘3’ for state due to 
the formula override explained in Chapter 7.  
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Figure 8.4 – Trend Analysis Inputs and Output 
The Excel® linear regression function provided a simple method to predict the 
future state of each trait, based upon the selection of current data [see Figure 
8.5 – known X’s and Y’s].   
 
Figure 8.5 – Excel® Linear Regression Function 
This simple to use formula effectively predicted the future state level for a range 
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of asset level inputs [see Figure 8.6].  
 
Figure 8.6 – Excel® Linear Regression Function Test 
Although the linear extension of the line in the graph [see Figure 8.4], and the 
Excel® linear regression function [see Figure 8.5] were both simple to create, it 
wasn’t the only method that could be used.  This led to projects, specifically 
devised by the author, to investigate the suitability of tools such as Excel® and 
the Neural Network data-mining software Polyanalyst, and allocated to two 
University of Portsmouth Undergraduates.  These projects were to:  
1. Design a system to demonstrate the capture and identification of failure 
in systems before they occur (Oluwadamilola, 2013).   
2. Design, prototype, and produce a data monitoring system which has the 
ability to predict a catastrophic incident, whilst introducing an aspect of 
intelligence (Burns, 2013). 
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8.3 Project 1 
The project to demonstrate the capture and identification of failures in systems, 
before they occur, considered specific data captured for the following selected 
traits: 
 Engineering Governance. 
 Operating Procedures. 
 Emergency Procedures. 
 Financial Information.  
 Inspections & Maintenance. 
 Staff Competence. 
These were six out of the original nine traits headings identified in the early 
stages of research.  The ‘Engineering Governance’ trait was dropped in favour of 
‘State’, which is the resulting formula applied to the ten traits identified in 
Chapter 5. 
This project used the original scoring for traits as ‘one = Good’ to ‘nine = 
Extremely Dangerous’.  This scoring changed shortly after the project was set, 
and is as stated in Chapter 7, with ‘nine = Good’ and ‘zero = very bad’.  The fact 
that the test was developed around a different scoring technique was not seen 
to deter from the aims of the test, and as such made no difference to the 
outcome. 
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8.3.1 The experiment 
The experiment was to determine whether an Excel® spread sheet could be used 
to provide trend analysis using sets of data held in an Excel® spread sheet.  
Random data values were entered into a database to emulate the type of 
information that might be entered under normal conditions.  This process was 
repeated until there was the equivalent of four weeks of data covering the six 
chosen trait headings.   
A program was written in a Visual Basic to test whether the system would 
identify three distinct test patterns: 
 Test 1 - For four consecutive weeks with a data entry of five or greater 
against any one trait. 
 Test 2 - For a sudden change after a period of constant data levels. 
 Test 3 - For a steady rise in data value throughout a four week period. 
8.3.2 Test 1 
A Visual basic program was created to identify the traits levels measured over 
four consecutive weeks at a trait level of five [see Figure 8.7 – instruction in red 
box].  This experiment performed well and resulted in the four weeks being 
highlighted in red. 
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Figure 8.7 – Test 1 – Four (4) Consecutive Weeks (Oluwadamilola, 2013) 
8.3.3 Test 2 
A Visual basic program was created to identify the traits levels measured over a 
four week period, and to check whether there was any sudden change in this 
trait value [see Figure 8.8 instruction in red box].  This test performed well and 
resulted in the sudden change in trait value being highlighted in red. 
 
Figure 8.8 – Test 2 – Sudden Change (Oluwadamilola, 2013) 
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8.3.4 Test 3 
A Visual basic program was created to identify the traits levels measured over a 
four week period, and to check whether there was any sudden change in this 
trait value [see Figure 8.9 steady rise count in red box, predicted value of week 
four level plus one].   
 
Figure 8.9 – Test 3 – Steady Rise in Values (Oluwadamilola, 2013) 
This test performed well and resulted in the week five (next week’s) value being 
predicted at a level of nine which was one more than the current week’s value of 
eight [see Figure 8.10]. 
 
Figure 8.10 – Test 3 – Result (Oluwadamilola, 2013) 
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8.3.5 Project 1 Conclusions 
Oluwadamilola concluded that it was possible to observe a database of historic 
trend data using a Visual Basic program, and to acquire the patterns in the data.  
Once these patterns had been acquired, another Visual Basic program was 
written to recognise patterns and to highlight areas of interest, although this 
program would only detect patterns that it had been designed to detect.  Whilst 
the patterns remained as either rising, falling or sudden movement from a 
steady state, the system provided the correct response. 
Overall the Visual Basic tests performed well with a limited data set, but in order 
to cope with the larger dataset associated with ten traits and many months of 
recorded data, a more sophisticated programming tool might be required. 
8.4 Project 2 
The main objectives of project 2 were to design and produce a data monitoring 
system to predict a catastrophic incident, whilst introducing an aspect of 
intelligence.  
Project 2 considered the nine original traits identified in the early stages of 
research, these were:  
 Emergency Procedures. 
 Finance Info.  
 Inspection & Maintenance. 
 Maintaining Design Intent.  
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 Operating Procedures.  
 Permits to Work.  
 Plant Change. 
 Product Safety Hazards. 
 Staff Competence. 
These traits were weighted and combined to give the overall score for 
‘Engineering Governance’; this was later re-named as ‘State’ [see chapter 5].  
The scoring definitions used in the experiment were the same as those stated in 
Chapter 7, with ‘nine = Good’ and ‘zero = very bad’.  
The project included two main experiments:  
 Experiment A - To test whether Polyanalyst data-mining software would 
be a suitable medium to hold and manipulate data associated with the ‘D 
Lock’ fault tree described in Chapter 7. 
 Experiment B - To test whether Polyanalyst data-mining software would 
be suitable to predict trait level future states, based upon historic data 
held within an Excel® database.  This experiment tested the Polyanalyst 
Linear Regression and Neural Networks functions. 
8.4.1 Experiment A - FTA Test 1 
To test the predictive capability of Polyanalyst data mining software using part 
of the fault tree for ‘D Lock’ described in Chapter 8 [see Figure 8.11 – in red 
triangle]. 
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Figure 8.11 – Section of D Lock Fault Tree Tested 
The Polyanalyst flow chart fault tree test model used four different types of 
nodes to hold the data and perform the calculations required by the three tier 
fault tree, these were: 
 Import Comma Separated Value (CSV) data source node.  CSV data source 
node is a common way to hold and move tabular data between different 
program types.  In this example, between Excel and Polyanalyst [see Figure 
8.12 – circled in red]. 
 Derive node. This node adds new columns to data sets after performing 
embedded equations [see Figure 8.12 – circled in blue].  
 Dataset filter node. This node filters data that is no longer required as part 
of the process [see Figure 8.12 – circled in green].   
 Export CSV node. This node exports the data in a tabulated format [see 
Figure 8.12 – circled in purple]. 
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Figure 8.12 – Experiment A - FTA Test 1 FTA Flow Chart (Burns, 2013) 
The model was tested three times using all inputs as ‘one’, ‘zero’ and finally with 
‘North Pump = 1’ and ‘P078 = 1’.  The level three failure results were ‘No’, ‘Yes’ 
and ‘Yes’ respectively [see Figure 8.13 - level three reading for test 2 circled in 
red]. 
 
Figure 8.13 – Experiment A - FTA Test 1 Result 2 (Burns, 2013) 
8.4.2 Experiment A - FTA Test 2 
The second test set out to improve the output by merging the results from all 
three levels of the fault tree into a single FTA output spread sheet.  This test 
involved the additional Polyanalyst Merge node to combine the information 
from two sources into a single repository [see Figure 8.14 circled in red]. 
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Figure 8.14 – Experiment A - FTA Test 2 FTA Flow Chart (Burns, 2013) 
The results from Experiment A - Test 2 provided a single three level indication of 
all the FTA level outputs [see Figure 8.15]. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.15 – Experiment A - FTA Test 2 FTA Output (Burns, 2013) 
8.4.3 Experiment B – Linear Regression Test 1 
This test set out to prove whether the Polyanalyst linear regression function 
could calculate the gradient and position of a linear graph representing the 
historical data, simulating trait information captured between the dates of 
January 2011 and March 2013.  This test involved two additional Polyanalyst 
node types: 
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 Score node.   This node is used to combine and compare the output from 
the neural network node with the input from a CSV dataset [see Figure 
8.16 – circled in purple]. 
 Linear Regression node.  This linear regression node [see Figure 8.16 – 
circled in red] models the relationship between two variables represented 
by the ‘X’ and ‘Y’ graph axis, to form a linear equation in the form of 
‘y=mx+c’.  Where ‘m’ is the gradient and ‘c’ is the ‘y’ intercept. 
 
 
Figure 8.16 – Experiment B - LR Test 1 (Burns, 2013) 
The Linear Regression (LR) model was trained using the historical data stored in 
an Excel® database, representing the traits associated with one asset.  The 
output from the LR node was compared with a CSV node, containing a set of 
‘current working data’, using the Score node.  This was plotted on the Line Chart 
node [see Figure 8.17].  This graph shows the LR output as a red line and the 
‘current working’ data from the CSV node as a blue line.  The prediction accuracy 
was within one of the true value. 
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 Figure 8.17 – Experiment B - LR Test 1 Output Graph (Burns, 2013) 
8.4.4 Experiment B – Neural Network Test 1 
The neural network test 1 discussed and tested the suitability of Artificial Neural 
Networks (ANNs) to undertake numerical predictions of future states based 
upon historic data.  This test involved two additional Polyanalyst node types: 
 Neural network node. This node performs an algorithm based upon a 
neural network [see Figure 8.18 – circled in red]. 
 Line graph node.  This node displays the output of the score node [see 
Figure 8.18 – circled in green]. 
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Figure 8.18 – Experiment B - NN Test 1 (Burns, 2013) 
The neural network (NN) was trained using the same set of historical data used 
in the linear regression test, simulating trait information captured between the 
dates of January 2011 and March 2013 for one asset.  The NN node learning 
option was set to automatic learning to provide the optimum setup for the test. 
The output from the NN node was compared, using the Score node, with 
‘working data’ held in the CSV node, and the output was captured by the Line 
Chart node [see Figure 8.19]. 
The results of this test indicated that it was a representative model.  The red line 
and the blue line were similar, especially when the spurious reading on the 8th 
February was removed [see Figure 8.19 – dotted red line]. 
The ‘2.55’ difference in readings for the 8th February 2013 (2/8/2013 is American 
format) could have been due to previously learnt variations, or simply part of 
the model inaccuracy.  
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Figure 8.19 – Experiment B - NN Test 1 Output Graph (Burns, 2013) 
As part of the test, the training data had the last week of data removed and the 
NN node predicted a future state of ‘6.19’.   
8.4.5 Experiment B – Neural Network Test 2 
The neural network test 2 set out to test whether information relevant to 
penstock ‘P078’ could be extracted from the penstock state board and fed into 
the prediction NN, and fed directly into the FTA to provide the future prediction 
of the top level event ‘D Lock catastrophic flooding’.  This test involved one 
additional Polyanalyst node type: 
 Modify Columns node. This node allows the program to modify data 
types, and to re-order/re-name the contents of columns in a data base 
[see Figure 8.20– circled in red]. 
  
 
228 
 
Figure 8.20 – Experiment B - NN Test 2 (Burns, 2013) 
The results showed that the information could be extracted [see Figure 8.21 – 
point 1] and manipulated for one particular penstock [see Figure 8.21 – point 2], 
and that the predicted value derived from the NN [see Figure 8.21 – point 4] 
could be fed into the FTA [see Figure 8.21 – point 5]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.21 – Experiment B - NN Test 2 Results (Burns, 2013) 
The results showed a level of inaccuracy, with an output of ‘6.55’ and with all 
inputs as nine.  This could be attributed to the level and independence of 
training data used to train the NN.  The test was repeated several times with 
other input levels and the results were similar in levels of accuracy. 
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8.4.6 Project 2 Conclusions 
Burns found that the results of project 2 showed that it was possible to store, 
handle, predict and calculate a fault tree top level event using current data for 
several penstocks.   
Miss Burns also concluded that the accuracy of these calculations could be 
improved by increasing the amount of training data used from one hundred and 
thirty weeks to two hundred weeks.    
8.5 Chapter 8 Summary 
Chapter 8 demonstrated that it was possible to hold and manipulate historic 
trait data in three ways: 
 Graphical Representation. 
 Visual Basic. 
  Linear Regression & Neural Networks. 
Graphical representation 
Whilst a simple spread sheet with surface plots was a reasonable 
representation, it did not provide any ‘heads up’ for probable future states, 
other than whether the user recognised an issue based on their experience. 
Visual Basic 
The use of Visual Basic (VB) programs running in an Excel® environment 
provided automatic recognition of potential scenarios, although each potential 
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scenario must be understood and a program written accordingly.  The 
development of a full set of VB programs to adequately cover every eventuality 
would be unrealistic. 
Linear Regression & Neural Networks 
The use of data mining software, such as Polyanalyst, provided good results to 
some of tests undertaken, and would undoubtedly continue to provide the 
answers to many more scenarios.  However, Polyanalyst was a complex program 
that relied upon large amounts of data to train the models, and dedicated 
personnel to capture the requirement and to build the correspondingly large 
programs.  To improve these results to a point whereby the system provides 
accurate data, would take additional time and resource.  This was not seen as 
something to be exhaustedly tested as part of this thesis, although the potential 
was apparent, especially when such systems involving Artificial Neural Networks 
(ANNs) were capable of improvement through self-learning. 
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9 Results and Conclusions 
This chapter summarises the results and conclusion identified within this thesis, 
covering the following main areas: 
 Claims of originality. 
 Literary research. 
 Research of catastrophic incidents. 
 Identification of common traits. 
 Grouping the traits. 
 Determining the tools. 
 Prototyping the monitoring system. 
 Development of predictive capability. 
9.1 Claims of Originality 
This thesis resulted in the following novel contributions to advance the field of 
disaster prevention: 
 The ability to predict potential situations that lead to catastrophic 
incidents. 
 The classification of common traits that lead to catastrophic incidents. 
 The grouping of traits under specific headings based on those used by the 
Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and four other headings based upon 
engineering governance terms. 
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 The creation of a standardised approach to the investigation of 
catastrophes. 
 The identification of a novel way to amalgamate trait information with a 
qualitative fault tree to provide a known current ‘state’ of all fault tree 
events and therefore the state of the top event of ‘catastrophic disaster’. 
 The creation of a new way of presenting trait conditions using 2D surface 
graphs and dashboards. 
9.2 Literary research. 
The literary review explored six main topics: 
 Catastrophic Incidents. 
 Leading Indicators (Common Traits). 
 Methods to Predict Catastrophic Incidents. 
 Monitoring Systems. 
 Intelligent Monitoring Systems. 
 Predictive Capability. 
9.2.1 Catastrophic Incidents 
There were several well documented catastrophic incident investigations carried 
out by institutions and government bodies, such as the United Kingdom’s Health 
and Safety Executive (HSE) and the United States Chemical Safety Board (CSB).  
The ten catastrophic incidents discussed in this thesis were selected to provide a 
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representative cross section of the engineering industry. 
The breadth and depth of cited information ensured an unbiased approach to 
the capture of causes and associated issues.  The varying level of published 
information for each disaster was attributed by the author to the level of 
destruction and the amount of time since the disaster occurred. 
9.2.2 Lead Indicators (Common Traits) 
The published investigations cited in this thesis demonstrated that several 
different processes were used in the identification of root causes.  Some 
investigations grouped the findings under headings such as ‘Safety Management 
Systems (SMS)’, ‘Permit to Work (PTW)’, and ‘Risk Assessments (RA) and each 
investigation identified several root causes, confirming that none involved any 
single specific act or failure.  The lead indicators were based upon the findings of 
the ten disasters and as such were based upon lag indicators of issues that had 
already occurred. 
Whilst there was an abundance of information on each disaster, each 
investigation involved individual processes and question sets, there was no 
evidence of a standardised process or question format.  The consequence of this 
research found that a standardised approach to the investigation of disasters, 
based on specific set of trait headings, would provide the findings in a 
comparable format with all other disasters.  This in turn would ensure guidance 
from government and professional bodies could be targeted at specific 
industries more appropriately and effectively.   
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9.2.3 Methods to Predict Catastrophic Incidents 
There were a number of self-help books aimed at senior management and safety 
professionals alike, that considered how to measure and reduce some of the 
root causes associated with catastrophic incidents (Maguire, 2006) (Reason, 
1997).  There were several examples of monitoring systems that recorded lead 
indicators, such as audits and inspections, and others that recorded lag 
indicators such as process failures and near misses.  There was also reference 
material on data collection and trend analysis being applied to the monitoring of 
machinery (Kothamasu, Huang, & VerDuin, 2009). 
However, there was no evidence of any systems that had been developed for 
the monitoring and measurement of traits based on trend analysis from 
recorded historic data, or the possibility of linking this information to the events, 
and combinations of events that lead to catastrophic incidents. 
9.2.4 Monitoring System 
The literature research identified a multitude of monitoring techniques, 
designed to optimize maintenance, improve efficiency and reduce costs.  Each 
had a variation of dashboard that presented this information to the operators 
and managers.  There were examples of real time monitoring techniques and 
methods to manually capture lag indicators via operator feedback and various 
scoring systems. 
However, there was no evidence of research that discussed the use of a 
monitoring system specifically designed to determine the possibility of 
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catastrophic incidents, based upon the measurement and manipulation of data 
associated with particular traits that were measurable within an engineering 
environment. 
9.2.5 Intelligent Monitoring System 
The literature research found a number of intelligent systems such as condition 
based monitoring systems that captured fluid, vibration, light, heat and noise 
levels, and how these measurements provided warnings when compared against 
specific tolerances.   
However, there was no evidence of any research covering intelligent monitoring 
systems that specifically considered the measurement of common traits and 
overlaying this onto a fault tree representing a catastrophic incident. 
9.2.6 Predictive Capability 
The literature research on predictive tools identified various techniques that 
could be employed to predict the future state of a system based upon the trend 
analysis of historic data, using formulas to calculate the next expected value on a 
graph or table.  Although the use of trend analysis to predict the probability of 
future states within systems was common place, there was no evidence of trend 
analysis being applied to a system that monitored traits in order to identify 
patterns that might indicate the potential of a catastrophic incident.  
9.2.7 Literary Research Conclusions 
The ten catastrophic incidents were specifically chosen for their relative 
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complexity and the levels of damage incurred.  They covered a range of 
engineering industries, including space exploration, aircraft, petrochemical and 
the rail industry.  The research provided a plethora of information on root 
causes that was used to develop a set of common traits, as detailed in Chapters 
4 and 5.  The surprising outcome of understanding the common traits, was the 
recognition that there was apparently no standardised approach to the 
investigation and reporting of disasters. 
The research into designing a predictive capability identified several tools and 
methods that identified root causes, and other tools that represented the 
various combinations of events, that when combined in certain conditions, 
would lead to a particular fault scenario.  This information was used to 
determine the most appropriate tools for the task of predicting catastrophic 
incidents in Chapter 6. 
The realisation that there was no identified research on specialised intelligent 
monitoring systems to predict whether a catastrophe was about to happen 
based upon the measurement of several traits, demonstrated the work 
undertaken by this thesis to be of specific value within complex engineering 
industries.  This intelligent system designed in Chapter 7, was improved using 
the information gained through the literature research into predictive methods, 
and the experiments described in Chapter 8, including the two projects 
undertaken by the University of Portsmouth undergraduates. 
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9.3 Research of Catastrophic Incidents 
Information on the ten catastrophic incidents was freely available and covered 
the incidents in varying levels of detail, these were summarised in Chapter 3.  
The research found that each disaster had undergone a full investigation to 
identify the root causes of the incident, and although there have been many 
disaster investigations, there was no evidence of a standardised approach to 
investigations or any common naming criteria for the root causes.   
The research undertaken in Chapter 3 provided a detailed summary of the 
various issues and failures that led to each disaster, there were no assumptions 
or theories tested as part of Chapter 3. 
9.4 Identification of Common Traits 
The disasters summarised in Chapter 3 were used to inform and determine the 
many root cause categorisations captured in Chapter 4.  In order to compare 
each disaster using a common language, the identified root causes were 
arranged into several traits headings that in turn were grouped under generic 
engineering governance headings of ‘People’, ‘Process’ and ‘Tools’.   
Chapter 4 found that the many root causes associated with ten catastrophic 
incidents could effectively be grouped into twenty-one trait headings, and that 
each disaster was caused by several concurrent failures of the traits.  
9.5 Grouping the Traits 
The trait data identified in Chapter 4 provided a starting point for understanding 
the general breadth of traits associated with catastrophic incidents.  The 
  
 
238 
comparison of these ten disasters, using the twenty-one traits, indicated over 
70% commonality in the traits associated with each of the disasters.  
In order to test these findings, and provide a better understanding of the issues 
that could lead to catastrophic incidents, the twenty-one trait headings 
established in Chapter 4 were combined with the thirty-five trait headings 
identified by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) case studies paper.  Out of 
the fifty-six traits several captured similar issues under slightly different 
headings.  In order to further simplify the measurement of traits, these fifty-six 
were grouped under ten new trait headings.   
 
Figure 9.1 – Reproduced from Figure 5.8 
The ten new headings comprised of six headings already recognised by the HSE 
[see Figure 9.1] and four headings that succinctly captured the issues covered by 
the remaining traits [see Figure 9.2].   
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Figure 9.2 – Reproduced from Figure 5.9 
The comparison of thesis findings and HSE findings, each under the ten new 
headings, showed similarities in the trait types identified from this thesis and the 
HSE case studies (HSE, 2004) [see Figure 9.3]. 
 
Figure 9.3 – Reproduced from Figure 5.11 
The main result of grouping the traits was to further highlight the need to agree 
and standardise a set of common trait headings, and to apply these to all future 
investigations.  This would make the comparison of results more meaningful 
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across all industries, and simplify the dissemination and targeting of information. 
9.6 Determining the Tools 
The objective of Chapter 6 was to determine the most appropriate Root Cause 
Analysis (RCA) technique to capture the combinations of events that lead to 
failures.  Five RCA techniques were shortlisted from those available, and Chapter 
6 identified and compared the advantages and disadvantages of the five 
techniques.  Chapter 6 concluded that the most appropriate RCA method for use 
in the determination of root causes into potential catastrophic accidents, within 
a marine engineering business when used in a qualitative sense, was Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA).  This decision was based upon the simplicity of implementation 
and the ability to represent FTA as a Boolean formula within a database.   
9.7 Prototyping the Monitoring System 
The aim of the work presented in Chapter 7 was to develop a prototype 
monitoring system that would represent a specific bounded area within 
Portsmouth Naval Base (PNB).  This involved the definition of ‘D Lock 
Catastrophic Failure’ as the top-level failure, and the development of a fault tree 
to capture all the events and combinations of events that could lead to a 
catastrophic failure of D Lock.  Each event represented the state of a particular 
asset and this condition was a weighted sum of all the measured ten traits 
identified in Chapter 6. 
In order to standardise the approach to measuring and defining each trait, they 
were assigned a numbering system from zero to nine, with zero indicating a ‘Fail’ 
  
 
241 
condition and nine indicating a ‘Good’ condition.  The ten possible states (0 to 9 
inclusive) were defined in Chapter 7.   The fault tree used colour to depict the 
state of each event, with green indicating ‘good’ and red indicating ‘fail’ [see 
Figure 9.4 and at Annex A]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.4 – Reproduced from Figure 8.1 
This effectively represented the condition of each event ‘State’ and how 
variations in the ‘State’ affected the top level event of ‘D Lock catastrophic 
failure’.   
Chapter 8 explored the presentation of information in a dashboard format on a 
map of Portsmouth Naval Base (PNB).  This provided an excellent pictorial 
dashboard representation of the current issues and failures, and was noted for 
its ease of understanding and potential for Naval Base management in the 
future.  Whilst the Boolean logic performed well and provided good results for 
the calculations associated with the ‘AND’ and ‘OR’ gates within the fault tree, 
the test did raise certain issues associated with the collection of data for each of 
the ten traits and the lack of advanced notice of failure such a system would 
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provide. 
Some of the information to support the ten traits was gathered automatically 
from the existing maintenance and inspection databases, other information 
came from several locally held manual databases, and information manually 
updated by the Portsmouth Naval Base Chief Engineer’s department.  Whilst it 
was not seen as a priority to design a system that automatically captured and 
manipulated data in real time, the reliance on gathering information and 
manually inputting this into the database, did raise some questions over what 
the required mandated processes would be to keep the data collection ticking 
over, and how this would be managed. 
The resulting dashboard was a good representation of the current situation, but 
if this identified a ‘Fail’ condition it would not provide time to react, apart from 
immediate stoppage or quarantine.  This research highlighted the need to 
develop a predictive capability.  
9.8 Development of Predictive Capability 
The aim of Chapter 8 was to discuss and test different methods of performing 
trend analysis in order to provide a predictive capability within the monitoring 
system.  The experiments undertaken as part of the development of predictive 
capability demonstrated that it was possible to hold and manipulate historic trait 
data using different methods such as: 
 Graphical representation. 
 Visual Basic. 
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 Linear Regression & Neural Networks.   
9.8.1 Graphical Representation 
The test for the graphical representation used the data held in the prototype 
monitoring system and was tested using a pre-determined scenario.  The 
database and the graphical representation of the fault tree, effectively held the 
current information on the ‘State’ of each event, and as this varied between 
‘good’ and ‘fail’ in accordance with the scenario, so the FTA reflected this 
condition through the simple use of Boolean logic built into the Excel® database.   
 
Figure 9.5 – Reproduced from Figure 8.3 
Whilst a simple spread sheet with a surface plot [see Figure 9.5] provided a 
reasonable graphical representation it only provided the current state, it did not 
indicate the probable future state.  This predictive element would rely upon the 
experience of the operator to recognise potential issues as the weeks went by.  
In the surface plot example [see Figure 9.5] at week four there was an indication 
that the ‘operating procedures’ were gradually getting worse, this was also 
captured in the ‘State’ line at the top of the graph once the level went to three 
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and was identified by the formula.  With a complex picture, showing all the 
events in one place, it would be difficult if not impossible to easily identify any 
such issues.  As a pictorial representation, surface plots presented the recent 
history in a simple but effective way, but they did not provide any advantage 
over identifying possible future states.  Therefore this was not seen as a realistic 
tool for further research. 
9.8.2 Excel® Linear Regression Function 
The testing carried out in Section 8.2 identified the Excel® linear regression 
function [see Figure 9.6 ]. 
  
Figure 9.6 – Reproduced from Figure 8.5 
This function was very easy to use and produced significant results when tested 
over a range of inputs.  The use of this function was seen as a very realistic 
contender for the prediction of future asset states, when based within an Excel® 
database. 
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9.8.3 Visual Basic 
The Visual Basic (VB) experiment was to determine whether an Excel® spread 
sheet could be used to provide trend analysis from data held in an Excel® spread 
sheet using a VB program.  Three programs were tested to assess whether they 
would recognise the following three distinct patterns in data: 
 Test 1 – any four consecutive weeks with a numerical entry of five or 
greater against any one trait. 
 Test 2 – any sudden change against any one trait after a period of constant 
numerical value. 
 Test 3 – any steady rise in data value throughout a four week period. 
The results of the three tests demonstrated that it was possible to write a VB 
program that would observe a database of historic data and acquire the patterns 
in the data.  Once these patterns had been acquired, another VB program 
recognised the three patterns and highlighted the areas of interest.   
The disadvantages of VB programming were that they would only detect the 
specific patterns they had been instructed to detect, and each potential scenario 
must be anticipated and a VB program written accordingly.  This form of 
programming was not seen as a realistic tool for predictive capability. 
9.8.4 Linear Regression & Neural Networks 
The second batch of experiments involved testing the Polyanalyst data-mining 
software to establish whether it would replicate the Boolean logic associated 
with the fault tree for D Lock Catastrophic Failure, and to prove whether it could 
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be used to predict the future state based upon historic data.  The results 
demonstrated that data-mining software fulfilled the Boolean logic function 
associated with the fault tree and scored reasonably well in the identification of 
future states based upon small sets of training data. 
In conclusion, the use of data mining software such as Polyanalyst provided 
satisfactory results to some of tests, and would undoubtedly continue to provide 
the answers to many more scenarios.  However, Polyanalyst relied upon large 
amounts of training data, and the need for suitably trained and experienced 
operators to capture the requirement and build the complex programs.   
This was not seen as something that must be pursued as part of this thesis, 
although the potential was apparent, especially when such a system involving 
Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) would have the advantage of self-learning.  
9.9 Overall Conclusion 
The novel approach to this research involved the subjective ranking of ten traits 
that were weight averaged to provide a ‘state’ condition for each asset.  This 
information was presented to a fault tree to determine the ‘state’ of the top 
level event via Boolean calculations based upon the positioning of ‘AND’ and 
‘OR’ gates.   
Another innovation was identifying the requirement to standardise the 
approach to investigations and methods for effectively reporting results across 
multiple engineering industries, allowing legislation, get well programs and 
initiatives to be disseminated and understood. 
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This research demonstrated that ‘an intelligent monitoring system to predict 
potential catastrophic incidents’ was possible, and that the advantages of having 
such a system would be immense.  The additional development of a common set 
of traits that could be used to investigate disasters, was a potential advance in 
the standardisation of incident reporting. 
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10 Recommendations for Further Work  
This Thesis demonstrated that the development of a predictive monitoring 
system was possible and also demonstrated the significant effect it would have 
on the methods used by engineering industries to effectively and efficiently 
manage the likelihood of a catastrophic incident to an acceptable level of risk.  
The additional research into predictive capability, to predict the circumstances 
that might, if unchecked, cause a disaster to occur, found that the warnings 
would allow time to react and prioritise effort and funding. 
In order to get to a position whereby a system could predict disasters with a 
level of confidence and to push this area of research further, it is suggested that 
the following areas could be examined: 
 The development of a full working system, covering all engineering aspects 
within the Portsmouth Naval Base (PNB) operations area. 
 The assessment and development of an automatic data capture facility for 
the ten trait headings, possibly built into a maintenance management or 
financial management software.  
 The continued research into the various data mining techniques, and to 
identify the most cost effective and efficient tool for use within PNB. 
 The research of three dimensional [3D] models to depict the current and 
possible future condition of all assets and infrastructure within PNB. 
 The further research of catastrophes from other engineering industries, to 
compare the results of this thesis, and to update weightings if required. 
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10.1 Development of a full working system 
It is recommended that a full working monitoring system be developed to 
encompass the whole of PNB.  This research could specifically target the 
identification of all significant commonalities between the different business 
areas within PNB, and how they interact.  The practicality of this monitoring 
system design could be tested when used in this complex environment, for a set 
period of time, in order to gain full confidence in the design.   
10.2 Development of Automatic Data Capture 
It is recommended that the development of methods to automatically capture 
the data that supports the ten traits be further researched, especially the 
capture of ‘real time’ data such as: 
 Planned maintenance information, covering completed, due and overdue 
maintenance. 
 Defects as they occur, including the ability to prioritise defects as high, 
medium or low impact. 
Automatic data capture should also include the capture of data derived from 
audits, surveys, investigations and operational restrictions such as:  
 Results of independent and internal audits for Quality, Safety and 
Environmental processes and management systems. 
 The findings of Mechanical, Electrical and Civil engineering surveys 
undertaken on the PNB assets and infrastructure. 
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 The outcomes of internally investigated accident and incident 
investigations. 
 Operational restrictions imposed by the Chief Engineer’s Department. 
 Operational restrictions imposed by external authorities. 
10.3 Further Research of Data Mining Techniques 
 
It is recommended that the use of data mining techniques be further researched 
to determine the most efficient tool and method.  This could be separated into 
two specific areas of research: 
 To identify the most cost effective way of determining the future state of 
all assets within PNB. 
 To identify the most efficient tool to use, taking note of the ability of data-
mining software to reconfigure using the known output accuracy against 
current and past performance data. 
10.4 Research the Suitability of 3D Models as Dashboards 
Whilst having a system that can project information onto a 2D map of 
Portsmouth Naval Base (PNB) was a massive improvement over the existing 
reporting dashboards, the use of 3D maps to identify the issues and potential 
failures may provide a significant advantage over 2D, by allowing the user to 
move around systems, over and below ground level.  It is recommended that the 
design of a 3D dashboard be researched for the most appropriate and effective 
method of displaying important information, taking into consideration human 
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factors implications such as the ability to comprehend and act upon warnings. 
10.5 Further Research of catastrophes 
The ten catastrophes researched in this thesis provided a representative cross-
section of the higher risk engineering industries, and the weightings used in the 
calculation for the ‘state’ condition were based upon these findings.  It is 
recommended that further research be applied to the investigation of 
catastrophes within other engineering sectors to test whether the weightings 
are still relevant, or whether the weightings should be adapted to suit the type 
of engineering industry. 
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Annex A – Top Level ‘D Lock Catastrophic Failure’ FTA 
 
  
   
  
 260   
Annex B – 10 Week Capture 
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Catastrophic 
Caisson 
Failure
00016
D Lock 
Catastrophic 
Structural 
Failure
00017
D Lock 
West Caisson 
00010
Lock 
Wall Structure 
00013
D Lock
 East Caisson 
00012
Lock 
Groove(s) 
Structural
00011
  
 
261 
 
B.2  Week 2 
  
ID 
Number S
ta
te
P
la
n
t 
C
h
a
n
g
e
In
s
p
e
c
ti
o
n
s
 a
n
d
 
M
a
in
te
n
a
n
c
e
S
ta
ff
 C
o
m
p
e
te
n
c
e
O
p
e
ra
ti
n
g
 P
ro
c
e
d
u
re
s
 
E
m
e
rg
e
n
c
y
 
P
ro
c
e
d
u
re
s
P
e
rm
it
s
 t
o
 W
o
rk
S
a
fe
ty
 M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t 
S
y
s
te
m
s
M
a
in
ta
in
in
g
 D
e
s
ig
n
 
In
te
n
t
P
ro
d
u
c
t 
S
a
fe
ty
 H
a
z
a
rd
s
F
in
a
n
c
e
6
00001 D lock - Drainage A - P079 6 6 6 7 5 6 7 7 6 7 5
00002 D lock - Drainage B - P080 6 6 6 7 5 6 7 7 6 7 5
00003 North Pump - P090 6 6 6 7 5 6 7 7 6 7 5
00004 D Lock South - Pumping door - P077 6 6 6 7 5 6 7 7 6 7 5
00005 D Lock South - Pumping door - P078 6 6 6 7 5 6 7 7 6 7 5
00006 D lock SW - leveller to Harbour - P068 6 6 6 7 5 6 7 7 6 7 5
00007 D lock SW -  leveller to Harbour - P069 6 6 6 7 5 6 7 7 6 7 5
00008 D lock - leveller - P075 6 6 6 7 5 6 7 7 6 7 5
00009 D lock -  leveller to 3 Basin - P076 6 6 6 7 5 6 7 7 6 7 5
00010 D Lock West caisson 7 7 8 8 5 6 7 8 8 7 9
00011 Lock grooves structure 8 8 6 9 9 9 9 7 6 7 6
00012 D Lock East caisson 8 9 9 8 7 6 7 8 8 7 5
00013 Lock wall structure 8 8 6 9 9 9 9 7 6 7 6
00014 Drainage system failure 6
00015 Penstock leveller failure 6
00016 D Lock catastrophic caisson failure 7
00017 D Lock catastrophic structural failure 8
00018 D Lock catastrophic flooding 6
 Equates to MIN(E38,E39,E40)
 Reflects E41 (planned for use in Dockyard wide warning system)
 Equates to MIN(E42,E43)
Assets/Events
D Lock catastrophic failure  Equates to MIN(E44,E45,E46)
 Equates to MIN(((E29+E30)/2),E31,((E32+E33)/2))
 Equates to MIN(((E34+E35)/2),(MIN(E36,E37)))
D Lock 
Catastrophic 
Failure
OR
Lock Structural 
Failure
Caisson Failure
Lock Drainage/
Levelling System 
Failure
OR OR OR
&
OR
D Lock
South
Pumping door
P078
00005
D Lock 
South
Pumping door
P077
00004
North Pump
P090
00003
Drainage 
System 
Failure
00014
D lock
SW leveller
to Harbour P069
00007
D lock
SW leveller
to Harbour P068
00006
D lock
leveller to 3 Basin
P076
00009
D lock
Leveller
P075
00008
OR
OR
Penstock 
Leveller 
Failure
00015
&&
D lock
Drainage B
P080
00002
D lock 
Drainage A
P079
00001
D Lock 
Catastrophic 
Flooding 
00018
D Lock 
Catastrophic 
Caisson 
Failure
00016
D Lock 
Catastrophic 
Structural 
Failure
00017
D Lock 
West Caisson 
00010
Lock 
Wall Structure 
00013
D Lock
 East Caisson 
00012
Lock 
Groove(s) 
Structural
00011
  
 
262 
B.3  Week 3 
  
ID 
Number S
ta
te
P
la
n
t 
C
h
a
n
g
e
In
s
p
e
c
ti
o
n
s
 a
n
d
 
M
a
in
te
n
a
n
c
e
S
ta
ff
 C
o
m
p
e
te
n
c
e
O
p
e
ra
ti
n
g
 P
ro
c
e
d
u
re
s
 
E
m
e
rg
e
n
c
y
 
P
ro
c
e
d
u
re
s
P
e
rm
it
s
 t
o
 W
o
rk
S
a
fe
ty
 M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t 
S
y
s
te
m
s
M
a
in
ta
in
in
g
 D
e
s
ig
n
 
In
te
n
t
P
ro
d
u
c
t 
S
a
fe
ty
 H
a
z
a
rd
s
F
in
a
n
c
e
6
00001 D lock - Drainage A - P079 6 6 6 7 4 6 7 7 6 7 5
00002 D lock - Drainage B - P080 6 6 6 7 4 6 7 7 6 7 5
00003 North Pump - P090 6 6 6 7 5 5 7 7 6 7 5
00004 D Lock South - Pumping door - P077 6 6 6 7 4 6 7 7 6 7 5
00005 D Lock South - Pumping door - P078 6 6 6 7 4 6 7 7 6 7 5
00006 D lock SW - leveller to Harbour - P068 6 6 6 7 4 6 7 7 6 7 5
00007 D lock SW -  leveller to Harbour - P069 6 6 6 7 4 6 7 7 6 7 5
00008 D lock - leveller - P075 6 6 6 7 4 6 7 7 6 7 5
00009 D lock -  leveller to 3 Basin - P076 6 6 6 7 4 6 7 7 6 7 5
00010 D Lock West caisson 7 7 8 8 5 6 7 8 8 7 9
00011 Lock grooves structure 8 8 6 9 9 9 9 7 6 7 6
00012 D Lock East caisson 8 9 9 8 7 6 7 8 8 7 5
00013 Lock wall structure 8 8 6 9 9 9 9 7 6 7 6
00014 Drainage system failure 6
00015 Penstock leveller failure 6
00016 D Lock catastrophic caisson failure 7
00017 D Lock catastrophic structural failure 8
00018 D Lock catastrophic flooding 6
 Equates to MIN(E38,E39,E40)
 Reflects E41 (planned for use in Dockyard wide warning system)
 Equates to MIN(E42,E43)
Assets/Events
D Lock catastrophic failure  Equates to MIN(E44,E45,E46)
 Equates to MIN(((E29+E30)/2),E31,((E32+E33)/2))
 Equates to MIN(((E34+E35)/2),(MIN(E36,E37)))
D Lock 
Catastrophic 
Failure
OR
Lock Structural 
Failure
Caisson Failure
Lock Drainage/
Levelling System 
Failure
OR OR OR
&
OR
D Lock
South
Pumping door
P078
00005
D Lock 
South
Pumping door
P077
00004
North Pump
P090
00003
Drainage 
System 
Failure
00014
D lock
SW leveller
to Harbour P069
00007
D lock
SW leveller
to Harbour P068
00006
D lock
leveller to 3 Basin
P076
00009
D lock
Leveller
P075
00008
OR
OR
Penstock 
Leveller 
Failure
00015
&&
D lock
Drainage B
P080
00002
D lock 
Drainage A
P079
00001
D Lock 
Catastrophic 
Flooding 
00018
D Lock 
Catastrophic 
Caisson 
Failure
00016
D Lock 
Catastrophic 
Structural 
Failure
00017
D Lock 
West Caisson 
00010
Lock 
Wall Structure 
00013
D Lock
 East Caisson 
00012
Lock 
Groove(s) 
Structural
00011
  
 
263 
B.4  Week 4 
  
ID 
Number S
ta
te
P
la
n
t 
C
h
a
n
g
e
In
s
p
e
c
ti
o
n
s
 a
n
d
 
M
a
in
te
n
a
n
c
e
S
ta
ff
 C
o
m
p
e
te
n
c
e
O
p
e
ra
ti
n
g
 P
ro
c
e
d
u
re
s
 
E
m
e
rg
e
n
c
y
 
P
ro
c
e
d
u
re
s
P
e
rm
it
s
 t
o
 W
o
rk
S
a
fe
ty
 M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t 
S
y
s
te
m
s
M
a
in
ta
in
in
g
 D
e
s
ig
n
 
In
te
n
t
P
ro
d
u
c
t 
S
a
fe
ty
 H
a
z
a
rd
s
F
in
a
n
c
e
3
00001 D lock - Drainage A - P079 3 6 6 7 3 6 7 7 6 7 5
00002 D lock - Drainage B - P080 3 6 6 7 3 6 7 7 6 7 5
00003 North Pump - P090 6 6 6 7 5 5 7 7 6 7 5
00004 D Lock South - Pumping door - P077 6 6 6 7 4 6 7 7 6 7 5
00005 D Lock South - Pumping door - P078 6 6 6 7 4 6 7 7 6 7 5
00006 D lock SW - leveller to Harbour - P068 6 6 6 7 4 6 7 7 6 7 5
00007 D lock SW -  leveller to Harbour - P069 6 6 6 7 4 6 7 7 6 7 5
00008 D lock - leveller - P075 6 6 6 7 4 6 7 7 6 7 5
00009 D lock -  leveller to 3 Basin - P076 6 6 6 7 4 6 7 7 6 7 5
00010 D Lock West caisson 7 7 8 8 5 6 7 8 8 7 9
00011 Lock grooves structure 8 8 6 9 9 9 9 7 6 7 6
00012 D Lock East caisson 8 9 9 8 7 6 7 8 8 7 5
00013 Lock wall structure 8 8 6 9 9 9 9 7 6 7 6
00014 Drainage system failure 3
00015 Penstock leveller failure 6
00016 D Lock catastrophic caisson failure 7
00017 D Lock catastrophic structural failure 8
00018 D Lock catastrophic flooding 3
 Equates to MIN(E38,E39,E40)
 Reflects E41 (planned for use in Dockyard wide warning system)
 Equates to MIN(E42,E43)
Assets/Events
D Lock catastrophic failure  Equates to MIN(E44,E45,E46)
 Equates to MIN(((E29+E30)/2),E31,((E32+E33)/2))
 Equates to MIN(((E34+E35)/2),(MIN(E36,E37)))
D Lock 
Catastrophic 
Failure
OR
Lock Structural 
Failure
Caisson Failure
Lock Drainage/
Levelling System 
Failure
OR OR OR
&
OR
D Lock
South
Pumping door
P078
00005
D Lock 
South
Pumping door
P077
00004
North Pump
P090
00003
Drainage 
System 
Failure
00014
D lock
SW leveller
to Harbour P069
00007
D lock
SW leveller
to Harbour P068
00006
D lock
leveller to 3 Basin
P076
00009
D lock
Leveller
P075
00008
OR
OR
Penstock 
Leveller 
Failure
00015
&&
D lock
Drainage B
P080
00002
D lock 
Drainage A
P079
00001
D Lock 
Catastrophic 
Flooding 
00018
D Lock 
Catastrophic 
Caisson 
Failure
00016
D Lock 
Catastrophic 
Structural 
Failure
00017
D Lock 
West Caisson 
00010
Lock 
Wall Structure 
00013
D Lock
 East Caisson 
00012
Lock 
Groove(s) 
Structural
00011
  
 
264 
B.5  Week 5 
  
ID 
Number S
ta
te
P
la
n
t 
C
h
a
n
g
e
In
s
p
e
c
ti
o
n
s
 a
n
d
 
M
a
in
te
n
a
n
c
e
S
ta
ff
 C
o
m
p
e
te
n
c
e
O
p
e
ra
ti
n
g
 P
ro
c
e
d
u
re
s
 
E
m
e
rg
e
n
c
y
 
P
ro
c
e
d
u
re
s
P
e
rm
it
s
 t
o
 W
o
rk
S
a
fe
ty
 M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t 
S
y
s
te
m
s
M
a
in
ta
in
in
g
 D
e
s
ig
n
 
In
te
n
t
P
ro
d
u
c
t 
S
a
fe
ty
 H
a
z
a
rd
s
F
in
a
n
c
e
2
00001 D lock - Drainage A - P079 2 6 6 7 2 6 7 7 6 7 5
00002 D lock - Drainage B - P080 2 6 6 7 2 6 7 7 6 7 5
00003 North Pump - P090 6 6 6 7 5 5 7 7 6 7 5
00004 D Lock South - Pumping door - P077 6 6 6 7 4 6 7 7 6 7 5
00005 D Lock South - Pumping door - P078 6 6 6 7 4 6 7 7 6 7 5
00006 D lock SW - leveller to Harbour - P068 6 6 6 7 4 6 7 7 6 7 5
00007 D lock SW -  leveller to Harbour - P069 6 6 6 7 4 6 7 7 6 7 5
00008 D lock - leveller - P075 6 6 6 7 4 6 7 7 6 7 5
00009 D lock -  leveller to 3 Basin - P076 6 6 6 7 4 6 7 7 6 7 5
00010 D Lock West caisson 7 7 8 8 5 6 7 8 8 7 9
00011 Lock grooves structure 8 8 6 9 9 9 9 7 6 7 6
00012 D Lock East caisson 8 9 9 8 7 6 7 8 8 7 5
00013 Lock wall structure 8 8 6 9 9 9 9 7 6 7 6
00014 Drainage system failure 2
00015 Penstock leveller failure 6
00016 D Lock catastrophic caisson failure 7
00017 D Lock catastrophic structural failure 8
00018 D Lock catastrophic flooding 2
 Equates to MIN(E38,E39,E40)
 Reflects E41 (planned for use in Dockyard wide warning system)
 Equates to MIN(E42,E43)
Assets/Events
D Lock catastrophic failure  Equates to MIN(E44,E45,E46)
 Equates to MIN(((E29+E30)/2),E31,((E32+E33)/2))
 Equates to MIN(((E34+E35)/2),(MIN(E36,E37)))
D Lock 
Catastrophic 
Failure
OR
Lock Structural 
Failure
Caisson Failure
Lock Drainage/
Levelling System 
Failure
OR OR OR
&
OR
D Lock
South
Pumping door
P078
00005
D Lock 
South
Pumping door
P077
00004
North Pump
P090
00003
Drainage 
System 
Failure
00014
D lock
SW leveller
to Harbour P069
00007
D lock
SW leveller
to Harbour P068
00006
D lock
leveller to 3 Basin
P076
00009
D lock
Leveller
P075
00008
OR
OR
Penstock 
Leveller 
Failure
00015
&&
D lock
Drainage B
P080
00002
D lock 
Drainage A
P079
00001
D Lock 
Catastrophic 
Flooding 
00018
D Lock 
Catastrophic 
Caisson 
Failure
00016
D Lock 
Catastrophic 
Structural 
Failure
00017
D Lock 
West Caisson 
00010
Lock 
Wall Structure 
00013
D Lock
 East Caisson 
00012
Lock 
Groove(s) 
Structural
00011
  
 
265 
B.6  Week 6 
  
ID 
Number S
ta
te
P
la
n
t 
C
h
a
n
g
e
In
s
p
e
c
ti
o
n
s
 a
n
d
 
M
a
in
te
n
a
n
c
e
S
ta
ff
 C
o
m
p
e
te
n
c
e
O
p
e
ra
ti
n
g
 P
ro
c
e
d
u
re
s
 
E
m
e
rg
e
n
c
y
 
P
ro
c
e
d
u
re
s
P
e
rm
it
s
 t
o
 W
o
rk
S
a
fe
ty
 M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t 
S
y
s
te
m
s
M
a
in
ta
in
in
g
 D
e
s
ig
n
 
In
te
n
t
P
ro
d
u
c
t 
S
a
fe
ty
 H
a
z
a
rd
s
F
in
a
n
c
e
1
00001 D lock - Drainage A - P079 1 6 6 7 1 6 7 7 6 7 5
00002 D lock - Drainage B - P080 1 6 6 7 1 6 7 7 6 7 5
00003 North Pump - P090 6 6 6 7 5 5 7 7 6 7 5
00004 D Lock South - Pumping door - P077 6 6 6 7 4 6 7 7 6 7 5
00005 D Lock South - Pumping door - P078 6 6 6 7 4 6 7 7 6 7 5
00006 D lock SW - leveller to Harbour - P068 6 6 6 7 4 6 7 7 6 7 5
00007 D lock SW -  leveller to Harbour - P069 6 6 6 7 4 6 7 7 6 7 5
00008 D lock - leveller - P075 6 6 6 7 4 6 7 7 6 7 5
00009 D lock -  leveller to 3 Basin - P076 6 6 6 7 4 6 7 7 6 7 5
00010 D Lock West caisson 7 7 8 8 5 6 7 8 8 7 9
00011 Lock grooves structure 8 8 6 9 9 9 9 7 6 7 6
00012 D Lock East caisson 8 9 9 8 7 6 7 8 8 7 5
00013 Lock wall structure 8 8 6 9 9 9 9 7 6 7 6
00014 Drainage system failure 1
00015 Penstock leveller failure 6
00016 D Lock catastrophic caisson failure 7
00017 D Lock catastrophic structural failure 8
00018 D Lock catastrophic flooding 1
 Equates to MIN(E38,E39,E40)
 Reflects E41 (planned for use in Dockyard wide warning system)
 Equates to MIN(E42,E43)
Assets/Events
D Lock catastrophic failure  Equates to MIN(E44,E45,E46)
 Equates to MIN(((E29+E30)/2),E31,((E32+E33)/2))
 Equates to MIN(((E34+E35)/2),(MIN(E36,E37)))
D Lock 
Catastrophic 
Failure
OR
Lock Structural 
Failure
Caisson Failure
Lock Drainage/
Levelling System 
Failure
OR OR OR
&
OR
D Lock
South
Pumping door
P078
00005
D Lock 
South
Pumping door
P077
00004
North Pump
P090
00003
Drainage 
System 
Failure
00014
D lock
SW leveller
to Harbour P069
00007
D lock
SW leveller
to Harbour P068
00006
D lock
leveller to 3 Basin
P076
00009
D lock
Leveller
P075
00008
OR
OR
Penstock 
Leveller 
Failure
00015
&&
D lock
Drainage B
P080
00002
D lock 
Drainage A
P079
00001
D Lock 
Catastrophic 
Flooding 
00018
D Lock 
Catastrophic 
Caisson 
Failure
00016
D Lock 
Catastrophic 
Structural 
Failure
00017
D Lock 
West Caisson 
00010
Lock 
Wall Structure 
00013
D Lock
 East Caisson 
00012
Lock 
Groove(s) 
Structural
00011
  
 
266 
B.7  Week 7 
  
ID 
Number S
ta
te
P
la
n
t 
C
h
a
n
g
e
In
s
p
e
c
ti
o
n
s
 a
n
d
 
M
a
in
te
n
a
n
c
e
S
ta
ff
 C
o
m
p
e
te
n
c
e
O
p
e
ra
ti
n
g
 P
ro
c
e
d
u
re
s
 
E
m
e
rg
e
n
c
y
 
P
ro
c
e
d
u
re
s
P
e
rm
it
s
 t
o
 W
o
rk
S
a
fe
ty
 M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t 
S
y
s
te
m
s
M
a
in
ta
in
in
g
 D
e
s
ig
n
 
In
te
n
t
P
ro
d
u
c
t 
S
a
fe
ty
 H
a
z
a
rd
s
F
in
a
n
c
e
6
00001 D lock - Drainage A - P079 6 6 6 7 5 6 7 7 6 7 5
00002 D lock - Drainage B - P080 6 6 6 7 5 6 7 7 6 7 5
00003 North Pump - P090 6 6 6 7 5 5 7 7 6 7 5
00004 D Lock South - Pumping door - P077 6 6 6 7 5 6 7 7 6 7 5
00005 D Lock South - Pumping door - P078 6 6 6 7 5 6 7 7 6 7 5
00006 D lock SW - leveller to Harbour - P068 6 6 6 7 5 6 7 7 6 7 5
00007 D lock SW -  leveller to Harbour - P069 6 6 6 7 5 6 7 7 6 7 5
00008 D lock - leveller - P075 6 6 6 7 5 6 7 7 6 7 5
00009 D lock -  leveller to 3 Basin - P076 6 6 6 7 5 6 7 7 6 7 5
00010 D Lock West caisson 7 7 8 8 5 6 7 8 8 7 9
00011 Lock grooves structure 8 8 6 9 9 9 9 7 6 7 6
00012 D Lock East caisson 8 9 9 8 7 6 7 8 8 7 5
00013 Lock wall structure 8 8 6 9 9 9 9 7 6 7 6
00014 Drainage system failure 6
00015 Penstock leveller failure 6
00016 D Lock catastrophic caisson failure 7
00017 D Lock catastrophic structural failure 8
00018 D Lock catastrophic flooding 6
 Equates to MIN(E38,E39,E40)
 Reflects E41 (planned for use in Dockyard wide warning system)
 Equates to MIN(E42,E43)
Assets/Events
D Lock catastrophic failure  Equates to MIN(E44,E45,E46)
 Equates to MIN(((E29+E30)/2),E31,((E32+E33)/2))
 Equates to MIN(((E34+E35)/2),(MIN(E36,E37)))
D Lock 
Catastrophic 
Failure
OR
Lock Structural 
Failure
Caisson Failure
Lock Drainage/
Levelling System 
Failure
OR OR OR
&
OR
D Lock
South
Pumping door
P078
00005
D Lock 
South
Pumping door
P077
00004
North Pump
P090
00003
Drainage 
System 
Failure
00014
D lock
SW leveller
to Harbour P069
00007
D lock
SW leveller
to Harbour P068
00006
D lock
leveller to 3 Basin
P076
00009
D lock
Leveller
P075
00008
OR
OR
Penstock 
Leveller 
Failure
00015
&&
D lock
Drainage B
P080
00002
D lock 
Drainage A
P079
00001
D Lock 
Catastrophic 
Flooding 
00018
D Lock 
Catastrophic 
Caisson 
Failure
00016
D Lock 
Catastrophic 
Structural 
Failure
00017
D Lock 
West Caisson 
00010
Lock 
Wall Structure 
00013
D Lock
 East Caisson 
00012
Lock 
Groove(s) 
Structural
00011
  
 
267 
B.8  Week 8 
  
ID 
Number S
ta
te
P
la
n
t 
C
h
a
n
g
e
In
s
p
e
c
ti
o
n
s
 a
n
d
 
M
a
in
te
n
a
n
c
e
S
ta
ff
 C
o
m
p
e
te
n
c
e
O
p
e
ra
ti
n
g
 P
ro
c
e
d
u
re
s
 
E
m
e
rg
e
n
c
y
 
P
ro
c
e
d
u
re
s
P
e
rm
it
s
 t
o
 W
o
rk
S
a
fe
ty
 M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t 
S
y
s
te
m
s
M
a
in
ta
in
in
g
 D
e
s
ig
n
 
In
te
n
t
P
ro
d
u
c
t 
S
a
fe
ty
 H
a
z
a
rd
s
F
in
a
n
c
e
7
00001 D lock - Drainage A - P079 7 6 6 7 7 6 7 7 6 7 5
00002 D lock - Drainage B - P080 7 6 6 7 7 6 7 7 6 7 5
00003 North Pump - P090 7 6 6 7 7 5 7 7 6 7 5
00004 D Lock South - Pumping door - P077 7 6 6 7 7 6 7 7 6 7 5
00005 D Lock South - Pumping door - P078 7 6 6 7 7 6 7 7 6 7 5
00006 D lock SW - leveller to Harbour - P068 7 6 6 7 7 6 7 7 6 7 5
00007 D lock SW -  leveller to Harbour - P069 7 6 6 7 7 6 7 7 6 7 5
00008 D lock - leveller - P075 7 6 6 7 7 6 7 7 6 7 5
00009 D lock -  leveller to 3 Basin - P076 7 6 6 7 7 6 7 7 6 7 5
00010 D Lock West caisson 7 7 8 8 5 6 7 8 8 7 9
00011 Lock grooves structure 8 8 6 9 9 9 9 7 6 7 6
00012 D Lock East caisson 8 9 9 8 7 6 7 8 8 7 5
00013 Lock wall structure 8 8 6 9 9 9 9 7 6 7 6
00014 Drainage system failure 7
00015 Penstock leveller failure 7
00016 D Lock catastrophic caisson failure 7
00017 D Lock catastrophic structural failure 8
00018 D Lock catastrophic flooding 7
 Equates to MIN(E38,E39,E40)
 Reflects E41 (planned for use in Dockyard wide warning system)
 Equates to MIN(E42,E43)
Assets/Events
D Lock catastrophic failure  Equates to MIN(E44,E45,E46)
 Equates to MIN(((E29+E30)/2),E31,((E32+E33)/2))
 Equates to MIN(((E34+E35)/2),(MIN(E36,E37)))
D Lock 
Catastrophic 
Failure
OR
Lock Structural 
Failure
Caisson Failure
Lock Drainage/
Levelling System 
Failure
OR OR OR
&
OR
D Lock
South
Pumping door
P078
00005
D Lock 
South
Pumping door
P077
00004
North Pump
P090
00003
Drainage 
System 
Failure
00014
D lock
SW leveller
to Harbour P069
00007
D lock
SW leveller
to Harbour P068
00006
D lock
leveller to 3 Basin
P076
00009
D lock
Leveller
P075
00008
OR
OR
Penstock 
Leveller 
Failure
00015
&&
D lock
Drainage B
P080
00002
D lock 
Drainage A
P079
00001
D Lock 
Catastrophic 
Flooding 
00018
D Lock 
Catastrophic 
Caisson 
Failure
00016
D Lock 
Catastrophic 
Structural 
Failure
00017
D Lock 
West Caisson 
00010
Lock 
Wall Structure 
00013
D Lock
 East Caisson 
00012
Lock 
Groove(s) 
Structural
00011
  
 
268 
B.9  Week 9 
  
ID 
Number S
ta
te
P
la
n
t 
C
h
a
n
g
e
In
s
p
e
c
ti
o
n
s
 a
n
d
 
M
a
in
te
n
a
n
c
e
S
ta
ff
 C
o
m
p
e
te
n
c
e
O
p
e
ra
ti
n
g
 P
ro
c
e
d
u
re
s
 
E
m
e
rg
e
n
c
y
 
P
ro
c
e
d
u
re
s
P
e
rm
it
s
 t
o
 W
o
rk
S
a
fe
ty
 M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t 
S
y
s
te
m
s
M
a
in
ta
in
in
g
 D
e
s
ig
n
 
In
te
n
t
P
ro
d
u
c
t 
S
a
fe
ty
 H
a
z
a
rd
s
F
in
a
n
c
e
7
00001 D lock - Drainage A - P079 7 6 6 7 9 6 7 7 6 7 5
00002 D lock - Drainage B - P080 7 6 6 7 9 6 7 7 6 7 5
00003 North Pump - P090 7 6 6 7 9 6 7 7 6 7 5
00004 D Lock South - Pumping door - P077 7 6 6 7 9 6 7 7 6 7 5
00005 D Lock South - Pumping door - P078 7 6 6 7 9 6 7 7 6 7 5
00006 D lock SW - leveller to Harbour - P068 7 6 6 7 9 6 7 7 6 7 5
00007 D lock SW -  leveller to Harbour - P069 7 6 6 7 9 6 7 7 6 7 5
00008 D lock - leveller - P075 7 6 6 7 9 6 7 7 6 7 5
00009 D lock -  leveller to 3 Basin - P076 7 6 6 7 9 6 7 7 6 7 5
00010 D Lock West caisson 7 7 8 8 5 6 7 8 8 7 9
00011 Lock grooves structure 8 8 6 9 9 9 9 7 6 7 6
00012 D Lock East caisson 8 9 9 8 7 6 7 8 8 7 5
00013 Lock wall structure 8 8 6 9 9 9 9 7 6 7 6
00014 Drainage system failure 7
00015 Penstock leveller failure 7
00016 D Lock catastrophic caisson failure 7
00017 D Lock catastrophic structural failure 8
00018 D Lock catastrophic flooding 7
 Equates to MIN(E38,E39,E40)
 Reflects E41 (planned for use in Dockyard wide warning system)
 Equates to MIN(E42,E43)
Assets/Events
D Lock catastrophic failure  Equates to MIN(E44,E45,E46)
 Equates to MIN(((E29+E30)/2),E31,((E32+E33)/2))
 Equates to MIN(((E34+E35)/2),(MIN(E36,E37)))
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West Caisson 
00010
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Wall Structure 
00013
D Lock
 East Caisson 
00012
Lock 
Groove(s) 
Structural
00011
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B.10  Week 10         
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7
00001 D lock - Drainage A - P079 7 6 6 7 9 6 7 7 6 7 5
00002 D lock - Drainage B - P080 7 6 6 7 9 6 7 7 6 7 5
00003 North Pump - P090 7 6 6 7 9 6 7 7 6 7 5
00004 D Lock South - Pumping door - P077 7 6 6 7 9 6 7 7 6 7 5
00005 D Lock South - Pumping door - P078 7 6 6 7 9 6 7 7 6 7 5
00006 D lock SW - leveller to Harbour - P068 7 6 6 7 9 6 7 7 6 7 5
00007 D lock SW -  leveller to Harbour - P069 7 6 6 7 9 6 7 7 6 7 5
00008 D lock - leveller - P075 7 6 6 7 9 6 7 7 6 7 5
00009 D lock -  leveller to 3 Basin - P076 7 6 6 7 9 6 7 7 6 7 5
00010 D Lock West caisson 7 7 8 8 5 6 7 8 8 7 9
00011 Lock grooves structure 8 8 6 9 9 9 9 7 6 7 6
00012 D Lock East caisson 8 9 9 8 7 6 7 8 8 7 5
00013 Lock wall structure 8 8 6 9 9 9 9 7 6 7 6
00014 Drainage system failure 7
00015 Penstock leveller failure 7
00016 D Lock catastrophic caisson failure 7
00017 D Lock catastrophic structural failure 8
00018 D Lock catastrophic flooding 7
 Equates to MIN(E38,E39,E40)
 Reflects E41 (planned for use in Dockyard wide warning system)
 Equates to MIN(E42,E43)
Assets/Events
D Lock catastrophic failure  Equates to MIN(E44,E45,E46)
 Equates to MIN(((E29+E30)/2),E31,((E32+E33)/2))
 Equates to MIN(((E34+E35)/2),(MIN(E36,E37)))
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00011
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Annex C – Trait Scoring Criteria 
  RAG Plant Change 
G
o
o
d
 9 Asset fully functioning, fit for purpose and formally accepted into service. 
8 Asset fully functioning and fit for purpose, no formal acceptance. 
7 Asset fully functioning and presumed fit for purpose. 
W
ar
n
in
g 6 Asset fully functioning but unknown design state. 
5 Asset functioning but evidence of design changes made without CE sign off. 
4 Asset reduced functionality and unknown design state. 
Fa
il 
3 Asset susceptible to repeated failures. 
2 Asset in restricted use due to unknown state. 
1 Asset in restricted use due to unknown state and multiple failures. 
0 Assets under permanent quarantine. 
 
 RAG Inspections & Maintenance 
G
o
o
d
 9 Surveys, inspections & maintenance assessed as suitable and in date. 
8 Surveys, inspections & maintenance up to date. 
7 Maintenance up to date, surveys & inspections overdue, no additional actions. 
W
ar
n
in
g 6 Maintenance up to date, surveys & inspections overdue, actions agreed via Engineering Decision (ED). 
5 Safety critical maintenance overdue to be agreed via (ED). 
4 Safety critical maintenance, surveys & inspections overdue to be agreed via (ED). 
Fa
il 
3 Safety critical maintenance, surveys & inspections overdue – quarantined via (ED). 
2 Safety critical maintenance overdue – quarantined via (ED). 
1 Safety critical maintenance, surveys & inspections overdue – quarantined via (ED). 
0 Safety critical maintenance, surveys & inspections overdue – long term quarantined via (ED). 
 
 RAG Staff Competence 
G
o
o
d
 9 Fully resourced, task fully understood, all Suitably Qualified & Experienced Personnel (SQEP). 
8 Fully resourced, task fully understood, mostly SQEP. 
7 Fully resourced, task fully understood, minimum SQEP. 
W
ar
n
in
g 6 Adequate resource, task not fully understood, all SQEP. 
5 Adequate resource, task not fully understood, mostly SQEP. 
4 Adequate resource task not fully understood, minimum SQEP. 
Fa
il 
3 Minimum resource, need to apply Hazard Identification (HAZID) process to task, all SQEP. 
2 Minimum resource, need to HAZID task, mostly SQEP. 
1 Under resourced, need to HAZID task, minimum SQEP. 
0 Under resourced, need to HAZID task, no SQEP. 
 
 RAG Operating Procedures 
G
o
o
d
 9 Procedures in place and in date – fully audited. 
8 Procedures in place and in date – partially audited. 
7 Procedures in place and in date – not audited. 
W
ar
n
in
g 6 Minor Quality Assurance (QA) and Engineering Governance non-conformances (NCs). 
5 Only Important Procedures covered by Process Instructions (PIs). 
4 Only Some Procedures covered by PIs. 
Fa
il 
3 Still covered by old style procedures that have not been checked whether still applicable. 
2 Processes covered by old irrelevant procedures. 
1 Processes not covered by procedures. 
0 Major Quality Assurance & Engineering Governance Non-conformances. 
 
 RAG Emergency Procedures 
G
o
o
d
 9 
Emergency procedures cover all asset operations, relevant communications, regularly tested and audited, 
or Emergency Procedures not required. 
8 
Emergency procedures cover all asset operations, relevant communications and regularly tested, or 
Emergency Procedures not required. 
7 Emergency procedures cover all asset operations and relevant communications. 
W
ar
n
in
g 6 Limited practised emergency procedures in place, partially reduced operations (ED). 
5 Limited practised emergency procedures in place, reduced operations (ED). 
4 Limited practised emergency procedures in place, reduced operations with additional mitigation (ED). 
Fa
il 
3 Limited unpractised emergency procedures in place, restricted operations (ED). 
2 Limited unpractised emergency procedures in place, severely restricted operations (ED). 
1 No Emergency procedures in place, operations with additional mitigation, under special consent only (ED). 
0 No Emergency procedures in place, operations ceased until further notice (ED). 
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 RAG Permits to Work 
G
o
o
d
 9 
All Permit to Work (PTW) systems, Authorised Persons (APs) and Competent Persons (CPs) in place and fully 
audited by Authorising Engineer (AE) in accordance with (iaw) JSP 375, or PTW not applicable for this Asset. 
8 All PTW systems, APs and CPs in place and key areas audited by AE iaw JSP 375. 
7 All essential PTW systems, APs and CPs in place and key areas audited by AE iaw JSP 375. 
W
ar
n
in
g 6 All essential PTW systems, APs and CPs in place and audited locally iaw JSP 375. 
5 All essential PTW systems, APs and CPs in place, with restrictions (ED). 
4 
Defence Infrastructure Organisation (DIO) issued Operational Restrictions in place, reduced capability 
captured (ED). 
Fa
il 
3 
Significant lack of qualified and assessed APs and CPs, PTW systems not able to cope with demand. 
Restrictions in place (ED). 
2 
Significant lack of qualified and assessed APs and CPs, PTW systems not able to cope with demand. 
Quarantines and restrictions in place (ED). 
1 
Major operational restrictions in place due to lack of assessed APs and CPs. Significant restrictions in place 
(ED). 
0 No AP/CP org, in contravention of Regs/Acts/JSP 375. 
 
 RAG Safety Management Systems 
G
o
o
d
 
9 
All Safety Management Systems (SMS) in place, reflected in relevant Processes, fully audited by an 
Independent Authority and no identified non-conformances, or Safety Management Systems not required 
for this Asset. 
8 
All SMS in place, reflected in relevant Processes, fully audited by an Independent Authority with only minor 
non-conformances. 
7 
All SMS in place, reflected in relevant Processes, fully audited by an Independent Authority with only minor 
overdue non-conformances. 
W
ar
n
in
g 
6 
Majority of SMS in place, some processes requiring update, partially audited by an Independent Authority, 
or Major non-conformances that do not adversely affect operations, managed through mitigation (ED). 
5 
Majority of SMS in place, some processes requiring update, partially audited by an Independent Authority, 
or Major non-conformances that reduce the efficiency of operations, managed through mitigation (ED). 
4 
Majority of SMS in place, some processes requiring update, partially audited by an Independent Authority, 
or Major non-conformances that reduce the operational capability but managed through mitigation (ED). 
Fa
il 
3 
Significant SMS issues, major processes requiring update, partially audited by an Independent Authority, or 
Major non-conformances that severely reduce the operational capability, quarantined (ED). 
2 Important SMS missing or incomplete, or Major SMS non-conformances. 
1 Major SMS non-conformances or HSE Improvement Notice. 
0 Major SMS non-conformances or HSE Prohibition Notice. 
 
 RAG Maintaining Design Intent 
G
o
o
d
 
9 
Asset fulfils current legal and operational requirement, and strategic plans in place to update design to fulfil 
future (20yrs+) planned operational requirement.  All design information systematically managed on a 
central database and fully audited. 
8 
Asset fulfils current legal and operational requirement, and strategic plans in place to update design to fulfil 
future (5yrs+) planned operational requirement. All design information individually managed on a multiple 
databases and fully audited. 
7 
Asset fulfils current legal and operational requirement. All design information individually managed on 
multiple databases and fully audited. 
W
ar
n
in
g 
6 
Asset fulfils current legal and operational requirement.   All design information individually held on multiple 
databases, not audited. 
5 
Asset does not totally fulfil current legal and/or operational requirement, concessions in place (ED).  Design 
information held in personal files and folders. 
4 
Asset does not totally fulfil current legal and/or operational requirement, concessions in place that may 
marginally reduce operational capability (ED). Design information held by individuals, not audited. 
Fa
il 
3 
Asset does not totally fulfil current legal and/or operational requirement, concessions in place that reduce 
operational capability (ED).  Design information held by individuals, not audited. 
2 
Asset does not fulfil current legal and/or operational requirement, concessions in place that reduce 
operational capability (ED).  Design information held by individuals, not audited. 
1 Asset does not fulfil operational requirement, asset quarantined (ED).  No design data held. 
0 Asset does not fulfil legal requirement, asset quarantined (ED).  No design data held. 
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 RAG Product Safety Hazards 
G
o
o
d
 9 No Product Safety (PS) issues. 
8 Minor PS issues and hazards that are managed by the Product Safety Working Group (PSWG). 
7 Minor PS issues – risk levels C and D (against MOD D-Ships risk matrix) – Managed by PSWG. 
W
ar
n
in
g 
6 Minor PS issues – risk levels B, C and D – Managed by Product Safety & Environmental Committee (PSEC). 
5 
Major PS issues – risk level B with short term Hazard Management Actions (HMAs) in place to reduce the 
level of risk, and/or remove the associated process - Managed by PSEC and Open Items (OI) reporting. 
4 
Major PS issues – risk level B with long term HMAs in place to reduce the level of risk, and/or remove the 
associated process - Managed by PSEC and OI reporting. 
Fa
il 
3 Major PS issues – risk level B with HMAs temporarily stopping process via quarantine (ED). 
2 
Major PS issues – risk level B with HMAs to permanently stop the process through quarantine (ED) and 
requirements for design change. 
1 Major PS issues – risk level A – Unmanaged. 
0 Unmanaged assets with unknown risks.  Full quarantine (ED). 
 
 RAG Finance 
G
o
o
d
 9 In year Forward Maintenance Plan (FMP), or finance not currently required for this Asset. 
8 Mod Capital funding approved. 
7 In FMR – funded. 
W
ar
n
in
g 6 In FMR – awaiting funding approval with MOD. 
5 On MOD 10 Year Strategic Plan, Statement of Need (SoN) in system, but not yet funded. 
4 Business case accepted. Formal SoN raised. 
Fa
il 
3 Business case raised. 
2 Business case proposed. 
1 Unlikely to get funding in MOD financial year. 
0 No plans to fund. 
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Annex D – Ethics Form 
 
FORM UPR16 
Research Ethics Review Checklist 
Please complete and return the form to Research Section, Quality Management 
Division, Academic Registry, University House, with your thesis, prior to 
examination 
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